

THE
WORKS
OF
J. J. ROUSSEAU.

Translated from the FRENCH.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOLUME the FOURTH.

EDINBURGH:
Printed for J. DICKSON and C. ELLIOT,
M.DCC.LXXIII.

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EDINBURGH:

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1824.

EMILIUS;
OR, A
TREATISE
OF
EDUCATION.

Translated from the FRENCH of
J. J. ROUSSEAU,
Citizen of GENEVA.

*Sanabilibus ægrotamus malis; ipsaque nos in rectum genitos-
natura, si emendari velimus, juvat. SEN. de Ira. l. ii. c. 13.*

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

EDINBURGH:
Printed for J. DICKSON and C. ELLIOT.
M.DCC.LXXIII.



T H E
P R E F A C E.

THE following collection of reflections and observations, thrown together almost without order or connection, was begun to please a good mother, who is herself capable of thinking. I at first only designed a tract of a few pages: but my subject proving involuntarily seductive, this treatise swelled insensibly into a kind of large work; too large, without doubt, for what it contains, but too little for the matter of which it treats. I was long in suspense about its publication; and, in composing it, was frequently made sensible, by my labour, of the difference between having written a few pamphlets, and being equal to the composition of a book. After many fruitless efforts to do better, I judged it my duty to give it to the public as it is, conceiving it of importance to turn their attention to this object; with regard to which, though my notions should be wrong,

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yet if I should thereby suggest right ones to others, I will not wholly lose my time. A man, who, from the obscurity of retirement, exposes his writings to the public, without partisans to defend, or puffers to recommend them; without even knowing what is either thought or said of them, need be under no fear, that, if he is mistaken, his errors will be adopted without examination.

I SHALL speak little of the importance of a good education, nor shall I take upon me to prove that that method, which now is in use, is a bad one: a thousand others have done so before me, and I do not incline to fill my book with things which all the world knows. I shall only observe, that, time out of mind, there has been a general outcry against the established practice, without any body's thinking it proper to propose a better. The learning and science of the present age tend rather to destroy than build up. To censure is magisterial; but to propose one, must assume another tone, less suited to philosophical arrogance. Notwithstanding the shoal of performances that have appeared, all calculated, as it is pretended,

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tended, to no other end but public utility, the most useful of all objects, the art of forming men, is still forgotten. My subject was wholly new after Mr Locke's treatise; and I am apprehensive it will be so still after mine.

WE are not sufficiently acquainted with a state of infancy; amidst the many mistaken ideas we entertain, the farther we proceed, the farther we wander from the point. The greatest sages apply themselves to those things which it concerns man to know, without considering what it is children are capable to learn. They are always seeking the man in the child, without reflecting what he is before he can be a man. It is to the study of this I have applied myself, to the end that, though my scheme should be found chimerical and false, yet one might profit by my observations. I may have taken a very bad view of what ought to be done; but I conceive I have taken a good one of the subject to be wrought upon. Begin then, ye preceptors, to study your pupils better; for most assuredly you are not acquainted with them. Now, if
you

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you read this book with that view, I flatter myself it will not be without advantage.

WITH regard to what may be called the systematical part of this treatise, which is nothing else but the progress of nature, this is what will most bewilder the reader: on this, therefore, I shall undoubtedly be attacked, and perhaps not without reason. He will believe, that in place of reading a treatise of education, he is entertained with the reveries of a visionary on the subject. What is to be done? I do not write from the ideas of others, but from my own. I do not see things altogether as other people; and have been long reproached on this account. But does it depend on me to give myself other eyes, or to be affected by other ideas? No. It is my fault if I am too vain of my own sentiments, if I believe myself alone to be wiser than all the rest of the world. It is not possible for me to change my sentiments, but to distrust them: this is all I can do, and this I have done. If I sometimes assume an affirmative tone, it is not with a view to impose on the reader, but only to tell him what I think. Why
should

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should I propose any thing in the form of a doubt, of which I have not the least doubt myself? I say exactly what passes in my own mind.

IN declaring my sentiments with freedom, I am so far from giving them as an authority, that I always subjoin my reasons, to the end that the reader may weigh them, and judge for himself. But, though I do not incline to be obstinate in the defence of my own notions, I think myself, however, not the less obliged to propose them; because the maxims, concerning which I am of a very different opinion from other people, are not unimportant. They are such whose truth or falsehood it is of consequence to know, and which constitute the happiness or misery of mankind.

“PROPOSE that which is practicable,” is incessantly repeated to me. This is just the same as if one should say, Propose what is really practised; or at least, Propose something good, not inconsistent with the present evil. Such a project, with respect to certain things, is much more chimerical than mine; for, by such a combination, the

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the good is spoiled, and the evil is not removed. I had rather follow the established practice entirely, than adopt a good one by halves: there would be less contradiction in man: it is not in his power to tend two opposite ways. Fathers and mothers, what is feasible only ye are willing to do. But ought I to comply with your inclination?

IN every sort of projects, there are two things to be considered; first, the absolute good of the scheme itself; and secondly, the facility of putting it in execution.

WITH regard to the first, it is sufficient, provided the scheme be admissible and practicable in itself, that its merit consists in the nature of the thing; in the present case, for instance, that the education proposed to be suited to man, and well adapted to the human heart.

THE second consideration depends on relations acquired in certain situations; relations accidental to the thing itself, of consequence not absolutely necessary, and capable of infinite diversity. Thus a scheme of education may be practicable in Switzerland,

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land, and not in France; another may be practicable among trades people; and a third among persons of distinction. The greater or less facility of execution depends on a thousand circumstances, which it is impossible to determine otherwise than by a particular application of the method, to such and such a country or condition. Now, all these particular applications not being essential to my subject, do not enter into my plan. Others may treat them as they please, each according to the country or rank he may have in view. It is sufficient for me, that wherever children are born, they may be formed into men, after the manner I propose; and having made them such, they are formed as well as possibly they can be, both for themselves and for others. If I do not fulfil my engagement, I am undoubtedly in the wrong; but if I do, it is wrong to require me to do more; for this is all I engage for.

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EMILIU S;

OR, A TREATISE OF

EDUCATION.

BOOK I.

ALL things are good as they came out of the hands of their Creator, but every thing degenerates in the hands of man. He compels one soil to nourish the productions of another, and one tree to bear the fruits of another. He blends and confounds elements, climates, and seasons: he mutilates his dogs, his horses, and his slaves: he defaces, he confounds every thing: he delights in deformity and monsters. He is not content with any thing in its natural state, not even with his own species. His very offspring must be trained up for him, like a horse in the ménage, and be taught to grow after his own fancy, like a tree in his garden.

VOL. I.

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Without this, matters would be still worse than they are, and our species would not be civilized but by halves. Should a man, in a state of society, be given up, from the cradle, to his own notions and conduct; he would certainly turn out the most preposterous of human beings. The influence of prejudice, authority, necessity, example, and of all those social institutions in which we are immersed, would stifle in him the emotions of nature, and substitute nothing in their place. His humanity would resemble a shrub, growing by accident in the high-way, which would soon be destroyed by the casual injuries it must receive from the frequent passenger.

It is to thee, the tender and provident mother *, I address myself, who art prudent enough

* The early part of education is that which concerns us most, and this part is incontestably the province of the females. If the Author of nature had designed it for the males, he would doubtless have furnished them with milk for the nourishment of their children. In every treatise on education, therefore, it is proper more peculiarly to address the women; and that, not only because they are better adapted both by nature and custom for this task, but also because they are more interested in the success of it. Widows are left generally, in a great degree, at the mercy of their children, when they sensibly feel the good or ill effects of the manner in which they educated them. The laws, calculated less for persons than property, because their object is peace and not virtue, have not given sufficient authority to mothers. Their relation, however, is more certain than that of fathers; their duties more painful and laborious, and the discharge of those duties more essential to the peace and good government of a family: nay, it is usual for them also to have a stronger attachment to their children. There are occasions, on which if a son should want the respect due to his father, he might be, in some measure, excused; but if, on any occasion whatever, a child should prove so unnatural as to forfeit his respect to a mother, to her who bore him in her womb, who nourish-

nough to leave the beaten road, and seekest to preserve this rising shrub from the shocks of human prejudice. Cultivate, water the young plant before it die; so shall its fruit be hereafter delicious to your taste. Erect an early fence around the disposition of your child: others may delineate its extent, but it remains with you only to raise the barrier.

Plants are formed by culture, and men by education. If a man should come into the world in full growth and vigour, his bulk and strength would be useless, till he should have learned how to exert them: they would be even prejudicial to him, as they would prevent others from thinking it needful to lend him any assistance*; and thus, left to himself, he would perish before he had discovered the objects of his wants. We lament the state of infancy, without reflecting

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nourished him with her milk, who, for whole years, gave up her own ease to contribute to his, who had no cares but for him; should not justice hasten to smother the infamous wretch, as a monster unworthy to breathe a moment longer? It is said, that mothers spoil their children. In this, without doubt, they are wrong; but, perhaps, less wrong than you who corrupt them. A mother is desirous that her child should be pleased and happy; she desires he should be so at the time; and so far she is right: if she be mistaken in the means of making him so, she should be better informed. The ambition, avarice, insolence, and mistaken foresight of fathers, their negligence and cruel insensibility, are an hundred times more destructive to children, than the blind fondness of mothers. It will be necessary, however, to explain the sense in which I use the term of mother; which is hereafter done.

* For, being in external appearance like themselves, ignorant of speech as well as destitute of those ideas it might express, he would be incapable to make them understand the need in which he stood of their assistance; nor would any thing in his appearance suggest it to the spectator.

ting that the human race must have been extinct, had not man been first a child.

We are born weak, we have need of help; we are born destitute of every thing, we stand in need of assistance; we are born stupid, we have need of understanding. All that we are not possessed of at our birth, and which we require when grown up, is bestowed on us by education.

This education we receive from nature, from men, or from circumstances. The constitutional exertion of our organs and faculties is the education of nature: the uses we are taught to make of that exertion, constitute the education given us by men; and in the acquisitions made by our own experience, on the objects that surround us, consists our education from circumstances.

We are formed, therefore, by three kinds of masters. The pupil, in whom the effects of their different lessons are contradictory, is badly educated, and can never be consistent with himself. He in whom they are perfectly consonant, and always tend to the same point, hath only attained the end of a complete education. His life and actions demonstrate this, and that he alone is well brought up.

Of these three different kinds of education, that of nature depends not on ourselves; and but in a certain degree that of circumstances: the third, which belongs to men, is that only we have in our power: and even of this we are masters only in imagination; for who can flatter himself, he will be able entirely to govern
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A TREATISE of EDUCATION 5

the discourse and actions of those who are about a child?

No sooner, then, doth education become an art, or profession, than it is almost impossible it should succeed, as the concurrent circumstances necessary to its success are not to be depended on. All that can be done, with our utmost solicitude, is to approach as near as possible the end we aim at, attributing it to good fortune if it be attained.

If it be asked, what is this end? it may be answered, that of nature, which has been already proved. For, since the concurrence of three kinds of education is necessary to its perfection, it is by that one, which is entirely independent of us, we must regulate the two others. But perhaps this word, *Nature*, may appear vague and equivocal; let us therefore endeavour to give it a precise and determinate meaning.

Nature, it has been said, is only habit. But to what purpose is this said? Are there not habits, which are contracted only upon compulsion, and which can never suppress the tendency of nature? Such is, for example, the habitual growth of plants, restrained from pursuing their vertical direction. Take off the restraint, and it is true, they preserve the inclination they have been compelled to take: but, you will find, the rise of the sap has not on that account changed its primitive direction; if the plant continues to vegetate, its future growth becomes still upwards.

It is the same with the inclinations and dispositions of mankind. While we remain in exactly the same situation in which they were acquired,

red, we may retain even the most unnatural habits; but as soon as circumstances change, the force of habit ceases, and that of nature exerts itself. Education itself is certainly nothing but habit: but are there not persons in whom the impressions they received in education are effaced? Are there not others, again, that retain them? Whence arises this difference? If it be pretended that by nature is only meant habits conformable to nature, the position itself is unmeaning and absurd.

We are born capable of sensibility, and from our birth are variously affected by the different objects that surround us. We no sooner acquire, if I may so express myself, a consciousness of our sensations, than we are disposed to avoid or pursue the objects producing them; in proportion as they are at first sight agreeable or displeasing: we next learn to approve or dislike them, according to the convenient or inconvenient relation that subsists between ourselves and such objects, and lastly according to the judgment we form of their consistency with those ideas which reason gives us of happiness or perfection. These dispositions extend and confirm themselves, in proportion as we become more susceptible and enlightened! But, subject to the restraint of custom, they are more or less diversified by our opinions. Before they have taken this tincture of habit, they are what I call the dispositions of our nature.

It is to these original dispositions, therefore, we should on every occasion recur. This might also be effected, if our three kinds of education were merely different: but what can be done, when

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when they are directly opposite, and totally contradictory? when, instead of educating a man for himself, he must be educated for others? Their concurrent action is here destroyed; reduced to the dilemma of acting in opposition to nature, or to the institutions of society, we must chuse either to form the man or the citizen; for to do both at once is impossible.

Every particular society, when it is confined, and its members well united, alienates itself from the general one of mankind. A true patriot is inhospitable to foreigners: they are mere men, and appear to have no relation to him. This inconvenience is inevitable, but it is not great. The most essential point is a man's being beneficent and useful to those among whom he lives. The inhabitants of Sparta, when abroad, were ambitious, covetous, and unjust; but disinterestedness, equity, and concord, reigned within their walls. Be ever mistrustful of those cosmopolites, who deduce from books the far-fetched and extensive obligations of universal benevolence, while they neglect to discharge their actual duties towards those who are about them. A philosopher of this stamp affects to have a regard for the Tartars, by way of excuse for his having none for his neighbours. Natural man is every thing with him: he is a numerical unit, an absolute integer, that bears no relation but to himself or his species. Civilized man is only a relative unit, the numerator of a fraction, that depends on its denominator, and whose value consists in its relation to the integral body of society. The best political institutions are those which are best calculated to divest

vest mankind of their natural inclinations, to deprive them of an absolute, by giving them a relative existence, and incorporating distinct individuals in one common whole. A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a Roman; nay, he even loved his country, exclusive of its relation to himself. Regulus pretended himself a Carthaginian, as being become the property of his masters. In that character he refused to take his seat in the Roman senate, till a Carthaginian commanded him. He was filled with indignation at the remonstrances made to save his life, and returned triumphant to perish in the midst of tortures. This appears to me, indeed, to have but little relation to men with whom we are at present acquainted.

The Lacedæmonian, Pædaretes, who, presenting himself for admission into the council of the three hundred, was rejected, returned home, rejoicing that there were to be found in Sparta three hundred better men than himself. Supposing the demonstrations of his joy sincere, as there is room to believe they were, this man was a true citizen.

A woman of Sparta, having five sons in the army, and being in hourly expectation to hear of a battle, a messenger at length arrived, of whom she, trembling, asked the news. Your five sons, said he, are killed — “Vile slave, who asked you of my sons?” — But we have gained the victory, continued he. This was enough; the heroic mother ran to the temple, and gave thanks to the gods. This woman was a true citizen.

Those who would have man, in the bosom of society

society, retain the primitive sentiments of nature, know not what they want. Ever contradicting himself, and wavering between his duty and inclination, he would neither be the man nor the citizen; he would be good for nothing either to himself or to others. Like men of the present times, the Englishman, the Frenchman, the citizen, he would be in reality nothing at all.

To be something, to be consistent with one's self, and always the same individual, our words and actions should agree; we should be always determined in that part we ought to take; we should take it with an high hand, and persevere. If such a prodigy could be found, we might then know whether he be a man or a citizen, or how he can so manage as to be at once both the one and the other.

From these objects, which are necessarily opposed to each other, arise two contrary forms of institution; the one public and general, the other domestic and particular.

In order to form an idea of public education, read the republic of Plato. It is not a system of politics, as is generally imagined by those who judge of books only by their titles; but the finest treatise on education that ever was written.

It is customary, in alluding to any thing extremely chimerical, to mention the institution of Plato. Had Lycurgus laid down his system only in writing, I should have thought it a much greater chimera. Plato hath only refined the human heart; Lycurgus divested it of its native humanity.

The public institution exists not, nor can it exist,

exist, any longer; for where there is no country, there can be no citizens. Those two words, *country* and *citizen*, ought no longer to find a place in modern languages. I could give my reasons for it; which, however, I omit, as not immediately relative to my subject.

It must be observed, I do not esteem, as public institutions, those ridiculous establishments that go by the name of Universities *. I regard just as little the education acquired by an intercourse with the world, because that experience, aiming at two contrary ends, falls short of both. It is only calculated to make men deceitful, appearing always to interest themselves in the good of others, and being never interested in any thing but what relates to their own. As these pretensions are also become general, there is no one deceived by them; so that it is only so much pains thrown away.

From these contradictions arises that which we constantly experience in ourselves. Impelled by nature and custom contrary ways, and forced to yield in a degree to both impulses, we take a route in the mean direction of both, that leads us neither to the end of one or the other. Thus held in suspense, and wavering, during the whole course of our lives, we end our days without being able to render ourselves consistent, and

* There are, indeed, professors, both in the academy of Geneva and in the university of Paris, for whom I have the greatest love and esteem, and think them very capable of instructing youth were they not tied down to established customs. I would advise one of them to publish the project he has formed of a reformation therein. Perhaps an attempt may, some time or other, be made to remove the evil, when it is seen to be not without remedy.

I. *A TREATISE of EDUCATION.* II

and without ever being good for any thing to ourselves or others.

There remains then only a private education, or that of nature. But of what use to others, it may be said, would a man be, educated only for himself? Perhaps, if the twofold object proposed could be reduced to a single one, in taking from man his contradictory motives of action, we should remove a great obstacle to his happiness. To judge of this, we should see him quite formed; should have observed his inclinations and propensities, have traced their progress, and attended them throughout; in a word, we should be made acquainted with the natural man. I flatter myself the reader will have made some advance in these researches, after having perused this treatise.

In order to form this extraordinary man, let us consider first what we have to do. Much, doubtless, depends on preventing any thing from being done. When the wind only is against us, we have nothing to do but steer close and shape our course to windward: but in a strong current, if we would not lose ground, we must drop anchor. Take care, young pilot, that your cable does not veer, and your ship drive, before you are aware.

According to the order of society, in which the respective places of individuals are fixed, every one ought to be educated for that which he is to fill. A man formed for one place, if taken out of it, would be fit for no other, and consequently good for nothing. In this state, education is useful only as fortune seconds the intentions of parents; in every other case it would

would be hurtful to the pupil, were it only on account of the prejudices it might instil. In Egypt, where the son was obliged to follow the occupation or profession of his father, education had at least a determinate end; but among us, where rank and profession are only permanent, and persons continually changing; a father would not know whether, in bringing up his child to his own profession, he might be doing him good or ill.

According to the order of nature, all men being equal, their common vocation is the profession of humanity; and whoever is well educated to discharge the duties of a man, cannot be badly prepared to fill up any of those offices that have a relation to him. It matters little to me, whether my pupil be designed for the army, the bar, or the pulpit. Nature has destined us to the offices of human life, antecedent to the destination of our parents concerning the part we are to act in society. To live is the profession I would teach him. When I have done with him, it is true, he will be neither a lawyer, a soldier, nor a divine. Let him first be a man; he will on occasion as soon become any thing else, that a man ought to be, as any other person whatever. Fortune may remove him from one rank to another as she pleases, he will be always found in his place. *Occupavite, fortuna, atque cepi: omnesque aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad me aspirare non posses* *.

Our chief study is that of human life; the good and evil of which he that is best able to support, is, in my opinion, the best educated; and

* Tuscul. V.

and hence it follows that true education consists less in precept than action. We begin to instruct ourselves as we begin to live; our education commencing with our being, and our first preceptor the nurse. Thus the word *education* had, among the ancients, a different signification to that which is now given it; being used to express simply nutriment. *Educit obstetrix*, says Varro, *educat nutrix, instituit pædagogus, docet magister*. According to this distinction, education, institution, and instruction, are three things as different, as the nurse, the preceptor, and the master. But these distinctions not being well understood, a child, in order to be well conducted, should follow but one guide.

We must therefore generalize our views, and consider our pupil as man in the abstract; as exposed to all the various accidents of human life. If men were born inseparably attached to the soil of one country, if one season lasted the whole year, if individuals were incapable of changing their situation in life, the customs already established would be in some respects commendable; a child brought up to, and never removed from one certain station, would not be exposed to the inconveniences of another. But, considering the instability of human affairs, with that restless and bustling spirit of the age which turns every thing upside down in every new generation; can any method of education be more absurd than that of bringing up a child, as if he were never to set his foot out of his nursery, or was to be perpetually surrounded by attendants? If the helpless creature makes but one slip on the ground, or descends one step of the stairs,

he is infallibly ruined. It is not enough to teach him to bear pain, he should be inured to the sense of it.

In general, little more is thought of in the education of a child, than to preserve his being: this is not enough: he ought to learn how to preserve himself when he is grown up to manhood; to support the shocks of fortune, to bear riches or poverty; and to live, if occasion require, either amidst mountains of ice in Greenland, or on the burning rocks of Malta. You may take what precaution you will to preserve his life; he must inevitably die; and though his death may not be justly charged to your solicitude, your pains will be in a great measure thrown away. It is less needful to preserve your child from death, than to teach him how to live. To live is not merely to breathe; it is to act, to make a proper use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, and of all those parts of the human frame which contribute to the consciousness of our existence. The man who has lived most, is not he who hath survived the greatest number of years, but he who has experienced most of life. A man may be buried at an hundred years of age, who died in his cradle. Such a one would have been a gainer by dying young, at least if he had lived, in our sense of the word, till the time of his decease.

All our wisdom consists in servile prejudice; all our customs are nothing but subjection; confinement, and restraint. Civilized man is born, lives, and dies in slavery: at his birth he is bound up in swaddling-cloaths, and at his death nailed down in his coffin. As long as he wears the
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the appearance of the human form, he is confined by our institutions. It is said some midwives pretend, in moulding the heads of newborn infants, to give them a more proper form; and their pretensions are admitted. Strange infatuation! Our heads are very ill constructed by the Author of our being; we are therefore to have them new-modelled on the outside by the midwives, and within by the philosophers. The Caribbeans are a much happier people.

“ With us, an infant no sooner leaves the
 “ womb of its mother, and has hardly enjoyed
 “ the liberty of moving and stretching its limbs,
 “ than it is clapped again into confinement.
 “ It is swathed, its head fixed, its legs stretch-
 “ ed out at full length, and its arms placed
 “ straight down by the side of its body. In this
 “ manner it is bound tight with cloaths and
 “ bandages, so that it cannot stir a limb: in-
 “ deed it is fortunate if the poor thing be not
 “ so muffled up as to be unable to breathe, or
 “ if so much precaution be taken as to lay it on
 “ its side, in order that the fluid excretions
 “ voided at the mouth may descend of them-
 “ selves; for the helpless infant is not at liber-
 “ ty to turn its head to facilitate their dis-
 “ charge *.”

A new-born infant requires to be at liberty to move and stretch its limbs, to shake off that numbness in which, moulded together in a heap, they have remained so long. They are stretched out, it is true, but they are prevented from moving: even the head itself is rendered im-

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* Buffon, hist. nat. t. 4. p. 190, 12^{mo}.

moveable by stay-bands: so that one would imagine the nurses were afraid the poor creature should have the appearance of being alive.

Hence the impulsive force of those internal parts of the body disposed to increase, finds an unsurmountable obstacle to the movements required to accelerate their growth. The infant is continually making fruitless efforts, which waste its powers or retard their progress. More compressed, more confined, and less at ease in its swaddling-cloaths than in its mother's womb, I see not what it has gained by its birth.

This state of inaction, and constraint, in which the limbs of infants are confined, cannot fail to prevent the free circulation of the blood and secretion of the humours, to hinder the child's growth and strength, and alter his natural constitution. In countries where no such extravagant precautions are taken, the people are tall, robust, and well-proportioned: whereas, on the contrary, those where infants are thus treated, swarm with hunch-backed, crooked-legged, lame, rickety, and deformed persons of every kind. Lest their bodies should not grow distorted from their being at liberty to move freely, we are always in haste to distort them effectually by putting them into a press. We voluntarily deprive them of the use of their limbs, for fear they should by accident hurt or maim themselves.

May not such a cruel restraint have an effect upon their disposition, as well as their temperament? Their first sensations are those of uneasiness and pain; they find an obstacle opposed to every

every motion they are inclined to; more unhappy than a criminal in chains, they are continually making vain efforts, till their patience is exhausted, and they vent their anxiety in cries.

Do you say the first language of children is tears? I believe it: you thwart them from their birth: the first presents you bestow on them are chains; the first treatment they receive at your hands, is torture. Their voice being all that is left them free, is it a wonder they should make use of it to vent their complaints? They cry because you hurt them; and, I doubt not, if you were bound and bolstered up in the same manner, but you would cry still louder than they.

Whence comes this irrational, this unnatural custom? Ever since mothers have taken upon them to despise their principal obligation, and give up the nursing of their own children, it has been necessary to commit them to the care of women hired for that purpose; who, thus become the temporary mothers of children in whose favour nature is silent, have studied only to save themselves trouble. An infant whose arms and legs are at liberty, must be continually watched; but when it is fast bound, it may be thrown into any corner, without troubling yourself about its cries. Provided there are no other proofs of the nurse's negligence, if the child break not a leg or an arm, what signifies it to her whether it die, or remain a cripple the rest of its life? its limbs are preserved at the expence of its whole body, and, whatever may happen, the nurse is excused.

Do these polite mothers, who, disengaged from the trouble of children, indulge themselves

in the amusements of the town, know the treatment their harmless infants may, at the same time, receive in the country? How often is the little innocent, when its nurse is in the least hurry, hung up on a peg, like a bundle of clouts, there to remain crucified, till other business be leisurely dispatched! Such children as have been found in this situation, have been observed to be always black in the face; the stomach being violently compressed, preventing the circulation of the blood, and forcing it into the head: in the mean while the poor little creatures were supposed to be very patient, because they had not the power to cry. I know not precisely how long a child may remain alive in such a situation, but I imagine it cannot be a great while. This, however, I think, is one of the greatest conveniences of swaddling-cloaths.

It is pretended that children unswathed would be subject to various accidents from their restlessness, destructive to the perfect conformation of their limbs. This is one of the futile arguments of our false reasoning, and which has never been confirmed by experience. Of the multitude of children that, among people more rational than we, are nursed without laying any restraint on the motion of their limbs, we shall not find one that wounds or maims itself: they are incapable of moving with sufficient force to hurt themselves; and, if their limbs ever get into a wrong situation, the uneasiness they feel soon induces them to change it.

We have not as yet taken into our heads to swathe puppies or kittens; do we see any great inconvenience those animals labour under from
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our negligence? Infants, you will say, are not so alert: I grant it; but if they are more heavy, they are also proportionably feeble. They are hardly able to move, much less to maim themselves: nay, if you lay them on their back, they must perish in that position, like the tortoise, not having the power to turn themselves.

Not content with having ceased to suckle their children, the women of these times have acquired a reluctance to their production: indeed the one is a natural consequence of the other. No sooner does the situation of being a mother become burdensome, than means are presently found to get rid of it entirely: a fruitless beginning only is aimed at, that it may be continually repeated: and thus the attraction which nature designed should promote the multiplication of our species, operates to its destruction. This practice, added to the other causes of depopulation, forebodes the approaching fate of Europe. The sciences, arts, philosophy, and manners it gives birth to, will not fail to reduce it ere long to a desert. It will be peopled only by wild beasts; and in this will not have greatly changed its inhabitants.

I have frequently observed the little artifices of some new married women, who affect to be thought desirous of nursing their own children; and perceive they know very well how to get themselves solicited to give up that point. I have observed how artfully the husband, the physician, and particularly the mother, has been brought to interfere. A husband that would dare to consent that his wife should nurse her child, would be esteemed an abandoned wretch;
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an assassin that wanted to get rid of her. Ye prudent husbands, sacrifice, therefore, your paternal affection to domestic quiet; thinking yourselves happy that there are to be found, in the country, wives more continent than your own. And still more happy may you be deemed, if the time which yours gain by these means, is not bestowed on others as well as on yourselves.

The duties of women are by no means equivocal: but it is disputed whether, under their present contempt for them, it may not be the same thing to a child, if it be nourished by the milk of its mother or of any other person? This question should be determined by the physicians, who generally resolve it as the women would have them: and, indeed, I really think it may be better for a child to be nourished by the milk of an healthy nurse, than of a diseased or an ill conditioned mother, if there be any new evil to fear from her constitution.

But is the question answered by a physical solution only? Has a child less need of a mother's tenderness than of her breast? Other women, nay brutes, might afford it the milk which she refuses; but the solicitude, the tenderness of a mother cannot be supplied. She who suckles the child of another instead of her own, must be a bad mother; how then can it be expected she should make a good nurse? She may, it is true, become so in time, but slowly, and as habit takes the place of nature; in the mean while, the neglected child would have time enough to perish before his nurse had acquired a maternal affection for him.

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There results even from this possible advantage an inconvenience, which is of itself sufficient to deter a woman of any sensibility from committing her children to the care of others: and this is that of a stranger's partaking with, or alienating from her the rights of a mother; of seeing her child love another woman as well, or better than herself; of perceiving the affection it retains for its natural parent a matter of favour, and that of its adopted one a duty: for where I find the obligations of a mother duly discharged, I certainly ought to look for the attachment of the child.

The method usually taken to remove this inconvenience, is to inspire children with a contempt for their nurses, by treating them as real servants. When their business is done, the child is taken away, or the nurse dismissed, who is afterwards so ill received, that she is soon disgusted with coming to see her nursery. At the end of a year or two, the child sees and knows her no more: But his mother, who imagines herself substituted in her place, and endeavours to repair her negligence by her cruelty, is mistaken. Instead of making an affectionate son of an unnatural nurse-child, she only excites his ingratitude; and teaches him one day to despise her who gave him life, as he already despises her who nursed him with her milk.

How earnestly might I insist on this point, were it not so discouraging to expatiate in vain on useful subjects! More depends on it, by much, than is generally imagined. Would you have mankind return all to their natural duties, begin with mothers of families; you will be a
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stonished at the change this will produce. Almost every kind of depravation flows successively from this source; the moral order of things is broken, and the natural quite subverted in our hearts: home is less chearful and engaging; the affecting sight of a rising family no more attaches the husband, nor attracts the eyes of the stranger; the mother is less truly respectable, whose children are not about her; families are no longer places of residence; habit no longer enforces the ties of blood; there are no fathers, nor mothers, children, brethren, nor sisters; they hardly know, how should they love, each other? Each cares for no one but himself; and when home affords only a melancholy solitude, it is natural for us to seek diversion elsewhere.

But should mothers again condescend to nurse their children, manners would form themselves, the sentiments of nature would revive in our hearts, the state would be re peopled; this principal point, this alone would reunite every thing. A taste for the charms of a domestic life is the best antidote against corruption of manners. The noise and bustle of children, which is generally thought troublesome, becomes hence agreeable; it is these that render parents more necessary, more dear, to each other, and strengthen the ties of conjugal affection. When a family is all lively and animated, domestic concerns afford the most delightful occupation to a woman, and the most agreeable amusement to a man. Hence, from the correction of this one abuse, will presently result a general reformation; nature will soon re-assume all its rights. Let wives but once again become mothers, and the men will pre-

presently again become fathers and husbands.

Superfluous talk! Even their disgust at the pleasures of the world will never bring them back to their duty. Wives have ceased to be mothers; they will not, they even have no desire to be such. Nay, though they should desire it, they can hardly effect it: as at present a contrary custom is established, every one, desirous of being so, must stand in opposition to all that come near her, united in league against an example, which one party hath not set, and the other is unwilling to follow.

There are indeed some young persons to be found of a good natural disposition, who, despising the tyranny of mode and the clamours of their sex, venture to discharge, with a virtuous intrepidity, the most delightful obligation nature can impose. May their number be augmented by the influence of that happiness which is destined for those who engage in so pleasing a task. I will venture, and that on the authority of the most obvious reasonings, and on observations that have never deceived me, to promise such worthy mothers a real and constant attachment on the part of their husbands, a truly filial affection on that of their children, the esteem and respect of the public, happy delivery, speedy restoration to constant and vigorous health, and, after all, the pleasure to see their daughters follow their example, and commend it to others.

Where there is no mother, there can be no child. The obligations incumbent on both are reciprocal; and if they are neglected on one side, they will hardly be fulfilled on the other. The child should love its mother before it is sensible
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of it as a duty. If the voice of nature be not strengthened by habit and cultivation, it will be silenced in its infancy, and the heart will perish, if I may so express myself, before it is born. Thus the very first steps which are taken with us are foreign to nature.

The obvious paths of nature are also forsaken, in a different manner, when, instead of neglecting the duties of a mother, a woman carries them to excess; when she makes an idol of her child; increases its weakness, by preventing its sense of it; and, as if she could emancipate him from the laws of nature, prevents every approach of pain or distress; without thinking, that, for the sake of preserving him at present from a few trifling inconveniences, she is accumulating on his head a distant load of anxieties and misfortunes; without thinking that it is a barbarous precaution to enervate and indulge the child at the expence of the man. Thetis, says the fable, in order to render her son invulnerable, plunged him into the waters of Styx. This is an expressive and beautiful allegory. The cruel mothers I am speaking of act directly contrary: by plunging their children in softness and effeminacy, they render them more tender and vulnerable; they lay open, as it were, their nerves, to every species of afflicting sensations, to which they will certainly fall a prey as they grow up.

Observe nature, and follow the track she has delineated. She continually exercises her children, and fortifies their constitution by experiments of every kind; inuring them betimes to grief and pain. In cutting their teeth, they experience the fever; gripping colics throw them
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into convulsions; the whooping-cough suffocates, and worms torment them; surfeits corrupt their blood, and the various fermentations their humours are subject to, cover them with dangerous eruptions. Almost the whole period of childhood is sickness and danger, half the children that are born dying before they are eight years old. In passing through this course of experiments, the child gathers strength and fortitude, and, as soon as he is capable of living, the principles of life become less precarious.

This is the rule of nature. Why should you act contrary to it? Do not you see, that, by endeavouring to correct her work, you spoil it, and prevent the execution of her designs? Act you from without as she does within: this, according to you, would increase the danger; on the contrary, it will create a diversion, and lessen it. Experience shows, that children delicately educated die in a greater proportion than others. Provided you do not make them exert themselves beyond their powers, less risk is run by exercising, than indulging them in ease. Inure them therefore by degrees to those inconveniences they must one day suffer. Harden their bodies to the intemperance of the seasons, climates, and elements; to hunger, thirst, and fatigue; in a word, dip them in the waters of Styx. Before the body hath acquired a settled habit, we may give it any we please, without danger; but when it is once arrived to its full growth and consistence, every alteration is hazardous. A child will bear those vicissitudes which to a man would be insupportable: the soft and pliant fibres of the former readily yield

to impress; those of the latter are more rigid, and are reduced only by violence to recede from the forms they have assumed. We may therefore bring up a child robust and hearty, without endangering either its life or health; and though even some risk were run in this respect, it would not afford sufficient cause of hesitation. Since they are risks inseparable from human life, can we do better than to run them during that period of it wherein we take them at the least disadvantage?

The life of a child becomes the more valuable as he advances in years. To the value of his person, must be added the cost and pains attending his education; to the loss of life, also, may be annexed his own sense and apprehensions of death. We should, therefore, particularly direct our views to the future in his present preservation; we ought to arm him against the evils of youth, before he arrives at that period: for if the value of his life increases till he attain the age in which it is useful, what a folly is it to protect him from a few evils in his infancy, to multiply his sufferings when he comes to years of discretion? Can such be the instructions of a master of his profession?

Man is born to suffer in every stage of his existence. Even self-preservation is attended with some degree of pain. Happy are we that in our infancy we are susceptible only of physical evils! Evils much less cruel, much less terrible than others, and more seldom capable of reconciling us to death. Men never destroy themselves to get rid of the gout; the anguish of the mind only is productive of despair. We lament the
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state of infants, whereas it is our own that is most to be lamented. Our greatest evils are derived from ourselves.

A child as soon as it is born begins to cry; great part of its earliest infancy being spent in tears. Sometimes we dance it about and soothe it; at others threaten and beat it, in order to make it silent. We always either do that which is pleasing to the child, or exact of it what pleases ourselves; either submitting to its humours, or obliging it to submit to ours. There is no medium, it must either command or obey. Hence the first ideas it acquires, are those of tyranny and servitude. Before it can speak it learns to command, and before it can act it is taught obedience; nay, sometimes it is punished before it be conscious of a fault, at least before it can commit one. Thus it is we early instil into their tender minds those passions which we afterwards impute to nature, and after having taken the pains to make them vicious, complain that we found them so.

In this manner a child passes six or seven years under the care of the women, the constant victim of their caprices and his own. After he has learned of them what they usually teach, that is, after they have burdened his memory with words without meaning, and things of no consequence; after they have corrupted his natural disposition by the passions they have implanted, this factitious being is turned over to the care of a preceptor, who proceeds in the developement of those artificial buds already formed, teaching him every thing except the knowledge of himself, the business of human life, and the attain-

ment of happiness. So that when this slavish and tyrannical infant, replete with science and deprived of sense, equally debilitated both in body and mind, comes at length to enter on the world, it is no wonder that the display he makes of his folly, vanity, and vice, should cause us to lament the misery and perverseness of human nature. We are, however, mistaken: such is the man of our caprices; that of nature is differently constituted. Are you desirous of preserving his original form? begin with him as soon as he comes into the world: make yourself master of him as soon as he is born, nor quit him afterwards till he is grown up to manhood: without this you will never perfectly succeed. As his mother is his only true nurse, so is his father his only true preceptor. Let them mutually agree in the practice of their duty as well as in the theory: let their child pass from the hands of one to the other. He will be better educated by a judicious father, though of confined talents, than by the most able master in the world; for zeal will better supply the place of abilities, than abilities make up for the want of zeal.

But it will be said, other business, employments, duties——Duties! Surely those of a father are of the highest importance! * We need not

* When we read in Plutarch, that Cato himself, the censor, who governed in Rome with so much glory, brought up his son from the cradle, and that with so much assiduity, that he would quit every business to be present when the nurse, that is to say the mother, washed and rubbed him; when we read in Suetonius, that Augustus, master of the world he had conquered and over which he reigned, taught his grandchildren to write, to swim, to comprehend the elements of science, and had them constantly about him; we, that are grown so much wiser,

not be surpris'd however, if the man, whose wife disdains to nourish the fruit of their union, should in like manner disdain to cultivate and improve it. There is no picture in the world more delightful than that of a family; a single feature wanting, nevertheless, spoils the whole. If the mother be of too puny a constitution for a nurse, the father has too much business on his hands for a preceptor. Their children sent from home, and dispersed in boarding-schools, convents, and colleges, carry elsewhere their family-regards; or rather contract the habit of being attached to nothing. Brothers and sisters hardly know each other; but, when on any occasion assembled, behave to each other as politely, and with as much distant ceremony, as strangers: when intimacy between relations no longer subsists, the pleasures of life no longer depend on family-society, but are sought for in the corruption of manners. Where is there a man so blind, as not to see clearly the connection of these things?

A father, in begetting and providing for his children, hath in that discharged but a third part of his obligations. He owes a being to his species, social beings to society, and citizens to the state. Every man who is capable of paying this triple debt, and refuses, is in that respect criminal; and perhaps is more so when he pays it by halves. He who is incapable of performing the

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wiser, cannot help laughing at the insignificant good people of those days, who amused themselves with such trifles; too-confined, doubtless, in their abilities to be equal to the important affairs of the great men of the present times.

duties of a father, has no right to be one. Neither poverty, nor business, nor personal importance, can dispense with parents nursing and educating their children. Readers, you may believe me, when I take upon me to assure every parent, who is endued with sensibility, and neglects these sacred obligations, that he will long live to repent it in the bitterness of his sorrow, and never be comforted.

But what step doth a wealthy parent take? this master of a family, so very much engaged as to be obliged to give up the education of his children? He pays another person, to discharge those obligations which are laid on himself. Vernal soul! dost thou think thou canst purchase thy son another father with money? Deceive not thyself; it is not a master thou givest him, but a servant, who will soon make him as servile as himself.

Much has been said and written on the qualifications of a good governor. The first that I should require of him, and which would include a great many others, is, that he should not be venal. There are some professions so noble that they cannot be practised for hire, without shewing the professor unworthy of them: such is the profession of arms, and such that of moral institutions. To whom, then, shall I intrust the education of my child?—I have already told you; to yourself. But I am incapable. —Are you indeed incapable? Make then a friend. I see no other resource.

What a sublime idea do I entertain of a complete tutor! In fact, to be able to form the man, one ought either to be his father, or something
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more than man one's self. Yet such is the office you carelessly confer on the merest mercenaries.

The more I reflect on this subject, the more I perceive new difficulties arise. It is necessary the governor should have been educated for his pupil, that his domestics should have been educated for their master, that every one who comes near him should have received the same impressions which they are to communicate to him; and thus education on education becomes necessary nobody knows how far. How can a child be properly educated by one who has not been properly educated himself? But where is such an extraordinary mortal to be found? I confess I am ignorant. In these abject times, who knows what degree of virtue the human mind may attain? Yet suppose this prodigy found. It is in examining what he ought to do, that we shall see what he ought to be. I can venture to pronounce beforehand, however, that the father who is the most sensible of the value of a good governor, will be the first to do without one; as he will find it more difficult to procure one, than to become such himself. Or is he desirous, in such a case, to make a friend? let him educate his child to that end; he then will have no need to seek one elsewhere, and nature will have already done half his work.

A certain personage, of whom I know nothing more than his elevated station, once made me a proposal to educate his son. In this he doubtless did me great honour: so far, however, from being offended at my refusal, he ought to commend my discretion. Had I accepted his offer, and my method proved wrong, his son's educa-

education would have been spoiled; and if it proved right, it had been still so much the worse. The son would have renounced the titles of his father, he would have had no inclination to be a prince.

I am too sensible of the importance of a preceptor's duty, I feel too much my own incapacity, ever to accept of such an employ from any person whatever; even the motives of friendship itself affording to me additional reasons to refuse it. I imagine, indeed, that, after having read this book, few will be disposed to make me such an offer; and I must beg of those who are, not to take the trouble of a fruitless application. I made formerly a sufficient essay in this business to convince me I am not fit for it, and even my situation would excuse me were my talents equal to it. I thought it incumbent on me to make this public declaration, to satisfy those who do not appear to think so respectfully of me as to believe my resolutions on this head sincere.

But, though I hold myself incapacitated to undertake the most useful part of this arduous task, I shall venture to attempt that which is the most easy. To follow the example of many others, I shall not set my hand to the work, but to the pen; and instead of doing it myself, endeavour to advise others what ought to be done.

In attempts of this kind, their authors, generally very easy about the consistency of a theory they are not concerned to put in practice; lay down, without scruple, a number of fine precepts impossible to be followed; and for want of being sufficiently circumstantial and exempla-

ry in their application, render even those which are practicable useless.

I have, therefore, in this work, made choice of an imaginary pupil, and have taken the liberty to suppose myself of a proper age, in health, and possessed of the requisite abilities to undertake his education, to conduct him from the time of his birth, till, grown up to maturity, he may stand in need of no other guide than himself. This method appears to me useful, in preventing an author, diffident of himself, from running into chimeras: for, when he deviates from the ordinary practice, he has only to try his method on his pupil; and he will soon see, or the reader will see for him, whether he follows the natural progress of infancy and the sensations of the human heart.

This is what I have endeavoured to do, amidst the various difficulties that presented themselves. That I might not needlessly swell the size of my book, I have contented myself, however, with simply laying down those principles, of which every one, at first sight, must acknowledge the truth. As to those which require proof, I have applied them all either to Emilius, or other examples; and have shewn, by the most circumstantial applications, in what manner my theory may be reduced to practice: such, at least, is the plan I have laid down: it remains with the reader to decide how far I have executed my design.

Agreeable to this sketch of my plan, I speak but little, at first setting out, of Emilius; because my first maxims of education, although contrary to those generally established, are so self-

self-evident, that it is not easy for persons of common sense to refuse their assent to them. But, in proportion as I advance, my pupil, brought up very different from yours, is no longer an ordinary youth, but requires a regimen peculiar to himself. He appears then more frequently in the scene; and, toward the latter end of my tuition, I lose view of him not a moment, till he has no longer occasion for my assistance.

I shall not here expatiate on the qualifications of a complete tutor; I suppose them, and, at the same time, suppose myself possessed of them all. In the perusal of the work, the reader will see how liberal I have been to myself.

I shall here observe only, in contradiction to the common opinion, that the governor of a child should be young, even as young as possible, consistent with his having attained necessary discretion and sagacity. I would have him be himself a child, that he might become the companion of his pupil, and gain his confidence by partaking of his amusements. There are not things in common enough between infancy and manhood, to form a solid attachment at so great a distance. Children sometimes caress old men, but they never love them.

It is generally required that a governor should have already gone through a course of education in that character. This is too much: the same man can go through but one: if a first be necessary to qualify him for the second, what right had he to engage in that first?

From longer experience he may know better how to act, but he will be no longer capable of action.

action. Whoever has filled that station well enough to be sensible of its difficulties, will not be disposed to enter on it a second time; and if he has but ill acquitted himself the first time, it is a bad recommendation for the second. It is a very different thing, I own, to follow a young man up and down for four years, and to conduct him for five and twenty. You give your son a tutor, when he is already formed; I would have him have had a governor before he was born. Your preceptor may change his pupil every four years: mine can have but one. You make a distinction between a preceptor and a governor: another folly! Do you distinguish between the pupil and the scholar? There is but one science to be taught children; and that is moral behaviour. This is, besides, a science of itself, and whatever Xenophon has said of the education of the Persians, is not to be divided. I should rather also denominate a master in it a governor, than a preceptor; because it is less his province to instruct than conduct; it is not his business to lay down precepts, but to teach his pupil to discover them.

If so much care is to be taken in the choice of a governor, it should be surely permitted him on the other hand to chuse his pupil, particularly in a case where a model for imitation is proposed. This choice cannot be directed either by the genius or character of the child, which can only be known in the issue, and which I adopt before it is born. Nay, were I capable in this respect to make a choice, I should fix on an ordinary capacity; such therefore I suppose that of my pupil. Common men alone are the objects

jects of education; and theirs only should serve as an example to the rest of their species. A genius will educate himself, in spite of all obstacles. The soil is not a matter of indifference in the cultivation of mankind: they are not all such as they might have been if born in temperate climates. The disadvantage is visible in either extreme. A man is not planted like a tree, in any country, to grow there continually, but is frequently changing his place; and he who removes from one extreme to the other, is obliged to go twice as far to arrive at the same point, as he who sets out from a line drawn between both. If the inhabitant of a temperate climate visits successively both extremes, his advantages are further evident; for, although he should undergo the same modification as one that should pass from one extreme to the other, yet he would depart each way, the less by half, from his natural constitution. Thus a Frenchman may live in Guinea or in Lapland; but a Negro would not live so well at Torneo, nor a Samoyad at Benin. It appears, also, that the organization of the brain is less perfect in the two extremes. Neither the Negroes nor the Laplanders have the natural understandings of the natives of milder climates. If, therefore, my pupil must be an inhabitant of the earth, I would select him from those of a temperate zone; from the French, for instance, in preference to all others.

As we go northwards, we find men consume a great deal upon an ungrateful soil; towards the south they consume little on a fertile one. Hence arises a new distinction; the one being
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thereby rendered laborious, and the other contemplative. Society presents us, on one spot, with a picture of this distinction, in that between the poor and the rich. The former reside on the ungrateful soil, and the latter on the plentiful one.

The poor stand in no need of education; that of their station is confined, and they cannot attain any other. On the contrary, the education of those who are in a wealthy station, is that which is the least adapted to their own good, or to the good of society. Add to this, that an education adapted to the nature of things, ought to qualify a man for all conditions of life: now it is certainly less reasonable to educate the poor for a high station, than the rich for a low one; for, in proportion to the number of both, there are much fewer persons who become rich, than there are who become poor; as it is much easier to spend a fortune than to acquire one. Our pupil therefore shall be rich: thus we are sure at least of forming one man the more; a poor one may become a man of himself.

It is for the same reason, I shall not be sorry that Emilius should be also of noble birth; as we are sure of snatching one victim from the absurdities of prejudice.

Emilius is an orphan. It is to no purpose he should have a father or mother. As I charge myself with their obligations, I succeed to their rights and authority. He ought indeed to honour his parents, but complacence is all that is due to me. This is the first, or rather the only condition I make with him.

To this I should add, what is only a consequence

quence of it, that we are never to part but by mutual consent. This is an essential article, and I would even have both the governor and pupil look upon each other as inseparable, and the fortunes of each as common to both. For as soon as they regard, though at a great distance, their future separation, as soon as they foresee the moment when they are to become strangers to each other, they begin to be so already; each forms his separate views, and both taken up with the prospect of what may happen after their parting, continue together against their inclination. The pupil looks upon the tutor only as the badge and scourge of childhood; while the latter regards the former as an inconvenient burden, of which he should be glad to be lightened: thus they sigh in concert for the moment in which they shall see themselves rid of each other; and as there can be no real attachment between them, the one is as careless as the other is intractable.

But when they regard themselves as formed to spend their days together, it is of the utmost consequence to both to endear themselves to each other; and this of itself is sufficient to create a reciprocal esteem. The pupil will not be ashamed to be conducted in his infancy by the friend he is to accompany when grown up: on the other hand, the governor cannot but interest himself in the cultivation of the plant of which he is to reap the fruit; while in adding to the merit of his pupil he is laying up a fund by which he is to profit in his old age.

This preliminary adjusted, I suppose, from an happy delivery, to receive a well shaped, vigorous

gorous, and healthy child. A father has no choice, and therefore ought to give no preference to any of the children God has given him; they are equally his children, and are intitled to the same care and tenderness. Whether they are maimed or perfect, sickly or robust, each of them is a sacred deposit, of which he is to give an account to him of whom he received it, marriage being a contract made with nature as well as between the parties.

But whoever lays himself under an obligation which nature has not imposed, ought to be well assured of the means to discharge it, otherwise he will thereby render himself accountable for what is out of his power to perform. Whoever undertakes the tuition of an infirm and valetudinary infant, converts his office of governor into that of an attendant on the sick; he will lose that time in preserving an useless life, which was intended to increase its value; he will be exposed himself to the mortification of seeing himself, one day, reproached by a weeping mother for the death of her son, whom she hath long and assiduously kept alive.

I would not take charge of a sickly child tho' I were sure it would live to be fourscore. I would not be troubled with a pupil always useless to himself and to others, whose only concern would be self-preservation, and the weakness of whose body would prevent the cultivation of his mind. What should I be doing, in vainly bestowing all my time and pains on such an object, but adding to the loss of society, by depriving it of the services of two men instead of one? Let any one else take charge of his infirmities,

firmities, I consent and approve his charity; but my talent, if I know myself, lies not that way: I could never teach a child to live, who should be in continual apprehensions of dying.

The body should be vigorous, to act in obedience to the mind; a good servant should be robust and strong. I know intemperance will inflame the passions; that in time it will wear it absolutely away; mortification and abstinence too produce the same effect from a different cause. The more feeble a body is, the greater influence it has over the mind; the stronger it is, the more obedient is it to its commands. The sensual passions all lodge in effeminate bodies; they are excited by so much the more as they are incapable of gratification.

A debilitated body enervates the mind. Hence the influence of physic, an art more destructive to mankind than all the evils it pretends to cure. I know not, for my part, of what malady we are cured by the physicians, but I know many fatal ones which they inflict on us; such are cowardice, pusillanimity, credulity, and the fear of death: if they cure the body of pain, they deprive the soul of fortitude. What end doth it answer to society, that they keep a parcel of rotten carcases on their legs? It is *men* the community wants, and those we never see come out of their hands.

It is however the present mode to take physic; and it should be so. It is a pretty amusement for idle people that have nothing to do, and not knowing how to bestow their time otherwise, throw it away on self-preservation. Had they been so unfortunate as to have been born immortal,

mortal, they would have been the most miserable of beings. A life which they would not be under the continual apprehensions of losing, would be to them of no value. Physicians pay their court to such persons, by frightening them, and affording them daily the only pleasure they are susceptible of; that of hearing they are in danger and yet not quite dead.

I have no design to enlarge here on the futility of physic, my present purpose being only to consider it in a moral light. I cannot however forbear observing, that mankind use the same sophistry in regard to the use of medicine, as they do with respect to their search after truth. They suppose always, that when a physician treats a patient who recovers, he has cured him; and that when they have gone through a disquisition concerning the truth, they have found it. They do not see that we ought to put in the balance, against one cure effected by physic, the deaths of an hundred patients it has killed; or that we should oppose to the utility of one boasted truth, the mischief of a thousand errors fallen into by making the discovery. The science which enlightens, and the physic that cures, are, doubtless, very useful: but the pretended science that misleads, and the physic that kills, are as certainly destructive. Teach us therefore to distinguish between them. This is precisely the point in question. Could we teach our vain curiosity not to thirst after information, we should never be the dupes of falsehood; could we be satisfied to bear the maladies to which nature denies a cure, we should never die by the hands of the physician. Self-denial in these two

instances is prudent; men would be evidently gainers by such abstinence and submission. I do not pretend to deny that physic may be useful to some few particular persons, but I affirm it to be destructive to the human race in general.

It may be replied, as it constantly is, the fault lies in the physician, and not in the science of medicine, which is otherwise infallible. Well, well, be it so: take care, however, the physic be never accompanied by the doctor; for as sure as ever they come together, there will be an hundred times more to fear from the blunders of the artist, than to hope for from the efficacy of the art.

This deceitful science, calculated more to affect the mind than the body, is not more useful to one than the other: it cures us less of sickness than it kills us with terror. It does not so much keep death at a distance, as it anticipates his horrors. It wears us out, instead of prolonging our lives; and though it could be said to prolong the life of individuals, it would be still to the prejudice of our species; since it renders us less serviceable to society, by the regimen it imposes, and the constant solicitude it lays us under. It is to our knowledge of danger that we are indebted for our fears: the man who should think himself invulnerable, would be afraid of nothing. By arming Achilles against danger, the poet has deprived his character of all the merit of his valour: any one in such circumstances might have been an Achilles too.

Do you seek men of true courage? Look for
them

them where there are no physicians, where men are ignorant of the consequence of diseases, and where they are never apprehensive of death. Man, by nature, is formed to suffer with patience, and die in peace. It is the physicians with their prescriptions, the philosophers with their precepts, and the priests with their prayers and exhortations, that have debased the heart of man, and made him ignorant how to die.

Let me have a pupil, therefore, who will have no occasion for any of these gentry, or I shall reject him. I am unwilling that other people should spoil my work: I will have the education of him entirely myself, or not take any farther trouble about him. The sagacious Mr Locke, who had spent part of his life in the study of medicine, earnestly advises us, never to give children physic by way of precaution or for slight indispositions. I will go farther, and declare, as I never call in the physician for myself, so I will never trouble him on the account of Emilius; unless, indeed, his life be in evident danger; and then the doctor cannot do more than kill him.

I know very well the physician will not fail to take advantage of that delay. If the child dies, he was called in too late; had he been sent for sooner——if he recovers, it is then the physician who saved him. Be it so. I am content the doctor should triumph, on condition he is never sent for till the patient be at the last extremity.

For want of knowing the way to get cured, a child should learn to know how to be sick; this art will supply the want of the other, and often

often succeed a great deal better: this is one of the arts of nature. When a brute animal is sick, it suffers in silence and keeps itself still: and yet we do not see that brutes are more sickly than men. How many persons have impatience, disquietude, apprehension, and particularly medicines, destroyed, whom their diseases would have spared, and whom time alone would have cured? Will it be objected, that brute-animals, living in a manner conformable to nature, ought to be less subject to diseases? This is the very point I aim at. I would bring up my pupil precisely in the same manner; from which he would doubtless deduce the same advantages.

The only useful part of medicine is the Hygeine. This however is rather a virtue than a science. Temperance and exercise are the two best physicians in the world. Exercise whets the appetite, and temperance prevents the abuse of it.

To know what kind of regimen is the most salutary, we need only inquire what is that of those people who enjoy the greatest share of health, are the most robust, and live the longest? If the arts of medicine are found, from general observation, not to confer better health or longer life; the very proof of their being useless shows them to be hurtful, as so much time, so many persons and things are taken up thereby to no purpose. Not only the time mispent in the preservation of life, is lost from its enjoyment; it should be deducted also from its duration: but when that time is employed in tormenting us, it is still worse than the mere annihilation.

nihilation of it; it gives a negative quantity, and, if we calculate justly, should be taken from the future duration of our lives. A man who lives six years without physicians, lives more for himself and others, than he who survives, as their patient, for thirty. Having experienced both, I conceive myself peculiarly authorised to determine this point.

Such are my reasons for making choice only of a robust and healthy pupil, and the principles on which I would preserve him so. I shall not go about to prove the utility of manual labour, and those bodily exercises which serve to strengthen the constitution and preserve health: this is a point which nobody disputes: instances of longevity are almost all of them found among persons accustomed to exercise, and who have undergone the greatest labour and fatigue*. I shall be as far from entering into a tedious detail of the methods I shall take to effect this end. It will be seen that they necessarily enter into the practical

* I cannot help citing the following instance, on the authority of the English news-papers, as it affords so much room for reflection on this subject. 'One Patrick O'Neale, born in the year 1647. married his seventh wife in 1760. He served in the dragoons in the 17th year of the reign of Charles II. and in different corps till 1740, when he obtained his discharge. He had made all the campaigns of King William and the Duke of Marlborough. This extraordinary person never drank any thing stronger than small beer, and lived upon vegetables. His custom was to rise with the sun, and to go to bed when it set, except on such urgent occasions as prevented. Notwithstanding his great age, he is well in health, walks without a crutch, is hardly ever unemployed, and every Sunday goes to his parish-church accompanied by his children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren.'

practical part of my plan; so that this intimation will be sufficient, without farther explanation.

Our wants commence with our lives. The new-born infant must be provided with a nurse. If its mother consent to take upon herself that office, it is well. Directions for her behaviour will be given her in writing: for this advantage has its inconvenience, and keeps the governor at a little more distance from his pupil. But it is to be presumed, the good of the child, and the esteem she must have for him to whom she would commit so important a charge, will render the mother attentive to the directions and advice of its master: this presumed, we are certain that every thing she does will be better done by her than by any one else. If it must have an hired nurse, we must begin with making a good choice.

One of the misfortunes attending the rich, is their being universally imposed on. Is it to be wondered at, then, they should know so little how to judge of mankind? Their own wealth serves to corrupt them; and, by a just retaliation, they are the first who feel the defects of the only advantage they are acquainted with. Every thing about them is done wrong, but what they do themselves, and this is hardly any thing at all.

Is the choice of a nurse the point in question? They apply to the *accoucheur*. The consequence of this is, that she is the best nurse who has made him the greatest acknowledgment. I shall not consult a man-widwife, therefore, in the choice of a nurse for Emilius; but shall take
care

care to chuse one myself. I may not reason on this head, perhaps, so scientifically and eloquently as a professed chirurgeon; but this I am certain of, I shall be more sincere, and my zeal will be less apt to mislead me than his avarice.

There is no great mystery in this choice; the rules for it are well known; but I conceive a little more regard should be had to the age of the nurse's milk, as well as to its quality. New milk is altogether thin and waterish; it is required, indeed, to be in a manner purgative, in order to carry off the remains of the *meconium* thickened in the intestines of the new-born infant. By degrees the milk acquires consistence, and furnishes a more solid aliment to the child, as it becomes more capable of digestion. It is not without design, surely, that, among the females of every species of animals, nature thus varies the consistence of their milk according to the age of the infant.

A child newly born, therefore, requires a nurse newly delivered. This, I know, has its inconvenience; but as soon as ever we depart from the natural order of things, we find inconveniences in every attempt to do right. The only commodious expedient is to do wrong, and that is generally preferred.

A nurse should have a good heart as well as good health: the intemperature of the passions will alter her milk, as well as that of the humours: add to this, that to regard the matter only in a physical light, is to take a view but of half the object. A nurse may be a very bad one, and yet her milk may be good: a good
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disposition is as essential as a good constitution. If we take a vitious woman, I do not say the child will contract her vices, but I say it will suffer by them. Is it not incumbent on her to be careful, obliging, and cleanly, as well as to suckle it? If she be gormandizing and intemperate, she will soon spoil her milk; if she be negligent or passionate, what will become of the poor little wretch that lies at her mercy, and can neither defend itself nor complain? Persons of vitious dispositions are not at all adapted for any laudable employment whatever.

The choice of a nurse is of so much the greater consequence, as a child ought to have no other governess, in the same manner as he ought to have no other preceptor than his governor. Such was the custom of the ancients, who, though less pretenders to reason, were more rational than we. With them, the nurses who once undertook the education of children of their own sex, never left them afterwards: and hence we see the reason why, in their theatrical pieces, the confidant is generally a nurse. It is impossible, that a child who passes successively thro' so many hands, should ever be well brought up. At every change, he will naturally make secret comparisons, which tend to diminish his respect for those who superintend his education, and consequently their authority over him. If he should once come to think there are grown persons who have no more sense than children, all the authority of age is lost, and his education spoiled. A child should know no other superiors than its father and mother, or, in default of them, its nurse and governor: even these
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are too many by one; but this participation is inevitable, and the only way to remedy its defects, is, that they should so act in concert as to be only one, respecting him.

It is requisite that a nurse should live a little better than ordinary, and take more substantial aliment; but not that she should entirely vary her regimen. A sudden and total change, even tho' from bad to good, is always dangerous: and if her ordinary manner of living preserve her health and constitution, why should she be made to change it?

The peasants eat less animal food and more vegetables than our women in town; a regimen which is rather favourable than otherwise to them and their children. When they are engaged to suckle those of citizens, they are, however, obliged to vary their aliment, from the notion that meat-soups and broths afford a better chyle and greater plenty of milk. I am not at all of this opinion; and have experience on my side, which informs us, that children thus nourished are more subject to the gripes and worms than others.

Nor is this to be wondered at, since animal substances, when putrefied, are covered with worms, in a manner never experienced in the substance of vegetables. Now, the milk, as it is prepared in the animal body, becomes a vegetable substance*; as may be demonstrated

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* Women eat bread, vegetables, and milk-diers: the females of the canine and feline species, even she-wolves, feed on the same. Hence they derive vegetable juices for their milk. It remains to be examined, what is the milk of those animals which

by analyfation ; it turns readily by acids, and fo far from affording the leaft appearance of a volatile alcali, as animal fubftances do, it yields, like plants, an effential neutral falt.

The milk of thofe women who live chiefly on vegetables, is more fweet and falutary than that of carnivorous females. Formed out of fubftances of a fimilar nature, it keeps longer, as it is lefs fubject to putrefaction. And with refpect to its quantity, every one knows that pulfe and vegetables increafe the quantity of blood more than meat ; and why not therefore that of the milk ? I cannot believe that a child, who is not weaned too foon, or fould be weaned only with vegetable nutriment, and whose nurfe alfo fould live entirely on vegetables, would ever be fubject to worms.

Vegetable aliment may poffibly make the milk more apt to turn fcur ; but I am very far from regarding fcur milk as unwholfome nutriment. There are people in fome countries who have no other, and yet are in good health : the whole apparatus of abforbent alcali is to me indeed a piece of quackery.

There are fome constitutions with which milk does not at all agree ; nor will any abforbent reconcile it to the ftomach, while others digeft it very well without abforbents. Much inconvenience has been apprehended from the milk's turning to curds ; this is an idle apprehenfion, becaufe it is well known the milk always curdles in the ftomach.

Hence

which abfolutely cannot receive nourifhment from any thing but meat ; if there are any fuch, which I much doubt.

Hence it is that it becomes an aliment solid enough to nourish infants and other animals; whereas, if it remained fluid, it would pass off, and afford them no nourishment at all *.

We may cook up milk in what form soever we please, mix it with a thousand absorbents, it will be all to no purpose; whoever takes milk into the stomach, will infallibly digest cheese. The stomach, indeed, is particularly calculated to curdle milk; it is in the stomach of a calf we find the rennet.

I am of opinion, therefore, that, instead of changing the ordinary diet of nurses, it is sufficient only to increase its quantity, and take care it be the best of its kind. It is not from the nature of the aliment that vegetable foods are over heating. It is their high seasoning only that makes them unwholesome. Reform your kitchen; throw aside your baking and frying-pans; let not your butter, salt, or milk meats, come near the fire; let not your vegetables, boiled or stewed, have any seasoning, till they come hot to table: this kind of diet will then, instead of heating the nurse, furnish her with milk in abundance, and of the best quality †.

Can it be supposed that a vegetable diet should

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be

* Although the juices contributing to our nourishment are all liquid, it is yet necessary they should be compressed from solid aliments. A working man, who should live only upon broths, would soon be emaciated. He would be supported much better on milk, because it curdles, and assumes solidity in the stomach.

† Those who are desirous of seeing the advantages and inconveniencies of the Pythagorean regimen considered at length, may consult the tracts of the Drs Cocchi and Branchi on this important subject.

be the best adapted for a child, and animal food for its nurse? There is an evident contradiction in the notion.

It is particularly in their earliest years, that the constitutions of children are affected by the ambient air. It penetrates through the pores of their soft and delicate skin, acts powerfully on their growing bodies, and makes such impressions as are never after effaced. I should not advise, therefore, the taking a woman from the country, to shut her up in a close nursery in town, there to bring up my child. I should rather it should go to breathe the fresh air of some open village, than the stinking atmosphere of a city. It should adopt the situation of its new mother, dwell beneath her rustic cottage, and its governor should follow it. The reader will please to remember that its governor is not a hireling, but the friend of its father. "Well, but," it may be said, "what if no such friend can be met with? What if such a removal be inconvenient? What if all this you are advising be impracticable? What is to be done then?"—I have already told you; act as you do: you will need no counsel to advise you to do that.

Mankind were not formed to be heaped together in shoals, but to spread over the face of the earth to cultivate it. The more they assemble together, the more they corrupt one another. The infirmity of the body, and the depravity of the mind, are both the inevitable effect of their too numerous concourse. Man is, of all animals, the least adapted to live in herds. Flocks of men, like flocks of sheep, would all perish

perish in a short time. Their breath is destructive to their fellow-creatures ; nor is it less so in a literal than a figurative sense.

Cities are the graves that swallow up the human species. At the end of a few generations, they perish or degenerate ; so that they require to be constantly recruited and regenerated from the country. Send then your children to regenerate themselves, if I may so express myself, in the country ; and to recover, in the open fields, that vigour which is lost in the unwholesome air of populous cities. It is customary for pregnant women, who are in the country, to hasten their return to town ; in order to lie in : they ought to take the contrary method ; particularly those who intend to nurse their own children. They would have less to regret than they imagine ; and, in a situation better adapted to their species, the pleasures inseparably attached to the discharge of their natural duties would soon make them lose all taste for such as have no relation to nature.

As soon as the child is born, it is washed with warm water, usually mixed with wine. This addition of wine appears to me little necessary. As no fluid is in its natural state in fermentation, it is hardly to be thought the use of an artificial liquor needful to our preservation.

For the same reason, the precaution of warming the water may be as well dispensed with ; and, in fact, among many different people, their children are taken, immediately after their birth, and bathed in the river or the sea, without farther ceremony. But ours, enervated be-

fore they are born by the effeminate habits of their parents, bring into the world with them constitutions already spoiled, and which will not bear to be submitted immediately to those experiments which are necessary to re-establish them. It is by degrees only they are to be restored to their native vigour. Follow, then, at first, the established custom, and depart from it by degrees. Children should be frequently washed; their unavoidable uncleanness sufficiently indicates the necessity of it. But, as they gain strength, diminish by degrees the warmth of the water, till you come at length to wash them, winter and summer, with it quite cold, or even freezing. As, in order not to expose them to danger, this diminution must be slow, gradual, and insensible, a thermometer may be made use of to measure the degree of heat or cold exactly.

This custom of bathing, once begun, ought never to be left off, but to be continued during life. I consider it, not only in respect to cleanliness and present health, but also as a salutary precaution; rendering the texture of the fibres more pliant and apt to yield, without effort or danger, to the impressions of the various degrees of heat and cold. For this reason, I would have my pupil, as he grows up, accustom himself to bathe in water, of all the different degrees of cold and heat, from the utmost tolerable degree of heat to the same of cold, making use of both alternately. Thus by habituating himself to support the different temperatures of water, which, being a denser fluid, touches the body in more points, and affects us more powerfully, he would be-

become almost insensible to the changes in the temperature of the air.

I would not have a child, also, the moment he is at liberty to breathe, by being freed from one incumbrance, be laid under others still more destructive. No stay-bands, no rollers, no swaddling-cloaths; but blankets, loose, and large enough to leave all its limbs at liberty; neither so heavy as to lay a restraint on its motion, nor so warm as to prevent its feeling the impressions of the air *. Place it in a roomy cradle †, well lined, where it may roll and tumble about at ease, and without danger. When it has gathered sufficient strength, let it crawl on its hands and knees about the nursery; let it use and stretch its little limbs, and you will see it daily grow stronger. Compare it with a child of the same age, wrapt up in swaddling cloaths, and you will be astonished at the difference of their progress ‡.

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* Children are stifled in great cities, in consequence of their bandages and thick cloathing: those who have the care of them being ignorant, that the cold air, so far from hurting them, braces up their fibres, and strengthens them; and that hot air relaxes, gives them a fever, and kills them.

† I say, a *cradle*, to make use of a common word for want of a better: otherwise I am well persuaded children have no occasion for rocking, and that this custom is often hurtful.

‡ The ancient Peruvians, in loosely swathing their children, left their arms at full liberty. When they threw aside this dress, they placed them at freedom in a little hollow, dug in the earth, and lined with cloaths. Here their children, unable to get out and crawl into danger, had their arms quite loose, and could move their heads and bend their bodies, without running the risk of falling or hurting themselves. As soon as they were able to stand, the nipple was shown them at a distance, and thus they were enticed to learn to walk. The young negroes are often in a situation in which it is with much more difficult-

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Great opposition is doubtless to be expected on the parts of the nurses, to whom a child, well bolstered up in swaddling cloaths, will certainly give less trouble, than one whose legs and arms, being at liberty, must be constantly watched. Add to this, that its uncleanness being more apparent in an open dress, its cloaths would oftener want shifting; and, after all, custom is an argument which in some countries is impossible to be refuted, to the satisfaction of the vulgar of every rank.

Never go about, therefore, to convince nurses. Lay on them your commands; see them executed, and spare no pains to make them as easy as possible in the execution. Why should you not partake of the trouble? In common nurseries, the physical part of education only is regarded: Provided the child lives, and does but thrive, as it is called, all is well; nothing more is regarded. But according to my system, wherein

ty they come at the breast: they cling round the hip of the mother with their knees and feet, and by that means stick so close, that they stand in no need of being supported, while they reach the breast with their hands, and thus continue to suck, without letting go their hold, or being in danger of falling, notwithstanding the various motions of the mother, who all the while is employed in her usual labour. These children begin to walk at the end of the second month, or rather to shuffle along on their hands and knees; an exercise that gives them ever afterwards a facility of running almost as swift in that manner as on their feet. *Buffon, tome iv. p. 192. 11^{mo}.*

To these examples M. Buffon might have added that of the English, among whom the extravagant and barbarous custom above mentioned is daily losing ground. See also *Loubiere, Voyage de Siam, Le Sieur le Beau, Voyage du Canada, &c.* I could, indeed, fill twenty pages with quotations, if it were necessary to support what I have advanced by the evidence of facts.

wherein the care of a child's education commences with its being, the infant becomes at his birth the disciple, not indeed directly of his governor, but of nature. The governor does nothing more than study her superior precepts, and endeavour to prevent them from being thrown away. It is his province to have an eye over, to observe and attend his pupil; to watch as diligently the first dawning of his feeble understanding, as the Mahometans look for the rising of the new moon.

We are born with a capacity for acquiring knowledge; but without knowing any thing. The soul, confined in half-formed and imperfect organs, possesses not even the sense of its own existence. The emotions and cries of a new-born infant, are effects purely mechanical, void of sense or will.

Let us suppose a child, at its birth, possessed of the strength and stature of a man; taken from his mother's womb, as one may say, armed at all like points, like Pallas issuing from the brain of Jove: this adult infant would be a perfect idiot, an automaton, an immoveable and almost insensible statue. He would see nothing, understand nothing, know nothing; nay, he would not be able to turn his eyes toward the object he might have occasion to see. He would not only be incapable of perceiving external objects, he would not be able to perceive them in the respective organs of perception: Colours would not appear to be painted on the retina, sounds would seem not to strike on the ear, the bodies in contact with him would not appear to touch his own; nay, he
would

would not be sensible of his having any body at all. The feeling of his hands would seem to exist in the brain; all his sensations would be generalized into one; he would seem to exist only in the common *sensorium*; he would have but one idea, *i. e.* that of a *self*, in which all his feelings would be absorbed; and this idea, or rather sensation, would constitute the only difference between such a supposed being and a common child. This being, also, thus formed on a sudden, would be as little capable of standing on his legs: it would require a long time for him to learn how to keep his body in equilibrio; perhaps he would not even attempt it, and you would see this tall robust animal fixed in one place like a stock or a stone, or crawling and tumbling about like a puppy.

He would perceive uneasiness occasioned by his wants, without knowing what he wanted, or dreaming of any means to gratify them. There is no immediate communication between the muscles of the stomach and those of the legs and arms, that, supposing him ravenous with hunger and surrounded with victuals, would make him take one step to approach, or reach out his hand to lay hold of them; so that, his body having none of the natural propensities to growth, nor any of those constant emotions which actuate children on that account, he would die of hunger before he would move to seek any thing for his subsistence. If we reflect ever so little on the order and progress of our acquirements, we shall not be able to deny, that a man must be nearly in such a situation of primitive ignorance and stupidity, before he has

acquired any thing of the experience of his fellow-creatures.

The point, therefore, is known, or may be known, from which we all set out to arrive at common understanding: but who is there can tell how distant is the other extremity of the line? Every one advances more or less according to his genius, taste, necessities, talents, zeal, and the opportunities afforded him. I know of no philosopher who hath been rash enough to prescribe the limits of our knowledge, and to say, Thus far, O man, shalt thou go, and no farther. We are ignorant of the extent of the human capacity, nor hath any one as yet measured the utmost possible distance between that of one man and another. Where is the mind so base as never to have been elevated by this reflection? Where is the man does not sometimes say in the pride of his heart, "How many men have I already surpassed! how many may not I yet overtake! why should my equal go farther than myself?"

I say it again, the education of a man commences at his birth: before he can speak, before he can understand, he is already instructed. Experience is the forerunner of precept; the moment he knows the features of his nurse, he may be said to have acquired considerable knowledge. Trace the progress of the most ignorant of mortals, from his birth to the present hour, and you will be astonished at the knowledge he has acquired. If we divide all human science into two parts, the one consisting of that which is common to all men, and the other of what is peculiar to the learned, the latter will appear
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insignificant and trifling in comparison with the other. But we think nothing of general acquisitions, because they are made insensibly, and even before we arrive at the age of reason; knowledge becomes conspicuous only in its difference on comparison; just as in working algebraic equations, common quantities are struck out and stand for nothing.

Even brutes themselves have their acquirements. They have organs of sense, and must learn how to make use of them; they have wants which they must learn to provide for; they must learn to swim, to walk, and to fly. Quadrupeds are not capacitated to walk merely because their legs are able to support them: as soon as they are brought forth, the first essays they make are very hobbling and uncertain. A singing-bird, escaped from the cage in which it was bred, will not know how to fly, because it has never flown. Sensible and animated beings owe every thing to instruction. If trees and plants had a progressive loco-motion, they must have been endued with senses, and have acquired knowledge, otherwise their species would have been extinct.

The first sensations of children are those which are merely affecting; they perceive nothing for some time but pleasure and pain. Being unable to walk about, or lay hold of any thing, they require a good deal of time to form to themselves by degrees these representative sensations which make objects appear to have an external existence. In the mean time, and while such objects are extending themselves, retreating as it were from the eye, and assuming
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forms and dimensions, the return of the affecting sensations begins to submit to the influence of habit; the eyes of children are turned constantly toward the light, and, if it come from one side, they imperceptibly take that direction; so that care should always be taken to set them facing the light, lest they should become squint-eyed, or accustom themselves to look crosswise. They should also be early accustomed to the absence of light, otherwise they will be apt to cry when they find themselves in the dark.

Sleep and nutriment, when too exactly proportioned, become necessary to them at the end of stated intervals; and, after a time, their propensities thereto arise, not from physical necessity, but habit; or rather, habit produces an additional necessity to those of nature: this must, by all means, be prevented.

The only habit in which a child should be indulged, is that of contracting none; he should not be permitted to exercise one arm more than the other; we should not accustom him to present his right hand oftener than his left, or to make use of one more than the other; he should not be used to eat, sleep, or do any thing, at stated hours, or not to be left alone, whether in the day or night. Prepare early for his enjoyment of liberty, and the exercise of his natural abilities, by leaving him in full possession of them unrestrained by artificial habits, and by putting him in a situation to be always master of himself, and to do whatever his resolution prompts him, as soon as he is able to form one.

As soon as a child begins to distinguish objects, a proper choice should be made in those

which are presented to it. Every new object is naturally interesting to a child: it finds itself so weak and feeble that it is fearful of every thing it is not acquainted with; but familiarity, which renders objects unaffecting, destroys this timidity. We see children educated in neat houses, where cobwebs are carefully swept away, are always afraid of spiders, and retain the same disgust for them as they grow up: whereas I never knew a peasant, either man or woman, afraid of a spider.

Why should not the education of a child, therefore, begin before it can speak or understand, since even the choice of objects presented to its view is sufficient to render it either timid or courageous? I would have them habituated to new objects, to ugly, disgusting, and uncommon animals; beginning with them, however, at a distance, and letting them approach by degrees; or till, being used to see others handle them, they will venture to handle them themselves. If a child, during his infancy, hath been used to regard toads, serpents, or cray-fish, with indifference, he will look without horror, as he grows up, on any animal whatever. No object is frightful to such as are daily accustomed to frightful objects.

All children are terrified at a mask. I would begin to reconcile Emilius to masks, by showing him first an agreeable one. Somebody should afterwards put it on, at the sight of which I would laugh, the company should laugh, and the child would then laugh with the rest. By degrees, I would use him to others less agreeable; and lastly to the most hideous and frightful.

ful. By artful management he will thus be brought to laugh and be as much pleased with the last as the first; I should not be afraid he would ever be terrified at a mask.

When Hector was going to take leave of Andromache, his child Astyanax, frightened at the nodding plume of his father's helmet, did not know him, but shrunk, crying, into the bosom of his nurse, and drew a smile from his weeping mother. What should have been done to cure the infant of his fears? Certainly the very thing which Hector did, in taking off his helmet and embracing the child without it. Nor should this have been all: at some other opportunity he should have been brought to handle and play with the feathers; after which his nurse should have taken the helmet, and put it, laughing, on her head; if it may be presumed a woman might dare to make so free with the arms of Hector.

To accustom Emilius to the report of fire-arms, I would first make a flash in the pan of a pistol; the sudden light of which would give him pleasure. I would then repeat it, with a larger prime: after being some time used to this, I would put a small charge into the barrel, without ramming it; and after that a greater; and so on, till I had brought him by degrees to hear with indifference the report of musquetry, bombs, cannon, and even the most terrible explosions. I have remarked that children are seldom afraid of thunder, unless the claps are excessively loud, and really hurt the drum of the ear. They have otherwise no such fear, till they have learned that it is sometimes hurtful,

and even mortal. The fears thus instilled by reason, should be eradicated by habit; while, by slow and artful means, both children and men would acquire intrepidity, and be afraid of nothing.

In a state of infancy, wherein the memory and imagination are as yet inactive, a child is attentive to nothing but what actually affects his senses with pain or pleasure. His sensations being thus the original materials of his ideas, to regulate the formation of those ideas agreeable to the order of things, is to prepare his memory to present them hereafter in the same order to his understanding: but as, while so young, he is only capable of attending to his sensations, it is sufficient at first to make him sensible of the connection between these sensations and the objects that excite them. He is curious to touch and handle every thing he sees; he should be indulged in the gratification of this curiosity; it suggests to him a very necessary course of experiments. Hence it is he must learn to feel heat and cold, the hardness, softness, and weight of bodies; to judge of their magnitude, figure, and other sensible qualities, by looking, touching *, hearing, and particularly by comparing the sight with the touch, and judging, by means of the eye, of the sensation acquired by the fingers.

It is by motion only that we discover any thing

* The sense of smelling is that which comes the latest to perfection in children. They appear not to be sensible of either good or ill scents, till they are two or three years old. They seem to have in this respect the same indifference, or rather insensibility, which is remarked in many other animals.

thing to exist out of ourselves; and it is by our own motion that we acquire the idea of extension. It is because a child has no such idea, that it will stretch out its hand, in the same manner, to lay hold of an object within its reach, or at an hundred yards distance. This effort appears to you only a token of command, an order to the object to come to him, or to you to fetch it; but it is in fact no such thing. It is made, because the objects which a child first perceives to exist in the brain, and afterwards in the eye, appear now to exist at arm's length; and he has no conception of any extension beyond his reach. Care should be taken, therefore, to walk him about often, to have him carried about from one place to another where he chuses to go, in order to give him just ideas of local relations, and teach him to judge of distances. When he begins, however, once to know these, your method must be changed, and you must let him go, or carry him, only where you please, not where he pleases: for when his senses no longer deceive him in this respect, the efforts I have been speaking of change their cause. This change is so remarkable, that it may require some explanation.

The uneasiness occasioned by our wants, is expressed by signs, when the assistance of others is required to relieve them. Hence the cries of infants. They are almost perpetually in tears: and indeed so they must be. As all their sensations are of the affecting kind; when these are agreeable, they enjoy them in silence; but, when painful, they naturally express themselves in their own language, and demand relief.

Now, while they are awake, they seldom are in a state of indifference: they are generally asleep, or some how or other affected with uneasy sensations.

All modes of speech are the factitious productions of art. It has been long a subject of inquiry, whether there existed in nature an universal language. Without doubt there does, and this is what children speak before they can talk any other. This language, indeed, does not consist of articulate words; but is emphatic, sonorous, and intelligible. The use of the invented modes of speech, hath made us neglect this so much as even quite to forget it. Let us study the wants and efforts of children, and we shall soon learn it again. Nurses are our masters in this language; they understand every thing said by their respective children; they make replies and hold connected dialogues with them; and, though they themselves make use of words, those words are perfectly needless: the child comprehends not the sense of the word, but the accent with which it is pronounced.

To the language of the tongue, we may also add that of gesture, equally expressive. By gesture I do not mean any motion of the feeble hands of such young children; the gesture of infants lies in the muscles of their face. It is astonishing to see such strength of expression in their half-formed physiognomies: their features are continually varying, with inconceivable rapidity of transition. You will see smiles, fears, desires, take place on their countenances, and vanish like lightning; at every change a new face appearing in an instant. The muscles of their
faces

faces are certainly more changeable than ours. On the other hand, their dull and languid eyes hardly speak at all. Such a species of expression indeed is adapted to an age whose wants are merely corporeal; the expression of our feelings consists in grimace, and the distortion of our features; that of our sentiments lies in our eyes.

As man, in his first stage of life, is a wretched and helpless being, so his first mode of expression is that of tears and complaint. An infant is sensible of his wants, and incapable of satisfying them; he therefore implores the assistance of those about him, by his cries. If he be hungry or have thirst, he cries; if too cold or too hot, if he want to move, or to be held still, he cries: if he want to sleep or to be danced about, he has no other method to express himself but by crying.

The less he is in a situation to help himself, the more frequently he requires assistance, to vary his circumstances or position. He has but one kind of language, because he knows in fact but one kind of inconvenience: in the present imperfection of his organs, he is incapable of distinguishing their different impressions; all the different causes of his uneasiness form but one sensation of pain.

Thus from the tears of children, which one is apt to think so little worthy of attention, arises the first sense of the relation which man bears to the objects that surround him: here is forged the first link of that extensive chain which forms the bond of society.

When a child cries, it is evidently uneasy; it
hath

hath some want that requires to be satisfied: we look, we examine what it is, find it out, and relieve it. If this be not the case, and the cause of uneasiness cannot be found, its tears continue to flow, and it begins to grow outrageous: we soothe it, to make it quiet; rock it, or endeavour to sing it asleep: if this does not succeed, we grow impatient and threaten it; nay sometimes a brutal nurse will beat the poor innocent in these circumstances. Strange lessons these, surely, at our first entrance into life!

I shall never forget that I once saw a crying child thus beaten by its nurse; on which it became immediately silent, and, as I thought, intimidated. I reflected upon this occasion, what a servile mind that must be, on which nothing would operate but rigour. I was, however, deceived; the little wretch was almost suffocated with choler; it lost its breath, and I saw it growing black in the face. In a moment after, it set up the most piercing cries; expressing all the signs of resentment, fury, and despair, adapted to its age. I was even apprehensive that it would expire under the violence of its agitation. This example alone would have convinced me, if I could ever have doubted it, of an innate sense of right and wrong being implanted in the human heart. I am very certain, had a burning coal fallen by accident on the hand of the child, it would have been less agitated than by this slight blow, given with a manifest intention to hurt it.

This disposition in children to passion and excessive anger, requires very nice management. Boerhaave thinks the diseases of children should
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be ranked, for the most part, in the class of convulsions; because their heads being proportionably larger, and the nervous system more extended than in adults, their nerves are more susceptible of irritation. Be careful, therefore, to keep them from servants, who are continually teasing and provoking them; such servants are infinitely more fatal to children than the intemperature of the air or the seasons. While infants are crossed only by the resistance of things, and not by persons, they will never grow fractious nor passionate. This is one reason why the children of common people, being more free and independent, are for the most part less infirm and delicate in their constitutions, and more robust than those of others, who, by pretending to educate them better, are perpetually contradicting them. It must, however, be remembered that there is a very wide difference between acting always in obedience to, or humouring a child, and not contradicting it.

Tears are the petitions of young children; if they be not looked on as such, they will soon become commands: infants would begin by praying our assistance, and go on to command our service. Thus from their own weakness, whence at first arises the sense of their dependence, follows the notion of domineering and command. This idea, however, is less excited by their wants than by our assiduities; and here we begin to perceive those moral effects, whose immediate cause doth not exist in nature. At the same time, we see how necessary it is, to discover the secret motives of the cries of children even in their earliest infancy.

When

When a child sometimes holds out its hand, without any other emotion, it thinks to reach the object, because it cannot estimate the distance of it: it is here only mistaken: but when, in reaching out its hand, it cries, or manifests other signs of impatience, it is not deceived in the distance of the object, but is either commanding it to approach, or you to fetch it. In the first case, therefore, it is proper to undeceive the child, by carrying it gently toward the object; and in the last, not to appear to mind it, but, the louder it cries, the less notice to take of it. It is of consequence to check children sometimes, in usurping the command over persons who are not in their power, or over things which they are not sufficiently acquainted with.

For the latter reason, it is better, when a child desires any thing that may be proper to give him, to carry him to the object, than to bring the object to the child; as, by this means, he deduces a conclusion adapted to his tender years, and which there is no other way of suggesting to him.

The Abbe de St Pierre calls men great children; we may with equal propriety give a turn to the expression, and call children little men. These propositions are true as maxims, though as principles they require explanation; but when Hobbes calls a vicious man a robust child, he is guilty of an absolute contradiction. All vice takes its rise from weakness: an infant is vicious only because he is weak; give him power, and you make him good. An all-powerful being could never do any ill. Of all the attributes ascribed to an omnipotent Deity, that of goodness

ness appears to be the most essential to his existence. We cannot conceive him to exist without it. Among all the people who entertained the Manichean notions of two principles, the evil one was constantly supposed inferior to the good; without which their whole system had been to the last degree absurd.

Reason only teaches us to know good from evil. Conscience, which excites us to love the one and hate the other, although independent on reason, cannot discover one from the other without it. Before we come to be capable of reasoning, we do good and ill without knowing it; and there is no morality in our actions, tho' there may, and frequently is, in our sentiments concerning the actions of others relative to us. A child will often put things into disorder, will break every thing it comes near, will grasp a sparrow as it would a stone, and kill it, without knowing what it is doing. And why? A philosopher will presently account for it, from the vices inherent in our nature; the pride, the thirst of power, the self-love, and the wickedness of man: a sense of its weakness, he will add, makes the child eager to perform actions of strength, and to experience its own power. But in answer to this, look upon that infirm and decayed old man, brought back by the revolutions of human life to the weakness of infancy: he not only remains peaceable and quiet in himself, but is desirous every thing about him should be so too. The least change of situation is troublesome to him, and he is pleased with an universal calm. How should the same imbecility, joined with the same passions, produce such different

ferent effects in the two ages, if the original cause were not changed? and where are we to seek this diversity of causes, unless in the physical constitution of the two individuals? The active principle, common to both, expands and unfolds itself in one, and contracts and closes itself in the other; in the one it tends to form, in the other to destroy, the man; in the one it tends to life, and in the other to death. The drooping activity of the vital principle is concentrated in the heart of age; in that of infancy, it overflows and diffuses itself; in the excess of its vivacity, a child seems to have life enough to animate every thing around it. Whether it makes or mars, it is all one to a child, provided the situation of things be changed; as every change necessarily implies action. If it seem to have a propensity to destroy things, it is not from a vicious principle; but because the action, necessary to make or compose any thing, is tedious and slow; whereas that of spoiling and breaking things to pieces, being quicker, agrees better with its natural alertness and vivacity.

At the same time, however, that the Author of nature hath given to children this active principle, he hath taken care to prevent its being hurtful, by giving them as little strength in proportion to indulge it. But no sooner are they misled to conceive the persons about them as instruments which they themselves are to put in action, than they make use of them to assist their weakness in pursuing their inclinations. Hence it is they become importunate, tyrannical, imperious, mischievous, and intractable;

a progress that doth not arise from a natural spirit of domineering, but is the effect of wrong education: for it requires no great experience to perceive how agreeable it is to act by means of others, and to have occasion only to speak in order to put the world in motion.

As it grows up, a child acquires strength, and becomes less active and restless; it contracts its powers more within itself. The body and soul, if I may so say, keep each other in æquilibrium; and nature requires no greater quantity of motion than is necessary to our preservation. But the desire of command doth not cease with the motives that gave rise to it; the notion of superiority is flattering to self-love, and is increased by habit: thus caprice succeeds to necessity, and the force of prejudice and opinion takes root in the mind.

The principle once known, we see clearly the track wherein we began to deviate from nature: let us inquire then, what must be done, in order to prevent our going astray. So far from being endued with superfluous abilities, children have at first hardly sufficient for the purposes nature requires; it is requisite therefore to leave them at full liberty to employ those she hath given them, and which they cannot abuse: this is my first maxim.

It is our duty to assist them, and supply their deficiencies, whether of body or mind, in every circumstance of physical necessity. Second maxim.

Every assistance afforded them should be confined to real utility, without administering any thing to the indulgence of their caprice or unreasonable humours; for they will never be ca-

precious unless through neglect, or in some particular circumstance depending on their constitution. Third maxim.

The meaning of their language and signs ought to be carefully studied, in order to be able to distinguish, in an age when they know not how to dissemble, between those inclinations that arise immediately from nature, and what are only fantastical. Fourth maxim.

The design and tendency of these rules are, to give children more real liberty and less command; to leave them more to do of themselves than to require of others. Thus, by being early accustomed to confine their desires to their abilities, they will be little affected with the want of what is out of their power.

Here we have a new, and very important reason for leaving their body and limbs at full liberty; with this precaution, however, that we remove them from the danger of falling down, and put every thing out of their reach whereby they may wound or hurt themselves.

It cannot be doubted that an infant, whose body and arms are at liberty, will cry less than another bolstered up in swaddling cloaths. The child, who is liable to suffer none but natural inconveniencies, will cry only when it feels pain; which is a great advantage in its education; for then we are certain to know when it stands in real want of assistance; and this should be afforded it, if possible, immediately. But if it be out of our power to relieve it, we should take no notice, nor make any fruitless attempts to quiet it: kisses and caresses will not cure its colic; yet it will remember the methods taken

to

to soothe it; and when it once knows how to employ you at its pleasure, it is become your master, and all is over. Being less restrained in their efforts to move, children would cry less; if we were less importuned with their tears, it would require less trouble to quiet them; threatened and soothed more seldom, they would become less timid and obstinate, and would retain more of their natural temper and disposition. It is less from letting children cry unnoticed, than from striving to appease them, that they get falls: my proof of this is, that those which are most neglected are the least subject to those accidents. I am far, however, from recommending that children should, for this reason, be neglected: on the contrary, I would have so much care taken of them as to prevent accidents of this kind, and not that their cries should give the first notice of them. Neither would I, at the same time, have a nurse be over-solicitous about trifles. Why should she think it so great a hardship on the child, to let it cry a little, when she sees on how many occasions its tears are useful and salutary? When children come to be sensible of the great value you set on their silence, they will take care you shall not have too much of it. They will, at length, set so great a value on it themselves, as to prevent your being able to obtain any; when, by dint of continual crying without success, they strain, exhaust, and sometimes destroy themselves.

The long fits of crying in a child, who is neither confined, sick, nor in real want of any thing, are only fits of habit and obstinacy. They are not to be attributed to nature, but to the

nurse, who, from not knowing how to bear such importunity, only increases it, without reflecting that, in making the child quiet to-day, she is only encouraging it to cry the more to-morrow.

The only way to cure, or prevent, this habit, is, to take no notice of a child in such circumstances. Nobody cares, not even children, to take fruitless pains. They may for a while persevere in their trials; but, if you have more patience than they have obstinacy, they will be disgusted at the experiment, and repeat it no more. This is the method to prevent their tears, and to use them to cry only when they are really in pain.

When they are possessed of these fits of caprice and obstinacy, a certain way to quiet them is, to divert their attention by some agreeable and striking object, that may make them forget their motive for crying. Most nurses excel in practising this expedient; and, if artfully managed, it is very useful: but it is of the utmost consequence that the child should not perceive this intention of diverting him, but that he should imagine we are amusing ourselves without thinking of him: in this respect, however, all nurses are very inexpert, and perversely do a right thing the wrong way.

Children are in general weaned too early. The proper season is indicated by the cutting of their teeth, an operation which is usually very sharp and painful. At this time, by a mechanical instinct, they carry every thing, which is put into their hands, up to their mouths. In order to facilitate this task, therefore, the child

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is usually provided with a coral, or other hard body, to rub against its gums. I am of opinion, however, this doth not answer the end proposed. The rubbing of hard bodies in this case against the gums, so far from softening, must make them hard and callous; rendering the teeth still more difficult to cut, and the pain more acute and lasting. Let us follow the traces of instinct. We do not see the young of the canine species, in cutting their teeth, ever gnaw flints, iron, or bones; but always wood, leather, rags, or other soft substances, which tear to pieces, or yield to the impression of their teeth.

But simplicity is banished from every thing, even from our treatment of the most simple of animals, an helpless infant. It must have bells of silver and gold, and corals of all sorts and prices. What an useless and destructive apparatus! I would have nothing of all this. No bells, no corals, for my child; but little natural twigs taken from the tree, with their leaves and fruit, the dried heads of poppies, in which it might hear the seeds rattle, a stick of liquorice which it might suck and chew: these would amuse it as well as any such magnificent toys, and would not use it to the luxurious parade of wealth or distinction.

It is generally acknowledged, that milk-meats, or puddings made of raw flour, are not a very wholesome nutriment, boiled milk and crude meal never agreeing well with the stomach. In puddings the flour is less baked than in bread, besides that it has not been fermented: panada, or bread-puddings, as also those made of the best rice, I should think much preferable. But

if children must absolutely have flour-puddings, it is proper the flour should be baked a little beforehand. We make, in my country, a very agreeable and wholesome soup, with a meal thus prepared. Meat-broths, and other spoon-meats of that kind, are also an indifferent aliment; which should be used but sparingly. It is necessary that children should accustom themselves early to chew; this is the true way to facilitate the cutting their teeth: and hence, when they begin to swallow, the saliva, mixed with their aliment, promotes digestion.

I would therefore use them, betimes, to chew dried fruits and crusts of bread. I would give them hard cakes and biscuits to play with; by softening which in their mouths they would sometimes swallow part of them: thus they would cut their teeth easily, and wean themselves almost imperceptibly. Infants born and brought up in the country have generally a very good appetite, and require no other trouble in weaning.

Children are accustomed to listen to sounds from their birth: we not only talk to them before they can understand the meaning of what is said, but before they can mimic the sounds repeated in their hearing. Their organs of speech, as yet in a state of incapacity, are brought by slow degrees to the imitation of sounds; and indeed we are not well assured that these make as distinct impressions on their organs of hearing as on ours. I do not disapprove of the nurse's amusing her child with singing, and other very sprightly and chearful notes; but I am absolutely against her stunning it perpetually with a confused

fused heap of useless words, of which the child comprehends nothing but the tone in which they are spoken. The first words repeated in the hearing of an infant, should be few, easy, and distinct : they should also be repeated often, and be only such as serve to express sensible objects, which may, at the same time, be pointed out to its view. Our unhappy readiness to content ourselves with words we do not understand, takes place earlier than may be imagined. The school-boy listens to the gabbling usher of his class, with the same stupid attention as he did to the prattle of his nurse. Hence it appears to be a very useful mode of instruction, to bring up children to hear nothing of it.

A thousand considerations present themselves, when we come to reflect on the formation of the language, and the first attempts of children. Whatever pains or method we take, they will all learn to speak in the same manner, so that philosophical speculations are entirely useless.

They have, as it were, a grammar adapted to their age, the rules of whose syntax are more general than those of ours ; and if we consider it attentively, we shall be surprised to see the exactness with which they pursue certain analogies ; very mistaken ones, if you will ; but very regular, and exceptionable only from their uncouth turn, or contrariety to common practice. Methinks I hear a poor boy severely reprimanded by his father, for saying, *Mon pere, irai-je-t-y ?* Now, it is clear the child pursues analogy better than our grammarians ; for as we should say to him, *Vas-y*, why should he not have said, *Irai-je-t-y ?* It is to be observed also with what address

address he thus avoided the disagreeable *hiatus* in saying *irai-je-y*, or *y irai-je*? Is it the fault of the poor child that we have improperly deprived this phrase of the determinate adverb *y*, because we know not what to do with it *? It is an intolerable and very superfluous piece of pedantry to think of correcting in children such little trespasses against the customs of speech as these, of which they infallibly correct themselves in time. Speak always correctly yourself, in their presence; behave so that they shall be better pleased with your company than that of others; and be assured their language will grow insensibly correct and pure as your own.

An abuse of another kind, though of equal importance, and not less easy to prevent, is our being too earnest to teach them to speak; as if we were afraid they would never learn it of themselves. This imprudent forwardness is productive of an effect directly contrary to the end designed, and occasions them to talk less early and more indistinct: the extreme attention which is paid to every thing they attempt to say, makes it needless for them to pronounce their words distinctly; hence, taking the trouble only just to open their mouths, many of them retain during life a vicious mode of pronunciation, and a confused manner of speech, that renders them almost unintelligible.

I have lived much among the country people, and never heard any of them lisp, whether men
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* Any reader, possessed of the least smattering of French, will readily understand this example, and at the same time see the impossibility of the translator's rendering it in English.

or women, old or young. May we not ask, whence this could happen? Are the organs in peasants constructed different from ours? No; they are only differently exercised. Opposite my window is a little mount, whereon the little children of the place assemble to play; and, although they are at a good distance, I can perfectly distinguish what they say, and often take down minutes of their discourse, as proper hints for this work. At the same time I am every day deceived by mine ear, as to their several ages; by their voices I should take them sometimes to be nine or ten years old, and by their looks and stature to be but three or four. Nor have I confined this observation to myself, but tried the same experiment on several of my city-friends, who come occasionally to visit me; all of whom have, without exception, fallen into the same mistake.

The reason of this is, that children educated in town, being chiefly confined to the nursery, and for ever under the wing of their governess, have occasion only to mumble out their words to be understood: they no sooner move their lips, than every one is attentive to what they have to say; the words they cannot pronounce, or pronounce ill, are said for them; and thus, by dint of attention, and by having the same people always about them, the meaning of what they would say is rather guessed at, than of what they actually do say understood.

In the country it is quite different. The nurse is not perpetually at hand, and the child is obliged to learn to speak distinctly and loud what he wants to have understood. There the children

dren rambling about the fields at a distance from their father, mother, or playfellows, are habituated to make themselves heard a great way off, and to adapt the efforts of their voice to their distance from those they would make to hear them. This is the true method of learning pronunciation, and not that of stammering out a few inarticulate words to an attentive governess. Thus when you speak to the child of a peasant, its bashfulness may prevent its giving you an answer; but whatever it says, it speaks plain and properly: whereas, on the contrary, in town, the nurse must always act as an interpreter, without which you would never be able to understand what is muttered between the teeth of their children *.

As they grow up, indeed, the boys ought to correct themselves of this fault, by what they learn at college, and the girls at the convent or boarding-school: in fact, those who are thus educated, speak in general more distinctly than such as are brought up constantly at home. But what prevents them from ever acquiring so clear and articulate a pronunciation as that of the peasants, is the necessity imposed on them of learning many things by heart, and of repeating them

* This is not without exception: those children who are at first the most difficult to understand, become often the most loud and noisy when they begin to acquire strength of voice. But there would be no end of replying particularly to such *minutia*; the sensible reader will easily perceive, that both deficiencies and excess in the same species of abuse may be equally remedied by the same method. I look upon these two maxims as inseparable; *always enough*, and *never too much*. The latter is the necessary consequence of the firm establishment of the former.

them afterwards aloud; for, in studying, they habituate themselves to scribble, and jabber over their lessons. Again, in reciting them, it is still worse; as, being frequently at a loss for words, they draw out their sentences and syllables in the most disagreeable tones: it is impossible it should, in such case, be otherwise; when the memory fails, the tongue must gabble of course. Thus it is we contract and retain the habits of a vicious pronunciation. Emilius, as will be seen hereafter, shall contract no such habits, or at least not in the same manner.

I acknowledge that the common people and peasants run into the other extreme: that they almost always speak louder than is needful; that, in pronouncing their words too articulately, their speech is harsh and disgusting; and that they make an ill choice of words and phrases.

But, in the first place, this extreme doth not appear to me so vicious as the other; for, as the chief end of speech is to make ourselves understood, certainly the greatest fault we can be guilty of in speaking is to be unintelligible. To affect to speak without accent or emphasis, is to deprive our discourse of all gracefulness and energy. Accent is the soul of conversation, and gives it expression and sincerity. It is less deceitful than words: and perhaps this is the reason it is rejected by persons of polite education. It is the custom of saying every thing in the same tone of voice and manner, that qualifies us for the mean art of abusing people without their perceiving it. To the diffuse and prescription of accent succeed the various affected, ridiculous, and absurd modes of polite conversation,

tion, in use particularly with those who frequent the court. This affectation of speech and look is what generally renders the French, at the first interview, disagreeable to people of other nations. Instead of giving their speech its natural accent, they give it an affected one; which is not a method to prepossess others in their favour.

All those little errors in speech, which we are usually so much afraid children should fall into, are not worth notice; they are with the greatest ease either to be prevented or amended: but those habits which they contract, by our rendering their discourse low, confused, and timid, by incessantly criticising their tone of voice, and taking exception at their words, can never be corrected. A man who hath learned to talk only in the nursery, and in assemblies, would make himself little understood at the head of a battalion, and would never be able to silence a popular tumult by his elocution. Let children first learn to speak to men; they will be able to prattle to women whenever they please.

Nurse them in the country amidst rustic sports and employments: they will there acquire a voice clear and sonorous, nor be in a situation to contract the confused lisping and stammering of children educated in town. Nor will they be any more liable to contract the provincial phrases and accent of the country; or at least will soon shake them off, if their master living with them from their birth, and conversing with them daily, take care to prevent, or efface, by the purity of his own language, the impressions made by the dialect of the peasants. Emilius must be taught to speak as good French as I am
master

master of, and at the same time to pronounce it much better and more distinctly than I can.

A child, who would learn to speak, should be accustomed only to hear words whose meaning he might be easily made to comprehend, and to speak those only which he is in a capacity to pronounce articulately. The efforts he makes to do this, will induce him frequently to repeat the same syllable, as it were to exercise himself in the distinct pronunciation of it. When he begins to stutter, however, never give yourself the trouble to guess what he would say. To presume even to be always attended to, is exercising a sort of command; and in this, be it of what kind soever, a child should never be indulged. Let it be thought sufficient with you, to provide him, very carefully, with what is necessary; it is his province to endeavour to make you understand what is not so. Much less should you be so precipitate, to oblige him to speak; he will learn to talk well enough of himself as he comes to perceive the utility of it.

It has been remarked, indeed, that such children as are backward in learning to talk, never speak so distinctly as others. It is not, however, from their being backward to speak that their organs contract any impediment; but, on the contrary, it is some natural impediment which makes them so late before they speak. Were not this the case, why should they be the less forward in this respect than others? Have they less need of speech, or are they less excited to it? This is not the case, but the direct contrary; for the great concern arising from this delay, when it comes to be known, occasions the poor

child to be much more eagerly solicited and tormented to speak than are those who begin earlier : now those solicitations to repeated efforts greatly contribute to render its speech confused and stammering ; whereas, if treated less precipitately, it would have had more time and leisure to have acquired a better pronunciation.

Children who are pressed too much to speak, have neither time allowed them to learn to pronounce distinctly what they say, nor to comprehend perfectly what they hear : whereas, if left to themselves, they would begin to practise upon words of the most easy pronunciation, annexing to them some signification, which they would make understood by their gestures ; they would give you their own words before they received yours, and make use of the latter only as they should understand them : for not being pressed to it, they would first observe the sense you yourself should give them ; which when they were certain of, they would adopt them accordingly.

But the greatest evil attending this precipitation, is, not that our first discourse to children, and the first language they speak, are to them void of meaning ; but that, with respect to them, they convey a meaning different from ours, without our knowing it, or being able to find it out ; so that, in sometimes appearing to answer us very pertinently, they speak without having understood us, and without our understanding them. It is at such equivocal expressions we are sometimes so much surprised, when we annex ideas to their words to which they themselves are strangers.

frangers. This inattention, on our part, to the true sense that words convey to children, appears to be the grand cause of the first errors they fall into, and which, even after they are undeceived, continue to influence their turn of mind during the rest of their lives. I shall have more than one occasion, in the following sheets, to illustrate this by examples.

The vocabulary of a child, therefore, should be as confined as possible. It is a very great inconvenience for him to have more words than ideas, to know how to talk about things of which he is yet incapable of thinking. I imagine one reason, why persons who live in the country have generally more clear understandings than those who reside in town, is, that their dictionary is less extensive. They have few ideas; but they compare, and reason on them very justly.

In the first developement of the several organs and faculties of a child, they nearly accompany each other. He begins to talk, to eat, to walk, almost at the same time. This may be properly called the first epoch of human life. Before this period, he is little better than he was in the womb of his mother; he has no sentiments, no ideas, nay hardly any sensations; he is even insensible of his own existence:

Vivit, et est vita nescius ipse suæ.

Ovid. Trist. i. 3.

BOOK II.

WE are come now to the second period of life, at which the state of infancy, properly speaking, ends, and that of puerility begins: for the words *infans* and *puer* are by no means synonymous. The first is comprehended in the other, and signifies a child *who cannot speak*; hence we find, in Valerius Maximus, the expression *puerum infantem*. I shall continue, notwithstanding, to make use of the word *children* agreeable to its modern acceptance.

When a child begins to talk, it weeps less. This progression is natural; one language being only substituted for another. As soon as he can complain in express terms, why should he do it by tears, unless indeed he suffer too violently to be able to vent his complaint in words? If he continue, otherwise, in the practice of crying, it is the fault of those who are about him. When once Emilius comes to be able to say, *I am not well*, he must be in very great pain indeed if he afterwards sheds a tear.

If a child be of a delicate constitution, extremely susceptible, and naturally apt to cry for nothing, I would soon dry up the source of his tears by rendering them fruitless. So long as he should continue crying, I would not go near him; but run to him immediately on his becoming silent. By this means, his manner of calling me to his assistance would be by his silence, or, at most, by giving only one cry. It is from the perceptible effect of signs, that children judge

judge of their meaning; they see no other relation between them. Whatever mischief a child may have done itself, it is very rare for it to cry when alone, at least if it hath no hopes of being heard.

If Emilius should get a fall, a bump on his forehead, make his nose bleed, or cut his fingers; instead of running to him with an air of apprehension and danger, I would remain quite still, at least for some time. The mischief is done, and there is a necessity for his bearing the pain of it; my over-solicitude would only serve to frighten him the more, and increase his sensibility. In fact, it is less the pain than the fright which affects children on these occasions. I would spare him, at least, the anxiety of the latter; for he will certainly judge of his misfortune in a great degree as I do. If he sees me alarmed, run eagerly to his relief, console and pity him, he will think himself undone: but if he sees me apparently indifferent, and make light of it, he will soon make as light of it himself, and think himself cured as soon as the smart is over. It is at this age children acquire their first principles of courage; and, by being inured to slight inconveniences, learn by degrees to support greater.

So far also from being anxious to prevent Emilius from cutting or hurting himself, I should be very sorry if this did not sometimes happen; and that he should grow up without feeling pain. The first thing we ought to learn, and that which is of the greatest consequence for us to know, is to suffer. It seems as if children were formed little and feeble only to learn this important lesson without danger. If they fall down,

or run against any thing, they neither break a leg nor an arm: if they wound themselves with any sharp instrument, the wound is hardly ever fatal or very deep. I know not, in short, any instance of a child, when left at liberty, having killed, maimed, or done itself any considerable damage; unless, indeed, in cases where it has been imprudently exposed to tumble down from some high place, to fall into the fire, or within the reach of some deadly weapon. How useless and pernicious, therefore, is that magazine of implements with which a child is armed at all points against pain; and is hence exposed to it, when he grows up without experience and without courage; so that he is apt to think himself mortally wounded by the prick of a pin, and to faint away at the sight of his own blood!

Our pedantic method of instruction is, always to teach children what they would learn better of themselves, and to neglect what we only are capable of teaching them. Is there any thing more ridiculous than the pains we take to teach them to walk, as if we had ever seen a child, through the negligence of its nurse, ignorant of it when he is grown up! On the contrary, how many persons do we see walk badly all their lives, because they were badly taught at first?

Emilius shall have no pudding-caps, no go-earts, no swings, no leading-strings, or at most only a back-string, for the sake of holding him up on the pavement when he just begins to walk, or to assist him in running *. Instead of keeping

* No persons are so ridiculous in their gait, nor less sure-footed, than such as have been too much used to leading-strings when

ing him stifling in the close air of his nursery, he should be taken out every day into the open fields. There he might run and play about; and if he tumbles a hundred times a-day, so much the better; he will the sooner learn, when down, to get up again. The pleasure of being at liberty will be a sufficient recompense for his falls. I would have my pupil frequently hurt himself; in return, however, he would be always gay and sprightly; whereas, though yours should hurt themselves less, they would be, on the other hand, more fractious, peevish, and dull. I doubt much if the advantage would be on their side.

Another step in the progress of children, renders complaints less needful; this depends on the developement of their corporeal powers. When they are capable of doing more themselves, they have less need of recurring frequently to others. With the increase of their strength, increases also their knowledge in the means of exerting it. It is at this period the life of the individual may be properly said to commence; it is at this time he begins to be conscious of himself. His memory extends the sense of his identity to every moment of his existence; he becomes always one and the same person, and of course already susceptible of happiness or misery. From this time, therefore, he must be considered as a moral being.

Although the longest term of human life is deter-

when little. This is another of those observations which are esteemed trivial, because notoriously true, and which are true also in more senses than one.

determinate, and it be easy to calculate the probability of our reaching that term at any intermediate age, yet nothing is more uncertain than the duration of life in the persons of individuals; very few of whom arrive at its longest period. Life is the most precarious at its commencement; the less time we have existed, the less hope have we of future existence. Of all the children that are born, the half only, at most, arrive at the age of fourteen, and it is very probable yours may not reach the age of manhood.

What can we think, then, of that barbarous method of education, by which the present is sacrificed to an uncertain future; by which a child is laid under every kind of restraint, and is made miserable, by way of preparing him for we know not what pretended happiness, which there is reason to believe he may never live to enjoy? Supposing it not unreasonable in its design, how can we see, without indignation, the unhappy innocents subjected to a yoke of insupportable rigour, and condemned like galley-slaves to continual labour, without being assured that such mortifications and restrictions will ever be of any service to them? The age of cheerfulness and gaiety is spent in the midst of tears, punishments, threats, and slavery. We torment the poor creatures, for their future good; and perceive not that death is at hand, and ready to seize them amidst all this sorrowful preparation for life. Who can tell how many children have fallen victims to the extravagant sagacity of their parents and guardians? Happy to escape such cruelty, the only advantage

tage the poor sufferers reaped from the evils they endured, being to die without regretting a life of misery.

Man, be humane ! It is the first, the chief of moral duties, to exercise humanity to every thing, of what age or condition soever, that is relative to man. What ! is wisdom void of humanity ? Have a tender regard for children ; indulge them in their diversions, their pleasures, and in every thing dictated by their harmless natures.

Who is there among us that has not, at times, looked back with regret on that period of our lives, wherein the countenance was always smiling, and the heart as constantly at ease. Why will you deprive the little innocents of the enjoyment of a season so short and transient ? of a blessing so precious, which they cannot abuse ? Why will you clog, with bitterness and sorrow, those rapid moments which will return no more for them than for you ? Ye fathers, do you know when the stroke of death shall fall on your offspring ? Lay not up in store, then, for your own sorrow, by depriving them of the enjoyment of the few moments nature has allotted them : as soon as they become sensible of the pleasures of existence, let them enjoy it, so that whenever it may please God to call them home, they may not die without having tasted of life.

What exclamations are here raised against me ! How loud I hear the clamours of that mistaken wisdom, which leads us perpetually out of ourselves ; which regards the present always as nothing, and, incessantly pursuing a future that recedes as we advance, by taking us from the spot we are in, transports us where we shall never be !

This

This is the time, you will perhaps reply, to correct the propensities of human nature: it is in infancy, you will say, when our pains are least violent, that they should be multiplied, in order to diminish their number when we arrive at the years of discretion. But who hath told you that such will be the consequence? or that such an arrangement of cause and effect is in your power? or that all that fine discipline, in which you train the weak mind of an infant, will not be one day more pernicious than useful? Who hath assured you that you shall save him any pain or trouble hereafter, by what you inflict on him now? and how will you prove to me, that those evil propensities which you pretend to eradicate, are not owing to your own mistaken behaviour, much more than to nature? That is an unlucky foresight which makes us for the present miserable, under the notion, whether well or ill founded, of rendering us one day or other happy. Hence let those who usually confound liberty and licentiousness, and make no difference between a child that is spoiled, and one that is made happy, learn to make a distinction.

To prevent our running into chimeras, let us never lose sight of what is befitting our situation. Humanity has its place in the order and constitution of things; the state of infancy in those of human life; men should be considered as men, and children as children. To assign both their separate places, and regulate the human passions, agreeable to the constitution of man, are all that can be done for his happiness. The rest depends

pend on circumstances which are not in our power.

We know nothing of absolute happiness or misery. All is in this life a mixture of both; we never enjoy a pure sense of either; indeed, we remain not two moments together in the same circumstances. The affections of the mind, as well as the modifications of the body, are in a perpetual change. Good and evil are common to every thing, and affect us only in different proportions. The most happy are those who feel the least of pain; the most miserable, those who experience the most of pleasure. Every one suffers more from the former than he enjoys of the latter, and this disproportion is common to all mankind. The happiness of man, in his present state, is merely negative, and must be estimated by the least quantity of his sufferings.

Every sense of pain is inseparable from the desire of being freed from it: every idea of pleasure is alike inseparable from the desire of enjoying it; now, every desire supposes the privation or absence of the object desired, and this circumstance is always in some degree painful; in the disproportion, therefore, between our desires and our abilities, consists our misery. A susceptible being whose abilities should be equal to its desires, would be positively happy.

In what then consists human wisdom, or the means of acquiring happiness? To diminish our desires is certainly not the method; for if these were less than our abilities, part of our faculties would remain useless and inactive, and we should enjoy but half our being. Nor is it, on the other hand, to extend our natural capacity

city for enjoyment; for if our desires, at the same time, be extended in a greater proportion, we should only become thereby the more miserable.

It must consist, therefore, in lessening the disproportion between our abilities and our desires; and in reducing our inclinations and our powers to a perfect equilibrium. It is in such a situation, and in that only, that all our faculties may be employed; and yet the mind preserve its tranquillity, and the body its due regularity and ease.

It is thus nature, which formed every thing in the best manner, originally constituted us. Man, in his infancy, is possessed only of such desires as tend to his preservation, and of the faculties necessary to their gratification. Nature keeps all the rest concealed, as it were, in the bottom of his mind, to be produced as he shall have occasion for them. It is in this primitive state only that our desires and faculties are counterpoised by each other, and that man is not unhappy. As soon as his potential faculties proceed to action, imagination, the most active of all, takes its flight and goes before them. It is our imagination which forms an estimate of possibilities, good or evil; and which, of course, excites and inflames our desires with the hopes of gratifying them. But the object, which at first appears to be even in our possession, flies and outstrips our pursuit; or, when we think we have reached it, is transformed into a different shape, while that which attracted us appears still at a distance. When we no longer behold the distance we have run, we esteem it as nothing; while the remainder of our course seems the
more

more to extend itself : thus we exhaust ourselves before we arrive at the goal ; and the more we gain upon enjoyment, the farther distant doth happiness appear.

On the contrary, the less mankind depart from their natural situation, the less is the difference between their desires and abilities, and of consequence the nearer they are to happiness. Man is never more miserable than when he appears to be totally unprovided with any thing : for misery doth not consist in the mere privation of things, but in our sense of the want of them.

The material universe has its limits, the imaginary world is infinite : as we cannot enlarge the one, therefore, let us contract the other ; for it is their difference only that gives birth to all those inconveniences that make us really unhappy. If we except the blessings of strength, health, and the testimony of a good conscience, all the other conveniences and pleasures of life depend on opinion : except pain of body and remorse of conscience, all our evils are imaginary. This principle, it may be said, is trite and common. I confess it : but the practical application of it is not common ; and it is of the practice only I am now speaking.

When we say man is weak and feeble, what do we mean by it ? The word *feebleness* indicates some relation, a relation to the being to which it is applied. A being whose powers should exceed its wants, were it even an insect, a worm, could not be with propriety called feeble ; although another, whose wants should exceed its abilities, were it an elephant, or a lion, were he a conqueror, a hero, or a god, would be justly

denominated weak and feeble. When the apostate angel mistook his nature, and rebelled, he was much more weak than the happy mortal who is contented with his state of humanity. Man is very powerful when he is satisfied with being only what he is; but he is very weak when he would raise himself above his species: do not imagine, therefore, that in extending your faculties, you extend your powers of gratification; on the contrary, you diminish them, if your pride soars above them. Let us measure the radius of our sphere, and, like the insect in the middle of its web, remain in its centre: let us be satisfied with ourselves, and we shall have no occasion to complain of our weakness; for we shall never perceive it.

All animals are endued with the faculties necessary to their preservation, and no other. Man only is possessed of those which are superfluous. Is it not very strange that this superfluity should conduce to his unhappiness? In every country, the labour of a man's hands is sufficient for his subsistence. Were he wise enough to set the rest at nought, he would always be provided with what is necessary, because he would never have too much. Great wants often arise from great possessions, and the best means to acquire those things we want, is to deprive ourselves of what we already have. It is by our solicitous endeavours to increase our happiness that we change it into misery. Every man who is desirous only to live, will live happy; and of consequence will live honest, for of what advantage would dishonesty be to him?

If we were immortal, we should be, of all beings

ings, the most miserable. It is, doubtless, hard to die; but it is agreeable to hope we shall not live here for ever, and that a better life will put an end to the troubles of this. If we were offered immortality on earth, who is there would accept so melancholy a gift? What resource, what hope, what consolation, would be left us against the rigour of fortune and the injustice of mankind: the ignorant, who foresee nothing, are little sensible of the value of life, and are little afraid to lose it: the enlightened and truly wise have in prospect the possessions of a future life of greater value, which they prefer to all those of the present. It is only the vain and superficial pretenders to wisdom, that, in prolonging our views to the end of this life, and no farther, have done the most essential injury to mankind. The necessity of dying is, to a wise man, a reason for supporting the painful incidents of life. If we were not certain some time or other to lose it, it would cost us too much in its preservation.

As to moral evils, they all depend on opinion, except one, which is guilt, and that depends on ourselves: our physical evils either destroy themselves or us. Time or death are infallible remedies: but we suffer so much the more by them in proportion as we are ignorant how to bear them; and torment ourselves just as much more, by endeavouring to cure our maladies, as we suffer in supporting them. Live according to nature, be patient, and banish the physicians: by this means you will not, indeed, escape death, but you will feel its pangs but once; whereas, otherwise, it will be every day represented to your troubled imagination in all its horrors; while

the deluding art of medicine, instead of prolonging your days, will only rob you of their enjoyment. I would be glad to know of what real utility this art hath been to mankind. Some of those it cures, it is true, might otherwise die; but millions it has killed, might otherwise have survived their diseases. Will a man of sense ever put into such a lottery, where there are so many blanks to a prize? Surely no. Let him bear what he must; but whether it be his fate to die or recover, let him live at least as long as he can.

All is folly and contradiction in human affairs. We are more anxious about the preservation of life, in proportion as it becomes less worthy our consideration. Thus old men regret its loss more than young; they are unwilling to throw away the preparations they have been so long making to enjoy it. It is very cruel, at sixty years of age, to be snatched away by death before we have begun to live. It is conceived, that man hath a strong propensity to self-preservation, and this is true; but it is not generally perceived that this propensity, such as we experience it, is the effect of education. Man, by nature, is solicitous about his preservation only as the means of it are in his power: when these are out of his reach, he lies down contented, and dies, without tormenting himself to no purpose. Thus the first principle of resignation is instilled into us by nature. Savages and brutes struggle but little with death, but expire without complaining. This natural principle being destroyed, others are to be deduced from reason; but few know how to draw practical conclusions
of

of this kind; their factitious resignation being never so entire and complete as the first.

That foresight, which carries us beyond ourselves, and often transports us in imagination to scenes we shall never arrive at, this it is which is the true source of all our miseries. What frenzy is it, in a being so transitory as man, to keep always looking forward to a futurity that seldom arrives, and to neglect the present of which he is so certain! A frenzy by so much the more fatal, as it increases with age, and as old men, always distrustful, provident, and covetous, had rather deny themselves necessities to-day, than run the chance of wanting them an hundred years hence. Thus we lay hold and are tenacious of every thing; time, place, persons, and circumstances, all that is, or may be, becomes of consequence to our welfare: our own persons are thus the least part of ourselves. Every one expands himself, if I may so say, over the face of the earth, and becomes susceptible on every part of its extensive surface. Is it to be wondered at that our evils should multiply, and that we should feel in all those parts wherein we are capable of being wounded? How many sovereigns have been made unhappy by the loss of countries they have never seen? How many merchants are required to trade to the Indies, to furnish out the cries of Paris?

Is this nature, which thus transports men so far from themselves? Doth nature lay us under this dependence, to learn our destiny from others, and even sometimes be the last to hear of it; so that a man may die happy or miserable, without knowing any thing at all of the matter?

I see a person sprightly, gay, vigorous, and in health; his countenance inspiring joy, his looks denoting ease and contentment; in a word, the picture of happiness: the post arrives, a letter is brought him, he looks on the address, opens and reads it: his countenance changes, he grows pale, and falls motionless to the ground: when he comes to himself, he falls to weeping, sobbing, and tearing his hair; he makes the air resound with his exclamations, and seems agitated by the most terrible convulsions. Senseless man! what harm can that piece of paper have done you? what member hath it dislocated or broken? what crime hath it made you commit? in short, what change hath it worked in yourself, to throw you into such agitations?

What if this letter had miscarried, or had been thrown, by some charitable hand, into the fire? Would not the loss of this happy, and at the same time unhappy mortal, have been very problematical? His misfortune, though he had not heard of it, you will say, had been nevertheless real. Very well; but if he did not feel it, where was he in the mean time? His happiness, you will say, was only imaginary: I understand you: that is, health, ease, cheerfulness, and content of mind, are only chimeras. We no longer exist where we are, but exist only where we are not. Is it worth while to be under such fear of death, while that in which we live remains behind us?

Confine, O man, thy existence within thyself, and thou wilt be no longer miserable. Remain in the place nature hath assigned you in the scale of beings: spurn not against the hard law of necessity, nor waste, by your opposition, that strength
which

which heaven hath bestowed on you, not to extend and prolong your existence, but only to preserve it during its own time and in its own manner. Your liberty, your power, extend as far as your natural faculties, and no farther; all the rest is only slavery, illusion, and deceit. Authority itself is servile, when it is founded on opinion; for you depend on the prejudices of those whom you govern by the force of prejudice. To govern them according to your own pleasure, you must govern them agreeable to theirs. They have only to change their mode of thinking, and you will be obliged to change yours of acting. Those who approach you, need only know how to influence the opinions of the people over whom you bear imaginary sway, those of the favourites by whom you are swayed, those of your family, or even of yourself; and your vizirs, courtiers, priests, soldiers, valets, and even children, if you should resemble Themistocles*, will lead you like a child yourself in the midst of your legions. Do what you will, your actual authority will reach no farther than your personal abilities. As soon as it becomes necessary for you to see through the eyes of others, your will also must be directed by theirs. My people are my subjects, you will say, haughtily. Be it so. But who are you? the subject of your ministers:

* That little boy you see there, says Themistocles, is the arbiter of all Greece; for he governs my mother, my mother rules me, I the Athenians, and the Athenians all the other Greeks. What petty personages should we often find governors of the greatest empires, if from that of the sovereign we gradually descended to the first hand that puts the secret springs of this government in motion.

sters: And your ministers, in turn, what are they? the subjects of their secretaries, clerks, and mistresses, the servants of their very servants. Seize, usurp every thing, and then distribute gold by handfuls, erect batteries and gibbets, make laws, proclaim edicts, increase the number of your spies, soldiers, prisons, and executioners; impotent, petty sovereigns! what end will all this answer? You will be no better served, no less plundered and deceived, and not a jot more absolute. You will be ever saying, "Such is our sovereign will and pleasure," and always doing the will and pleasure of others.

He only performs the actions of his own will, who stands in no need of the assistance of others to put his designs in execution: and hence it follows, that the greatest of all blessings is not authority, but liberty. A man truly free, wills only what he is able to perform, and performs what he pleases. This is my fundamental maxim. It need only be applied to a state of infancy, and all the rules of education will naturally flow from it.

Society has enervated man, not only by depriving him of the privilege of exerting his natural faculties, but particularly in rendering them insufficient for his purposes. Hence it is that his desires are increased with his weakness; and hence also we may see what is the weakness of a child compared with that of a man. If man is a powerful, and a child a feeble being, it is not because the former has more absolute strength than the latter, but because he is naturally capable of supplying his own wants, and the other is not. Men therefore should be more refo-

resolute, and children more capricious; by which I mean, the latter should have a greater number of desires that do not arise from real wants, and cannot be gratified without the assistance of others.

I have given a reason for the weakness of a state of infancy. Nature hath provided for it, in the attachment of parents to their offspring. This attachment, however, may be carried to excess, and is subject to great abuse. Parents, who live themselves in a civilized state, introduce their children into the world too young. By increasing the number of their wants, instead of relieving, they augment the natural weakness of infancy. They augment it farther, in requiring more of a child than is required by nature, in subjecting to the will of the parent the little strength a child has to execute its own, and in converting into servility on both sides the reciprocal dependence adapted to the weakness of the one and the attachment of the other.

A wise man knows and will keep his place; but a child is ignorant of his, and therefore cannot confine himself to it. There are a thousand avenues through which he will be apt to escape: it belongs to those who have the care of his education, therefore, to prevent him; a task, by the way, which is not very easy. He should be neither treated as an irrational animal, nor as a man; but simply as a child: he should be made sensible of his weakness, but not abandoned to suffer by it; he should be taught dependence, and not merely obedience; he should be instructed to ask, and not to command. He is in a state of submission to others, only because of his
wants,

wants, and because they know better than himself what is good or hurtful for him. No one hath a right, not even the father of a child, to command it to do any thing that is useless.

Before prejudice and custom have altered our natural dispositions, the happiness of children, as well as of men, consists in the exercise of their liberty; but this liberty in the first is limited by their weakness. Whosoever does what he will is happy, provided he is capable of doing it himself: this is the case with man in a state of nature. But though a man act as he pleases, yet if his desires surpass his personal abilities, he is not happy: this is the case with children in the same state. They enjoy, even in that of nature, but an imperfect liberty, resembling that which men enjoy in a state of civil society. As we all stand in need of each other, we become by that means weak and miserable. Nature intended us to be men; the laws and customs of society have reduced us to the condition of children. The rich, the great, the powerful, are all mere infants, who, seeing every one solicitous to relieve their misery, deduce from thence the most puerile vanity, and are proud of that service and attendance which would not be paid them if they were completely men.

These considerations are of great importance, and may serve to account for all the contradictions we meet with in the social system. Man is subjected by two kinds of dependence: the first on circumstances and things, which is that of nature; and the second on men, which is the effect of society. The former being merely
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physical, is in no degree destructive of liberty, nor productive of guilt: the latter, being unnatural and disorderly *, is productive of all manner of vice; and it is by means of this the master and the slave mutually corrupt each other. If there be any way to remedy this evil in society, it is by substituting laws in the place of persons, and to invest the general will with a real power superior to that of individuals. If the laws of nations, like those of nature, were so fixed and invariable, as that no human force or art could alter them, our dependence on men would then become the same as that on circumstances; we might unite, in a republican government, all the advantages of a state of nature with those of society; to that liberty which preserves man from falling into vice, we might add that morality which raises him up to virtue. But this is not the case.

Subject your child, therefore, only to a dependence on circumstances; you will then follow the order of nature in the progress of his education. Oppose to his indiscreet desires only physical obstacles, or the inconveniencies naturally arising from the actions themselves; these he will remember on a future occasion: without forbidding him to do ill, it is sufficient to prevent him. Experience and impotence only should lay on him their positive commands. Give him nothing because he desires it, but because it is needful for him. Let him not know, that

* In my treatise on the principles of politic law, it is demonstrated, that the wills of individuals cannot be prescribed or subjected by any system of laws.

that in doing your will he is obedient to you, nor that in doing his you are subservient to him. Instil no ideas of command or obedience, but let him conceive both your actions and his own to be equally independent. Assist him when he stands in need of it, just so much as is necessary to make him free, but not imperious; thus in receiving that assistance with a kind of humiliation, he will aspire after that moment when he shall be able to do without it, and have the honour to serve himself.

In order to strengthen and forward the body in its growth, nature employs various means, which should never be thwarted. We should never, for instance, oblige a child to stand still, when it is desirous of running about; nor to walk about, when it is propense to stand. If the disposition of children is not spoiled by our own fault, they will never require any thing that is useless. Let them leap, run about, and make what noise they please. This is all the natural effect of the activity of their constitution, exerting itself to gather strength; but we ought to distrust every desire which they are incapable of themselves to gratify, and for which they are obliged to request our assistance. We should be very careful here to distinguish between the true, the physical want, and that of caprice, which now begins to shew itself, or that which arises only from the superfluity before mentioned.

I have already advised what is to be done when a child cries for this thing or the other. To this I will only add, that, when it is capable of expressing itself in words, if it endeavours to enforce its demands by crying, in order to obtain

tain its wants more speedily, or to come over a refusal, it ought to be absolutely and irrevocably denied. When it desires what is necessary, you ought to know and immediately comply with its request: but to be induced to do any thing by its tears, is to encourage it to cry; it is to teach it to doubt your good-will, and to think you are influenced more by importunity than benevolence. Beware of this: for if your child once comes to imagine you are not of a good disposition, he will soon be of a bad one; if he once thinks you compliant, he will soon grow obstinate. You should comply with his request immediately, if you do not intend to refuse it. Mortify him not with frequent denials, but never revoke a refusal once made him.

But above all things, beware of teaching your child the ceremonious jargon of politeness, a set of phrases which he employs, like magic syllables, to subject to his pleasure every one that comes near him, and to obtain upon demand whatever he desires. In the mode of education adopted by the rich, their children never fail of being rendered politely imperious, by being instructed to make use of such expressions as no body chuses to resist. Neither in voice nor manner have they any thing suppliant about them: on the contrary, they are as arrogant, if not more so, in their requests, than in their commands, inasmuch as they are always more certain of being obeyed. One sees immediately, that their *If you please*, means, *It is I please*, and that their *Pray* stands for *Do*. Admirable politeness this, which teaches them only to pervert the meaning of words, and not to be able

to speak otherwise than with the air of command!

For my part, who am less afraid Emilius should prove clownish than insolent, I had much rather hear him say in a suppliant tone, *Do so or so*, than make use of a dictatorial *Pray, if you please*. It is not the words he makes use of that is of so much consequence, but the acceptance he annexes to them.

Excessive severity, as well as excessive indulgence, should be equally avoided. If you leave children to suffer, you expose their health, endanger their lives, and make them actually miserable; on the other hand, if you are too anxious to prevent their being sensible of any kind of pain and inconvenience, you only pave their way to feel much greater; you enervate their constitutions, make them tender and effeminate; in a word, you remove them out of their situation as men, into which they must hereafter return in spite of all your solicitude. In order not to expose them to the few evils nature would inflict on them, you provide for them many which they would otherwise never have suffered.

It may here perhaps be objected, that I fall into the same error, for which I have reproached those mistaken parents, who sacrifice the present happiness of their children to the consideration of an uncertain or imaginary futurity. Not so; for my pupil will be sufficiently indemnified for the slight inconveniencies he suffers, by the liberty in which he is indulged. I see the neglected little rogues sometimes playing amidst the snow, with their hands black and blue, and so benumbed as hardly to be able to move their fingers.

A TREATISE of EDUCATION. III

fingers. They may go, if they will, to the fire and warm themselves; yet this they refuse to do; and, if you should compel them to it, they would suffer an hundred times more from your severity than from that of the cold. Of what then do you complain? Do I make the child unhappy by exposing him only to those inconveniencies he chuses to suffer? No. I make him happy for the present, by leaving him to enjoy his liberty; and prepare him for being so hereafter, by arming him against those evils he must necessarily encounter. If it depended on his choice to be my pupil or yours, do you think he would hesitate a moment which to prefer?

Can you conceive any being can be truly happy in circumstances inconsistent with its constitution? And is it not inconsistent with the constitution of man, to endeavour to exempt him from all the evils incident to his species? Yes, I will maintain it, that we are capacitated to experience great pleasure only, by being inured to slight pain: such is the nature of man. If his physical constitution be too vigorous, his moral constitution tends to depravity. The man who should be ignorant of pain, would be a stranger also to the sensations of humanity, and the tender feelings of compassion for his species; his heart would be unsusceptible of sympathy, he would be unsocial, he would be a monster among his fellow-creatures.

Would you know the most infallible way to make your child miserable? It is to accustom him to obtain every thing he desires: for, those desires still increasing from the facility of gratification, your incapacity to satisfy them must

sooner or later reduce you to the necessity of a refusal; and that refusal, so new and uncommon, will give him more trouble than even the want of that which he desires. From wanting your cane, he will proceed to your watch; he will next want the bird that flies in the air, the star that glitters in the firmament, in short, every thing he sees: nothing less than omnipotence would enable you to satisfy it.

It is natural to man to regard every thing as his own which he has in his power. In this sense, the principle of Hobbes is true to a certain degree. Could we increase with our desire the means of gratifying them, every one would conceive himself the lord over all. The child, therefore, who needs only desire a thing to obtain it, is led naturally to imagine himself the proprietor of the universe: he looks upon all mankind as his slaves; and when any thing is at length refused him, he, who conceives not the impossibility of executing any of his commands, esteems such refusal as an act of rebellion: all the reasons that can be given him at an age incapable of reasoning, appear to him only pretexts: he sees your ill-will through the whole: the sense of an imaginary injustice sours his disposition, he begins to hate every body; and without ever thinking himself obliged by their complaisance, is enraged at their contradiction.

How is it possible for me to conceive that a child, thus subject to be made the prey of the most irascible passions, can ever be happy! a tyrant, that is at once the meanest of slaves, and the most miserable of human beings! I have seen children, educated in this manner, who
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wanted their nurse to overturn the house, by setting her shoulder against it; who would ask for the weather-cock on the top of the steeple; for a regiment in full march to stand still, that they might hear the drums; piercing the air with their cries, and refusing to hear any thing that could be said to them, if their requests were not immediately complied with. It is in vain you would, on such occasions, endeavour to pacify them: their desires, irritated by the facility with which they have usually been gratified, are bent on impossibilities, whilst they meet on every side with nothing but contradictions, obstacles, sufferings, and sorrow. Always grumbling, fractious, and passionate, they pass their time amidst perpetual tears and complaints: can these be supposed very happy in their situation? Imbecility and authority united, generate only folly and misery.

If these notions of tyranny and command make men miserable in their infancy, how much more will they do so as they grow up, when the relations they stand in to others become more numerous and extensive? Accustomed to see every thing give way to their desires, how will they be surpris'd, in entering on the world, to see every thing resist their will, and to find themselves oppress'd by the weight of that universe which they imagin'd they could move about at pleasure! Their puerile airs of insolence and vanity will only incur mortification, raillery, and contempt; they will have continual affronts to encounter; cruel encounters, that will soon convince them they neither know their circumstances nor their abilities. Thus, finding them-

selves unequal to every thing, they will begin to think themselves equal to nothing; disgusted by so many unexpected obstacles, and so much mortified by contempt, they will hence become base, timid, and servile; falling as much below their capacity as they had been absurdly educated above it.

Let us recur, then, to our first rule. Nature hath constituted children to claim our love and assistance; but has she made them to be obeyed and feared? Has she given them a peremptory air, a severe look, a bold and menacing tone of voice, to render them formidable? I can comprehend that the roaring of a lion may terrify other animals, and that the sight of him should make them tremble; but if ever there was a sight truly indecent, detestable, and ridiculous, surely it must be that of a respectable body of magistrates, with their president at their head, in their robes of state, prostrating themselves before an infant in swaddling-cloaths, and addressing him in a florid harangue, to the pompous terms of which he returns a most gracious answer, by whimpering and bedewing his slabbering bib.

If we consider the state of childhood in itself, is there in the world a more feeble and helpless being, more exposed to the mercy of every thing about it, that hath more need of pity, assistance, and protection, than an infant? Doth not even its innocent looks and engaging figure seem peculiarly calculated to interest in its favour all that approach it, and to induce them to succour its weakness? What then is more disgusting, and contrary to the nature of things, than to see
a child,

a child imperious and refractory, commanding every one that comes near it, and impudently usurping the tone of a master over those who have only to leave it, and it must perish?

On the other hand, who must not see that a child lies under so many restrictions on account of its natural weakness, as to acknowledge it barbarous to add to this restraint that of our caprices, in depriving it of so confined a liberty, which it can so little abuse, and is of so little use to itself, or to us who take it away? If there be no object so deserving contempt as an insolent child, there is none so deserving our compassion as a timid and bashful one. Since we enter, at the age of discretion, into public slavery, why should we be previously subjected to private servitude? Let us permit one moment at least of human life to be exempted from that yoke which nature has not imposed; let us permit our children the free exercise of that natural liberty which keeps at a distance, for some time at least, those vices which are contracted in the bondage of society. Let the advocates for severity, then, on the one hand, and those fond parents who are slaves to their children, on the other, offer what frivolous objections they please; it is proper for them, before they boast the excellence of their own methods, to study that of nature.

But to return to practice: I have already said your child should obtain nothing merely because he asks for it, but because he stands in need of it *; that he should be made to do nothing out of

* It ought to be observed, that as pain is often a necessity, so pleasure is sometimes a natural want. Children have therefore,

of obedience, but only out of necessity: thus the words *command* and *obey* should have no place in his dictionary, much less those of *duty* and *obligation*; but those of power; necessity, impotence, and restraint, ought to stand forth in capitals. Before children arrive at years of discretion, they can form no ideas of moral beings or social relations: it is proper, therefore, to avoid, as much as possible, the use of those terms which express them; lest, if made use of in their hearing, children should at first annex ideas to them which afterwards it may be difficult to separate. The first wrong idea that he forms, becomes the seed of error and of vice. It is to this first step that we should give particular attention. Order it so, therefore, that, while he continues to be affected only by sensible objects, all his ideas be confined to his sensations; let him perceive nothing but the material world about him: otherwise you may be assured, that either he must hear you say nothing of the moral world at all, or he will form such fantastical notions of it as you will not be able to efface all the days of his life.

Mr Locke's maxim was to educate children by reasoning with them; and it is that which is now most in vogue. The success of it, however, doth not appear to recommend it; for my
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fore but one desire only which should not be gratified, and this is the desire of exacting obedience. Hence it follows, that in every thing they demand, it is the motive which excites them to make such demand, which ought to engage our attention. Indulge them, as much as possible, in every thing which may give them real pleasure; but constantly refuse them what they require from motives of caprice, or merely to exercise their authority.

own part, I meet with no children so silly and ridiculous, as those with whom so much argument hath been held. Of all the faculties of man, that of reason, which is in fact only a compound of all the rest, unfolds itself the latest, and with the greatest difficulty; and yet this is what we would make use of to develope the first and easiest of them. The great end of a good education is to form a reasonable man; and we pretend to educate a child by the means of reason! This is beginning where we should leave off, and making an implement of the work we are about.

If children were capable of reasoning, they would stand in no need of education; but, in talking to them so early a language they do not understand, we use them to content themselves with words, to cavil at every thing that is said to them, to think themselves as wise as their masters, and to become petulant and captious: at the same time, whatever we imagine to obtain of them by reasonable motives, is effected by those of covetousness, fear, or vanity, always annexed.

We may reduce almost all the lessons of morality that have, or can be, formed for the use of children, to the following formula.

Master. You must not do so.

Child. And why must I not do so?

Master. Because it is naughty.

Child. Naughty! what is that being naughty?

Master. Doing what you are forbid.

Child. And what harm is there in doing what one is forbid?

Master.

Master. The harm is, you will be whipped for disobedience.

Child. Then I will do it so that no body shall know any thing of the matter.

Master. O, but you will be watched.

Child. Ah! but then I will hide myself.

Master. Then you will be examined.

Child. Then I will tell a fib.

Master. But you must not tell fibs.

Child. Why must not I?

Master. Because it is naughty, &c.

Thus we go round the circle; and yet, if we go out of it, the child understands us no longer. Are not these very useful instructions, think you? I could be very curious to know what could be substituted in the place of this fine dialogue. Locke himself would certainly have been embarrassed had he been asked so puzzling a question. To distinguish between good and evil, to perceive the reasons on which our moral obligations are founded, is not the business, as it is not within the capacity, of a child.

Nature requires children to be children before they are men. By endeavouring to pervert this order, we produce forward fruits, that have neither maturity nor taste, and will not fail soon to wither or corrupt. Hence it is we have so many young professors and old children. Childhood hath its manner of seeing, perceiving, and thinking, peculiar to itself; nor is there any thing more absurd than our being anxious to substitute our own in its stead. I would as soon require an infant to be five feet high, as a boy to have judgment at ten years of age. In fact, of what use would reason be to him at that age?

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Reason is given us as a check upon our power; a child has no need of such restraint.

In striving to persuade your pupils to look upon obedience as their duty, you always add, to this pretended persuasion, the force of compulsion or menace; or, what is still worse, enforce it by flattery and promises. And thus it is that, allured by interest or constrained by violence, they affect to be convinced by reason. They see very well that to be obedient is advantageous, and to be refractory hurtful, as soon as you yourself perceive either the one or the other. But, as you require nothing of them but what is disagreeable, and, as it is always disagreeable to do the will of others, they conceal themselves in order to be at liberty to do their own; persuaded that, so long as their disobedience is undiscovered, they are doing right; but very ready to confess themselves wrong when detected, for fear of severer chastisement. The rational principles of moral obligation are beyond their comprehension; there is not a man in the world capable of making them truly sensible of them; though the fear of punishment, the hope of pardon, importunity, and the perplexity of knowing what to say, draw from them the confession required, and we imagine them convinced when they are only harassed and intimidated.

The consequence of all this is, that, in the first place, by imposing on them an obligation they are insensible of, you set them against your authority, and alienate from you their affections; you teach them to dissemble, lie, and deceive, in order to extort rewards, or avoid punishment: and lastly, by using them to conceal their real
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motives under apparent ones, you yourself furnish them with the means of perpetually abusing you, of preventing your knowledge of their true characters, and of amusing you and every body else, occasionally, with empty words. The laws, you will say, though obligatory in point of conscience, use the same means of restraint with grown persons. I confess it; but what are these persons but children spoiled in their education? This is the very thing we should endeavour to prevent. Use force with children, and argument with men: such is the order of nature: the philosopher stands in no need of legal restrictions.

Treat your pupil according to his years. Put him at first into his place, and keep him there so strictly, that he may never afterwards be tempted to go from it. Thus, before he may have learned what prudence is, he will have practised the most important of all its lessons. Never command him to do any thing in the world. Let him not even imagine you pretend to have any authority over him. Let him only be made sensible that he is weak, and you are strong; that, from your situation and his, he lies necessarily at your mercy: let him know, let him learn to perceive this circumstance; let him early feel on his aspiring crest the hard yoke nature hath imposed on man, the heavy yoke of necessity under which every finite being must bow; let him see that necessity in the nature and constitution of things, and not in the caprices * of mankind. The bridle of his restraint should

* We may be very certain that a child will think every injunction capricious that is contrary to its own inclinations, and for

should be force, and not authority. As to doing those things from which he ought to abstain, forbid him not, but prevent him, without explanation or argument: whatever you indulge him in, grant it to his first request without solicitation or intreaty, and particularly without making any conditions. Grant with pleasure, and refuse with reluctance; but, I say again, let all your denials be irrevocable; let no importunity overcome your resolution; let the *no!* once pronounced, be as a brazen wall, against which when a child hath some few times exhausted his strength without making any impressi^on, he will never attempt to overthrow it again.

By this method, you will render his disposition patient, equal, resigned, and peaceable, even when he is not indulged in the pursuit of his own inclinations: for it is in the nature of man to endure patiently the absolute necessity of his circumstances, but not the capricious and evil disposition of his fellow-creatures. *It is all gone,* is an answer against which a child never objects, at least if he believes it true. After all, it must be observed, there is no mean to be preserved in our conduct in this particular; we must either exact nothing of children at all, or subject them, at once, to the most perfect obedience. The worst education in the world is that which keeps a child wavering between the will of the tutor and its own; and eternally disputing which of the two shall be master: I had an hundred times rather mine should be always master. It is very

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for which it sees not a reason. Now, a child sees no manner of reason in any thing that contradicts its own humour.

strange, that, ever since mankind have taken it into their heads to trouble themselves so much about the education of children, they should never have thought of any other instruments to effect their purpose than those of emulation, jealousy, envy, pride, covetousness, and servile fear; all passions, the most dangerous, the most apt to ferment, and the most proper to corrupt the soul, even before the body is formed. With every premature instruction we instill into the head, we implant a vice in the bottom of the heart. Senseless preceptors, those, who think they work wonders, by making children actually vicious, in order to instruct them in the theory of virtue, and then gravely tell us, Such is man. Yes, such, indeed, is the man of your making.

Almost every method has been tried but one, and that the only one which can succeed, natural liberty duly regulated. No one ought to undertake the education of a child who cannot conduct him at pleasure, merely by the maxims of possibility and impossibility. The sphere of both being equally unknown to infancy, it may be extended or contracted as we please. A child may be equally excited or restrained, by the single plea of necessity, without murmuring: he may be rendered pliant and docile by the force of circumstance only, without ever giving occasion to sow the seeds of vice in his heart: for the passions will never be irritated so long as they must be exerted without effect. Give your pupil no kind of verbal instructions; he should receive none but from experience: inflict on him no kind of punishment, for he knows not what it is to be in fault: require him never to ask pardon,

don, for he cannot offend you. As he is insensible of all moral obligation, he cannot do any thing morally evil, or that is deserving of punishment or reprimand.

I foresee the reader will be already frightened, if he judges of such a child by his own: in this, however, he is mistaken. The constant restraint in which you keep your pupils irritates their vivacity; the more they are restrained under your eye, the more turbulent they are when they escape from it; they must indemnify themselves, when they can, for that severe confinement you impose on them. Two scholars, broke loose from a school in town, will do more mischief in a country village than all the boys in the parish. Shut up one of these young gentlemen with the son of a peasant of the same age; and the first will have broke or turned all the moveables in the room topsy-turvy, before the latter should have stirred from his seat. What can be the reason of this, if the one be not in a hurry to abuse his momentary liberty, while the other, accustomed to freedom, is not in any haste to make use of it? and yet the children of peasants, being frequently humoured and thwarted, are very far from being in that order in which I could wish to see yours.

Let us lay it down as an incontestable maxim, That the first emotions of nature are always right: there is no original perversity in the human heart. I will venture to say, there is not a single vice to be found there, that one could not say how and which way it entered. The only passion natural to man is the love of himself, or self-love taken in an extensive sense. This pas-

sion considered in itself, or as relative to us, is good and useful; and, as it has no necessary relation to any one else, it is in that respect naturally indifferent: it becomes good or evil, therefore, from our application of it, and the several relations we give it. Till the guide of self-love, then, which is reason, appears, a child should do nothing merely because he is seen or heard, nothing from causes merely relative to others, but only those things which nature requires and instigates; and then he will never do wrong.

I do not mean that he will never do any mischief, that he will never hurt himself, or perhaps break in pieces a valuable utensil that may happen to be unluckily placed within his reach. He may do a great deal of harm without doing ill: because the evil of the action depends on his intention to do an injury, and he will be always free from such intention. Should he not, and should he once acquire an evil intention, he is already spoiled; he is vicious almost beyond remedy.

An action may be evil in the eyes of avarice, that is not so in those of reason. In leaving children at full liberty to play about as they please, it is proper to remove every thing out of their way that may render their agility or wantonness expensive; thus nothing that is brittle and costly should be left within their reach. Let the furniture of their apartment be coarse and solid: let them have no looking-glasses, no china, nor other objects of luxury. As to my Emilius, whom I educate in the country, his chamber shall have nothing in it whereby it may be distinguished from that of the meanest peasant. To what purpose

pose should it be carefully ornamented, when he is to stay in it so short a time? But I forget; he will himself decorate it after his own fancy; we shall see presently in what manner.

If, notwithstanding your precaution, your child should commit some disorder, or break some piece of furniture, do not go to punish or rate him for your own negligence: do not let him hear from you a single word of reproach; let him not even perceive you are displeased, but act exactly in the same manner as if it had been broke by accident: in a word, you may think you have effected a great point, if you can prevail on yourself to say nothing about the matter.

May I venture here to lay down the greatest, most important, and most useful rule of education? It is this, Not to gain time, but to lose it. The generality of readers will be so good as to excuse my paradoxes; there is an absolute necessity for them in making reflections: and, say what you will, I had rather be remarkable for hunting after a paradox, than for being misled by prejudice. The most critical interval of human life is that between the hour of our birth and twelve years of age. This is the time wherein vice and error take root, without our being possessed of any instrument to destroy them: and when the implement is found, they are so deeply grounded, that they are no longer to be eradicated. If children took a leap from their mother's breast, and at once arrived at the age of reason, the methods of education now usually taken with them would be very proper; but according to the progress of nature, they require those which are very different. We should not:

tamper with the mind, till it has acquired all its faculties: for it is impossible it should perceive the light we hold out to it while it is blind; or that it should pursue, over an immense plain of ideas, that route which reason hath so slightly traced as to be perceptible only to the sharpest sight.

The first part of education, therefore, ought to be purely negative. It consists, neither in teaching virtue nor truth; but in guarding the heart from vice, and the mind from error. If you could be content to do nothing yourself, and could prevent any thing being done by others; if you could bring up your pupil healthy and robust to the age of twelve years, without his being able to distinguish his right hand from his left, the eyes of his understanding would be open to reason at your first lesson; void both of habit and prejudice, his passions would not operate against your endeavours, and he would become, under proper instructions, the wisest of men. It is thus, by attempting nothing in the beginning, you might produce a prodigy of education.

Take the road directly opposite to that which is in use, and you will almost always do right. As we think it not enough children should be children, but it is expected they should be masters of arts; so fathers and preceptors think they can never have too many checks, corrections, reprimands, menaces, promises, instructions, fair speeches, and fine arguments. You will act wiser than all this, by being reasonable yourself, and never arguing with your child, particularly in striving to reconcile him to what
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he dislikes : for to use him to reason only upon disagreeable subjects, is the way to disgust him, and bring argument early into discredit with a mind incapable of understanding it. Exercise his corporeal organs, senses, and faculties, as much as you please; but keep his intellectual ones inactive as long as possible. Be cautious of all the sentiments he acquires previous to the judgment which should enable him to scrutinize them. Prevent or restrain all foreign impressions; and, in order to hinder the rise of evil, be not in too great a hurry to instil good; for it is only such when the mind is enlightened by reason. Look upon every delay as an advantage; it is gaining a great deal, to advance without losing any thing : let the infancy of children therefore have time to ripen. In short, whatever instruction is necessary for them, take care not to give it them to-day, if it may be deferred without danger till to-morrow.

Another consideration, which confirms the utility of this method, is the particular genius of the child; which ought to be known before it can be judged what moral regimen is best adapted to it. Every mind hath its peculiar turn, according to which it ought to be educated; and it is of very material consequence to our endeavours, that it be educated according to that turn, and not to any other. The prudent governor will watch a long time the workings of nature, will observe his pupil well before he speaks the first word to him. Leave then his natural character at liberty to unfold itself; lay it under no restraint whatever, that it may the better be laid open to view. Do you think
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the time lost in which a child is thus left at liberty? Quite the contrary; it will be so best employed: for is it not thus you yourself learn to husband time still more precious? If you set about any thing, before you know in what manner to act, you proceed at random: liable to mistake, you are frequently obliged to undo what is done; and find yourselves farther from the end designed, than if you had been less precipitate to begin the work. Act not like the miser, who loses much because he is unwilling to lose a little; but sacrifice in infancy that time which you will regain with usury in a more advanced age. A prudent physician does not go blundering to prescribe, at first sight of the sick; he inquires first into the temperament and circumstances of the patient, and then adapts his prescription to them: He begins late to administer his remedies, and hence effects a cure; while the precipitate physician infallibly kills.

But where, will it be said, must we place an infant thus to be educated as an insensible being, as a mere automaton? Shall we take him to the world in the moon, or to some desert island? Shall we separate him from the rest of his species? Will he not, if in the world, have before him continually the prospect and example of the passions of others? Will he never meet in company with children of his own age? Will he not see his parents, his neighbours, his nurse, his governess, his servant, and at last his governor himself, who, after all, will be no angel? This objection is reasonable and solid. But have I told you the natural education of a child was an easy undertaking? Is it my fault, ye men

men of society ! that you have made every thing which is right, so difficult to be put in execution ? I perceive the difficulties, I acknowledge them ; and perhaps they are insurmountable. It is, however, certain, that, by endeavouring to obviate them, we may succeed to a certain degree. I only take upon me to point out the end we should aim at : I do not affirm it is possible to reach it ; but I affirm that he who approaches the nearest this end, hath succeeded the best.

One thing, however, is to be remembered, and this is, before any one undertakes to form a man, it is proper he should be formed such himself ; it is proper he should find in himself the model he proposes to imitate. While a child is as yet without knowledge, there is time to prepare every thing that approaches him, and to introduce to his first observations those objects which are proper for him to see. Render yourself respectable to all : begin by making yourself beloved, so shall every one be desirous to please you. You will never be master over your pupil, if you are not master of all those about him : nor will your authority be of any service, if it be not founded on virtuous esteem. It will be to no purpose to empty your purse, or give your money away by handfuls ; I never knew money make any one beloved. It is doubtless wrong to be covetous and niggardly, and to content ourselves with lamenting the miserable objects we might relieve ; but you may in vain open your coffers ; if you do not also open your heart, the hearts of others will remain still shut against you. It is your time, your care, your affections, it is yourself you must give ;

give; for otherwise, do what you will, it will always be remarked that your money is not you. There are instances of concern and benevolence which have a greater effect, and are really more useful, than all pecuniary gifts. How many of the unfortunate, and of the sick, have more need of consolation than alms! How many are there of the oppressed whom protection would serve more than money! Reconcile those who are at variance, prevent law-suits; bring children to a sense of their duty, and parents to that of indulgence; promote happy marriages; oppose oppression; spare not the credit and interest of your pupil's family, in favour of the poor and helpless to whom justice is refused, or whom wealth overpowers. Declare yourself boldly the protector of the unhappy. Be just, humane, and beneficent. Do not only give alms, but perform the deeds of charity. Acts of mercy and compassion relieve more evils than money. Love others, and they will love you; serve them, and they will serve you; be a father to them, and they will be your children.

Here presents itself, also, another reason for educating Emilius in the country, at a distance from the mob of servants, who, excepting their masters, are the vilest of mankind; at a distance from the detestable manners of the town, which are varnished over so speciously as to become seductive and contagious to children; whereas the vices of the peasants, gross and without disguise, are more apt to disgust than seduce such as are not interested in their imitation.

Besides this, a tutor would, in such a situation, be more completely master over the objects
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that might be presented to his pupil; his reputation, his discourse, his example, would carry with them an authority that would not accompany them in town. By rendering himself generally useful in his neighbourhood, every one would be eager to oblige him; to merit, in return, his esteem; and to appear before his pupil such as he himself in fact would wish: and tho' they should not be corrected of their vices, they would abstain from the public scandal of them; which is all that is required for our present purpose.

Forbear to charge your own faults on others. Children are less corrupted by the ill examples they see, than by the wrong precepts you teach them. Always moralizing, sententious, and pedantic, for one idea that you give them, thinking it a good one, you instil at the same time twenty others that are good for nothing: full of what passes in your own head, you see not the effect it produces in those of your pupils. Amidst that profusion of words, with which you confound and weary them out in your sermons, do you think there are none whose meaning they take wrong? Do you think they do not make their own comments on your diffuse explications, and that they do not find means to patch up a little system of their own, to oppose to yours as occasion offers?

Listen but to one of these young gentlemen who have been thus lectured; let him talk, ask questions, and run on at pleasure; you will be surprised to find what a strange turn your fine reasonings have taken in his mind: he confounds all you have said, perverts every thing; he

he will tire out your patience, and almost distract you by unforeseen and unthought of objections. Thus will he reduce you to silence, or to impose silence on him; and what can he think of the silence of a man who loves talking so much? If once he gains this advantage, and is sensible of it, adieu to education; all is at an end at once, he will no longer seek opportunities to instruct himself, but the means of refusing you.

Ye zealous tutors, be plain, therefore, discreet, and reserved; be never in haste to act, unless it be to prevent the action of others. Again, I repeat it, put off your good instructions, if possible, for fear of inculcating bad ones. This earth was constituted by nature to be the first paradise of man: beware of acting the part of the tempter, in corrupting innocence by the knowledge of good and evil. As you cannot prevent children from instructing themselves by external examples, confine your solicitude to the imprinting those examples on their minds in the form best adapted to their circumstances.

Violent passions produce a great effect on a child who is witness of them, because their marks are striking, and command attention. Anger, in particular, is so boisterous in its expressions, that it is impossible not to perceive it when near at hand. You will ask, perhaps, if this does not afford a fine opportunity for a pedagogue to make an excellent discourse? No. No excellent discourse at all; not a word should be said on the occasion. Let the child only be a witness to the scene; he will be too much surprised at the sight not to ask you the meaning of
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of it. Your answer is very simple, and naturally arises from the very objects that strike his senses. He sees an inflamed countenance, sparkling eyes, menacing gestures; he hears violent exclamations; all signs that the body is out of order. Tell him therefore, seriously, and without appearance of affectation, the poor man is taken suddenly ill; that he is seized with a fit of an ague. You may hence take occasion to give him, in few words, a general notion of diseases and their effects: for these depend immediately on nature, and form one of those chains by which he should perceive himself bound to the immoveable weight of necessity.

Is it not probable, that from this notion, which is far from being a false one, he may contract an early repugnance to all excess of passion, which he would regard as a distemper? Do not you think, at least, that such a notion, properly inculcated, might produce as salutary an effect as a tedious moral sermon? The future advantages attached to this notion also are not inconsiderable; as you are thereby authorised, if there should be occasion for it, to treat a fractious child as if he were sick; to confine him to his chamber, or even to his bed, if needful, and to prescribe him a strict regimen: by which means he will become afraid of these growing vices, and will look upon them as odious and formidable; without ever regarding the severity you are obliged to make use of, in order to cure him of them, in the light of a punishment. Should it so happen, also, that you yourself, in some unguarded moment, should depart from that temperance and moderation which it should be

your constant study to maintain, you need not seek to disguise your error; but apologise, for such folly of your passion, by frankly telling him, with a tender reproach, that he hath made you very ill.

It is further to be observed, as a matter of great consequence, that none of those simple and ingenuous expressions, which may give a child an idea of the ignorance in which he is educated, should be taken notice of and repeated in his hearing. An indiscreet fit of laughter in a bystander might disconcert all that you had been doing for six months, and do him an irreparable injury perhaps all his lifetime. I cannot too often repeat, that to be master of a child, it is necessary to be master of one's self. I conceive my young *Emilius* to be present at a furious scholding-bout between two female neighbours; and that going up to the most violent, he says to her, in a tone of compassion, *Good woman, you are extremely ill; I am very sorry for it.* This instance of simplicity would undoubtedly have its effect on the spectators, if not on the actresses themselves. Without either smiling, chiding or commending him, however, I take him instantly away, before he perceives that effect, at least before he can have time to reflect on it; and, by diverting his mind to other objects, soon drive it entirely out of his mind.

My design is not to be circumstantial on every occasion; but only to lay down general maxims, and illustrate what is difficult by examples. I hold it to be impossible to bring up a child in the midst of society, to the age of twelve years, with-

without giving him some idea of the relations between man and man, and of the morality of human actions. It is sufficient, therefore, to defer instructing him in these necessary notions as long as possible; and that, when it becomes absolutely requisite, such instruction be confined to objects of present utility; being calculated only to prevent his thinking himself at liberty to do what he pleases. There are children of dispositions so mild and conformable, that they may be conducted very far without danger, in their primitive innocence: but there are others so stubborn and violent, that it is necessary to make men of them as soon as possible, that we may not be obliged to chain them up as too unruly for children.

The first obligations we lie under, respect ourselves: our primary sentiments centre in our own existence; all our natural emotions, at first, relating to self-preservation. Hence, our first sense of justice arises not from what we owe to others, but from what is due from them to us: a circumstance which manifests another blunder in the common methods of education; wherein, by talking to children of their duties instead of their claims, we begin by telling them the reverse of what we ought to do, by endeavouring to inculcate what they cannot understand, and of course that in which they cannot be interested. If I had, therefore, the direction of one of those children just spoken of, I should say to myself, a child strives not so much to gain the mastery over persons * as over things; and he

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* We should never permit a child to play with grown persons in the same manner as with his inferiors, nor even as with his

will soon learn from experience to respect those of the former who are superior to him in strength and years, whereas the latter cannot stand up in defence of themselves. The first notion to be given such a child, is less that of liberty than of property; and in order to give him that idea, it is necessary he should become the proprietor of something. To tell him of his cloaths, his furniture, and his play-things, is saying nothing; because although such things are at his disposal, yet he knows not how or why he is possessed of them. To tell him they are his, because they are given to him, is to just as little purpose; for, in order to give them to him, somebody must have a prior right to them; and it is the principle of property itself which we want to explain to him. Add to this, that a gift betokens a convention or agreement between the parties, and a child cannot be made to comprehend the nature of a convention *. I beg my readers will remark, that in this example, as well as in a thousand others, we might fancy our-

his equals. If he should ever strike any one in earnest, though it were a footboy, or the meanest servant, let them always return his blows with interest, and in such a manner as to make him take heed how he strikes them again. I remember to have seen many an imprudent governess encourage the anger of children, exciting them to strike others, and even herself, while she laughed at their feeble attempts; not thinking that such attempts were intentional murders in the little creature, whose blows would have been fatal had its strength been equal to its fury.

* This is the reason that children want to have those things again which they give away, and cry when they are not returned to them. This, however, is not the case when they come to know the nature of a gift; they are then only more circumspect and cautious of what they give away.

ourselves giving excellent instructions to children, while at the same time we were only filling their heads with words that conveyed no meaning.

It is our business to recur to the origin and foundation of property; for thence our first ideas thereof should arise. My pupil, living in the country, has of course acquired some little notion of husbandry; to this end he wanted only observation and leisure, both which he possessed. It is natural to people of all ages, and more particularly to children, to wish to shew signs of their power and activity, and to exert themselves in the imitation, creation, and production of things. Emilius has not twice seen the gardener sow, and raise beans and pease, and he has already conceived a strong desire to become a gardener.

Agreeable to the principles already established, I oppose not his inclination; on the contrary, I encourage him in it, second his design, and work along with him, not merely to please him, but myself; at least I make him think so. Thus am I become a gardener's labourer, and, as my pupil wants strength to handle the spade, am contented to turn up the soil for him. He takes possession of it by planting a bean; a possession certainly as sacred and respectable as Nunes Balbao took of South America, in the name of the king of Spain, by planting his standard on the coast of the South sea.

We come every day to water our beans, and see them with great pleasure come out of the ground. At the same time, I increase this satisfaction of my pupil by informing him that

this little spot belongs to him; explaining the nature of his property therein, by representing to him that he hath spent his time, his trouble, and in short employed his whole person in the cultivation; that he has as much right to reclaim the produce thereof from any person whatever, as to wrest his arm out of the hands of any one who would retain it against his consent.

Having thus made him sensible of his right to the produce of his labour, he comes on a fine day, as usual, to water his rising plants; when behold, his beans are all torn up by the roots, the ground turned up, and the place hardly to be known. What a sight! what cause of affliction is here! His bosom swells with grief and indignation. Alas! he cries, what is become of my labour and pains, the fruit of all my toil and industry? who hath deprived me of my property? who hath taken away my beans? Thus, venting his exclamations at his first sense of injustice, he sheds a flood of tears, and fills the air with his cries and complaints. In the mean time, I take part in his distress, and endeavour to find out the author of the mischief. This is found to be the gardener, who is immediately sent for.

Here again is poor Emilius deceived in his expectations; the gardener, understanding our complaint, begins to complain louder than we. So! Gentlemen, it is you, I find, that have destroyed my fine melons with your pretended gardening. Did you not know that I had sown some choice Maltese melon-seed on that very spot, which you have dug up to plant your worthless beans? Yes,—the seeds were given me as a curiosity, and I was in hopes to regale you daintily

tily with the fruit when it became ripe. But you have destroyed the plants just peeping out of the ground, and have not only done me an irreparable injury, but have deprived yourselves of the pleasure of tasting the most exquisite melons in the world.

Roussseau. Forgive us, honest Robert; we did not know that you had bestowed your toil and pains on that spot. I see that we have been to blame, in spoiling your work; but we will send for some other seed, to supply the place of that we have dug up; and will take care, when we go to digging again, that nobody hath been at work there before us.

Robert. Then you may throw aside your tools, Gentlemen; for there is no ground lies here uncultivated. For my part, I labour on the soil my father improved before me; and my neighbours do the same; so that all the land you see, has been occupied long ago.

Emilius. Then there must be a good deal of melon-seed destroyed, Mr. Robert.

Rob. Excuse me there, young Gentleman; we do not often meet with such wild little gardeners as you. With us, nobody meddles with another's garden; but has a regard to the fruits of his labour, in order to secure those of his own.

Emil. Well, but what must I do? I have no garden.

Rob. That is nothing me. I assure you, if you spoil mine, you shall walk in it no more; for, take notice, I will not throw my time and labour away.

Rouff. No, that would be unreasonable; but
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cannot we somehow accommodate this matter? What if our friend Robert was to allot us a corner of his garden to ourselves, on condition of sharing with us in the produce of it.

Rob. That I will do without conditions; but remember that I shall dig up your beans, if you meddle with my melons.

In this specimen, of the manner of implanting the first notion of moral principles in the minds of children, it is observable how naturally the idea of property refers to the right of the first occupier. This method is plain and simple, and agreeable to the capacity of a child. Having given my pupil thus an idea of the right of property, and after that of exchanging possession, I should not let him go above one step farther before I stop him quite short.

It is to be observed here, that my instructions on this head, which in theory are laid down in two or three pages, may take up a whole year to put in practice; for in the pursuit of moral ideas we cannot advance too slow, nor tread too securely. Think of this example, ye young preceptors; and remember, that your lectures should always consist rather of action than discourse: for children easily forget what they say, as well as what is said; but not what they do, or what is done to them.

Instructions of this kind should be given, as I before observed, either sooner or later, according as the mild or turbulent disposition of the child may render them necessary. Their utility is obvious to the most superficial observer. To omit nothing, however, of importance

ance on a difficult subject, I shall give another example.

Your child, I will suppose, is so rude and boisterous as to spoil every thing he lays his hands on. Be not angry with him; but remove what you are fearful of his spoiling, out of his reach. If he break the utensils which he stands in daily need of, be not in haste to give him others; but let him experience the want of them. If he break the windows of his apartment, let the wind blow day and night in upon him, without troubling yourself about his catching cold; for it is better he should catch cold, than be indulged in such frantic airs: never complain of the inconveniences to which he may put yourself, but contrive so that he may be the first to feel their effects. After some time, indeed, you may have your windows mended; but without saying any thing to him: and should he break them again, change your method. In that case say to him, very coldly, and without putting yourself into a passion, These windows are mine; I took care to have them placed there, and will prevent their being broke, by shutting you up in a dark room where there are no windows to break. At the novelty of this proceeding, he will begin to cry and storm; nobody, however, must seem to hear him. On this, he will soon change his tone, to the milder notes of sighs and complaints. At this time, let one of the servants pass by accidentally, of whom he will doubtless beg his deliverance. Without any other pretence, however, the servant should be directed to say, *I have also windows to preserve*, and then walk away. In short, after the child

child should have remained there some hours, long enough to tire him heartily, and make him remember it, somebody should suggest to him the making you a proposal to set him at liberty, on condition of his breaking no more windows. He would desire no better terms, and accordingly would send for you to come to him. You should go, and hear his proposal; which being made, you should instantly accept of it; observing that it was a prudent thought, and that it was a pity he did not hit on it sooner, as you would both have been gainers by it. You should then, without requiring any protestation or verbal confirmation of his promise, salute him in the most friendly manner, and lead him immediately to your apartment; regarding the agreement made between you as sacred and inviolable as if attested on oath. What an idea do you think he will deduce from this procedure, of the faith and utility of engagements? I am much mistaken if there be a child in the world, not already quite spoiled, who could withstand such proceeding, or would wilfully break a window ever afterwards *.

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* Were even the obligation we are under to perform our promises, not so firmly rooted in the mind of a child by the force of its utility, his innate sense of right and wrong, just now beginning to exert itself, would soon impose it on him as a dictate of conscience. This is the internal source of all moral principle; and, in order to display itself, waits only for the acquirement of that knowledge which is necessary for it to work upon. The dictates of conscience are not inculcated by man, but engraven in the heart by the Author of all justice. Deprive man of the original laws of mutual convention, with the obligations they impose, and every thing is vain and delusive in human society: he who is not obliged by his own interest to keep his promise, is no more obliged than if he had not

We enter now on the moral world. Behold the opening to vice: with our sense of mutual conventions and reciprocal duties arise falsehood and deceit. No sooner do we find ourselves capable of doing what we ought not to do, than we are prompted to conceal our having done what we ought not to have done. When interest induces us to promise, interest in a greater degree tempts us to violate that promise; all that is required is to do it with impunity. The resource is natural; we endeavour to hide our actions, and to deceive by our words. Not being able to prevent vice, we are already in the circumstances of punishing it: hence arise the miseries of human life which take root in our errors.

I have already said enough to give the reader to understand, that I would never have punishment inflicted on children as a punishment, but that it should be made to follow as a natural consequence of their misdeeds. Hence you should never declaim against lying, nor punish them directly for telling untruths; but you should so manage it, that they should feel the ill effects of lying, by not being believed when they speak truth, and by being still accused of facts they are innocent of, notwithstanding all their asseverations. But we shall give an explanation of what may be called lying in children.

Falsehoods are of two kinds; the one relating to matters of fact, which respects the past; the
other

not promised at all; or, at most, is no more bound than a gamester, who, by taking the odds at play, knows how in any case to bring himself off. This principle is of the last importance, and deserves to be well considered; for it is here that man begins to act in contradiction to himself.

other relative to matters of right, and respecting the future. The first takes place when we deny having done what we actually have done, or affirm our having done what we have not done; and, in general, when we speak knowingly against the truth of things. The latter takes place, when we promise what we have no design to perform; and, in general, when we declare our intention to be contrary to what it really is. These two kinds of falsehood may sometimes be joined together *; but I consider them here by what is peculiar to each.

An helpless being, sensible of its standing in need of the assistance of others, and constantly experiencing their benevolence, can have no interest in deceiving them; on the contrary, it is very evidently his interest that they should see things as they really are, lest, if they are deceived, it should turn out to his prejudice. Hence it is clear, that it is not natural for children to deceive in matters of fact: but it is the law of obedience, to which they are subjected, that produces the necessity for lying; because obedience being in itself painful, children dispense with it in private as much as possible, and their present interest in avoiding punishment or reproach, is more powerful than the future one arising from telling truth. When a child is educated, therefore, agreeable to the natural prin-

* As when a culprit, accused of any bad action, defends himself from that accusation in particular, by insisting in general that he is an honest and innocent man. Here he is not only guilty of falsehood as to the matter of fact, but also as to matter of right.

principles of liberty, why should he deceive you in his words, or hide from you his actions? As you never reprehend nor punish him, never require any thing of him; why should he not make you privy to his actions, as well as any of his little companions? Whence should he apprehend more danger on one side than on the other?

It is still less natural for children to deceive in matters of right; as all promises to do any thing, or abstain from it, are deeds of convention, which are not included in a state of nature, but derogate from its freedom. Add to this, that all engagements entered into by children are null and void of themselves; in as much as, not being able to extend their limited views beyond the present, they know not what they are about in making such engagements. Nay, a child can hardly be said to deceive, at the very time of entering therein; for thinking about nothing but disengaging himself from something else for the present, whatever he undertakes to do hereafter is in fact nothing. If, for instance, he should be able to escape a whipping-bout, or obtain a box of sugar-plumbs, by promising to throw himself out of the window the next day, he would very readily promise to do it. Hence it is that the law very prudently pays no regard to engagements entered into by children; and when fathers, or masters, more severe, insist on their fulfilling them, it is only in cases where a child ought to have so done, had he made no such promise.

A child, not knowing what he is about in making engagements, cannot be said therefore to tell a lie, or deceive, in so doing. It is not

the same, however, in his refusing to fulfil them; for he may remember very well the promise he hath made, but he does not see the importance of keeping it. Having little or no abilities to judge of the future, he cannot foresee the consequences of things; and though he should break his engagements, he does nothing inconsistent with the understanding of his years.

It follows hence, that deceit and lying in children must all be attributed to their masters; and that, in endeavouring to teach them the truth, they only instruct them to lie. In our great haste to regulate, to govern and instruct them, we find not sufficient means to compass our end: we endeavour, therefore, to lay stronger hold on their minds by maxims without foundation, and precepts without reason; while we had rather they should learn our lessons and be deceitful, than remain ignorant and be sincere. As to myself, in particular, who give my pupil only practical lessons, and had rather see him good than learned, I require him not to know even the truth, lest he should disguise it; and never exact any promise of him, for fear he should be tempted to break it. If any mischief be done in my absence, and I know not the author of it, I take care never to tax Emilius with it, or to ask him if it was he that did it *; for in so doing

*Nothing can be more indiscreet than such a question, particularly when the child is culpable; for, if he thinks you know that he is so, he will see you are laying a trap for him; a circumstance that will influence him greatly in your disfavour: and if he thinks you know it not, he will very naturally say to himself, Why should I discover my own guilt? And thus your imprudent question will be a temptation to his telling a lie.

ing I should only teach him to deny it. And if at any time his intractable disposition should oblige me to enter into any engagement with him, I shall take my measures so well, that the proposal shall always come from him, not from me; that, when he is once engaged, he shall always perceive a present and actual interest in fulfilling his engagement; and that, if he ever fails so to do, the ill consequences of such failure shall appear to rise naturally from the order and constitution of things, and not from the resentment of his tutor. So far, however, from being under a necessity of recurring to such cruel expedients, I am almost certain it will be long before Emilius knows what it is to tell a lie; and that when he first hears of it, he will be greatly surprised, not being able to conceive the use of deceit. It is very plain, that the more independent I render his welfare, either of the will or judgment of others, the more I deprive him of any interest in practising falsehood.

When we are not in haste to instruct, we are not in haste to exact any thing of children; and we take our time, in order not to require it out of season. Thus an infant is properly formed without being spoiled; but, when a blundering preceptor, ignorant of his duty, is every moment requiring him to promise this or that, without distinction, choice, or reason, the child, wearied out and overburdened with such a heap of engagements, neglects, forgets, or despises them; regarding them all as so many mere formalities, he diverts himself with making and breaking them. Would you have him, therefore, be al-

ways faithful to his word, you must be discreet in exacting it of him.

The examples I have here given concerning falsehood, are applicable in many respects to all those other obligations which we impose on children, by rendering them not only disagreeable, but impracticable. By appearing to preach up virtue, we make them in love with vice; and encourage them to practise by forbidding it. In order to render them pious, we tire out their patience at church; and by making them mutter their prayers perpetually, we compel them to sigh for the liberty of praying no longer. To teach them charity, we make them give alms, as if we were above doing it ourselves. It is the master, however, that should give alms, and not the scholar: indeed, how fond soever the former may be of his pupil, he ought to dispute with him that honour: he ought to make him believe that a child of his age is as yet unworthy so great a privilege. To give alms is the action of a man, who may be supposed to know the value of what he bestows, and the want his fellow-creature has of it. A child who knows nothing of either, can have no merit in giving alms: give what he will, it is without charity or beneficence; indeed he will be almost ashamed to give, when, judging from your example, he must think it is the business of children, and that he shall do so no more when he grows up.

It is to be observed also, that we generally use children to give those things only of which they know not the value. What are to them the round pieces of metal they carry in their pockets,

pockets, and which serve to no other purpose but to give away? A child would sooner give a beggar an hundred guineas than a cake: but require the little prodigal to give away his play-things, his sweet-meats, and other trifles he is fond of, and we shall presently see whether or not you have made him truly liberal.

An expedient, however, is readily found in this case, which is by returning to children immediately whatever they give us; so that they are ready enough to give what they know will be speedily returned to them again. I have never seen any generosity in children but what was of one of these two kinds; that is, they either gave away that which was of no use to them, or what they were certain of having again. Mr Locke advises us to manage this matter so, as to convince children by experience, that the most liberal is always the best provided for. This, however, is to render a child only liberal in appearance, and covetous in fact. He adds, that children would thus acquire an habit of liberality; yes, the liberality of an usurer, who would give a penny for a pound. But when they come to the point of giving things away in good earnest, adieu to habit: when they found things did not come back again, they would soon cease to give them away. We should regard the habit of the mind, and not that of the hand. All the other virtues which are taught children, resemble this of their liberality; and it is by preaching them up to no purpose, that we load their early years with vexation and sorrow. Is not such a very wise scheme of education?

Throw aside, then, ye mistaken tutors, your grimace and affectation; be virtuous and good yourselves, that your examples may be engraven in the memory of your pupils, till they have weight enough to sink into their hearts. Instead of being in haste to require mine to perform acts of charity, I had rather perform them myself in his presence, and deprive him of the means of imitating me, as being an honour too great for his years; for it is of consequence that he should not look upon the obligations of men merely as those of children. If hereafter, seeing me distribute alms to the poor, he should ask me questions concerning it, and it should be then * proper to reply to him on this head, I should tell him, “That when the poor consented to others being rich, the rich on their part promised to provide for those who could not subsist on their property or their labour. — You, then, have promised that; he might reply. — Doubtless I am not the proprietor of what passes through my hands, on any other conditions than those annexed to propriety.”

On hearing this discourse, which, as we have already shewn, a child might be soon brought to understand, any one but Emilius would be tempted to imitate the behaviour of the rich; in which case I should at least prevent his doing it with

* It is to be observed, that I do not answer his questions whenever he pleases to ask them, but when I think proper. I should otherwise subject myself too much to his pleasure; and lay myself under the worst state of dependence that a governor can be in with respect to his pupil.

with ostentation; I should like better his privately usurping my privilege, and giving his money away by stealth. Such a piece of fraud would be compatible with his age, and the only one I should forgive him.

I know that the imitative virtues are but the virtues of an ape, and that no action is morally good which is not performed as such, and not merely because it is done by others. But at so early an age, while the heart is as yet insensible, children ought to be instructed to imitate those actions of which we want them to acquire an habit, and which they may afterwards perform from principle and a love to virtue. Man is an imitative being; mere animals are so too; this turn for imitation is well adapted to a state of nature, but degenerates into vice in a state of society. The monkey imitates man whom he fears, but imitates not the animals he despises; he approves the actions of a being superior to himself. Among us, on the contrary, we see our harlequins both of the theatre and the world, imitate the beautiful only, to debase and render it ridiculous: they endeavour to make out of their own meanness, something equal to those who are better than themselves; or, if they attempt really to imitate what they admire, they discover in the choice of their objects the false taste of imitators: they are more desirous of imposing on others, or of displaying their talents, than of making themselves better or wiser. The source of imitation among us, arises from a desire of transporting ourselves out of our own characters. If I succeed in my enterprise, Emilius will certainly have no such desire. We
must

must therefore relinquish the apparent good of which it might be productive.

Examine the rules of the common method of education; and you will find them all wrong, particularly those which relate to virtue and manners.

The only lesson of morality proper for children, and the most important to persons of all ages, is never to do an injury to any one. Even the positive precept of doing good, if not made subordinate to this, is dangerous, false, and contradictory. Who is there that doth not do good? All the world, even the vitious man does good to one party or the other: he will often make one person happy at the expence of making an hundred miserable; hence arise all our calamities. The most sublime virtues are negative; they are also the most difficult to put in practice, because they are attended with no ostentation, and are even above that pleasure so flattering to the heart of man, that of sending away others satisfied with our benevolence. O, how much good must that man necessarily do his fellow-creatures, if such a man there be, who never did any of them harm! What intrepidity of soul, what constancy of mind, are necessary here! It is not, however, by reasoning on this maxim, but by endeavouring to put it in practice, that all its difficulty is to be discovered*.

Thus

* The injunction of doing no one harm, infers that of doing the least possible harm to the community in general; for in a state of society the good of one man necessarily becomes the evil of another. This relation is essential to the thing itself, and cannot be changed. We may inquire, on this principle, which is best, man in a state of society or in a state of solitude? A certain

Thus have I endeavoured to give my readers some imperfect ideas of the precautions to be taken, in giving children those instructions which cannot be sometimes neglected without exposing them to the danger of injuring themselves and others, or of contracting ill habits of which they cannot afterwards be corrected: but you may be assured, the necessity of doing this will seldom happen where children are properly educated; because it is impossible they should become intractable, mischievous, lying, and selfish, unless we sow in their hearts the seeds of those vices which make them so. What I have said on this head, therefore, may serve rather as exceptions and rules: these exceptions, however, are the more numerous and frequent in proportion as children depart from their natural state of innocence, and contract the vices of men. It will be necessary, in the public education of children, to make use of instructions more premature than in a private education of an individual in the country. In the latter, it is always best to take those methods which give childhood time to grow up at leisure to maturity.

There are other exceptions of a different kind, adapted to such whose natural genius raises them above their years. As there are men who remain

certain noble author hath said, None but a wicked man might exist alone: for my part, I say, None but a good man might exist alone. If the latter proposition be less sententious, it is more true and more reasonable than the former. If a vicious man were alone, what harm could he put in practice? It is in society only that he finds the implement of mischief. If this argument be retorted upon me, against the man of virtue, I refer to what I have said above concerning the negative merit of doing good.

main children all their lives, so there are others who may be said to have been men almost from their birth. The misfortune is, that the number of the latter are but few; that it is very difficult to distinguish them in infancy; and that every mother, fondly conceiving her own child to be a prodigy, generally concludes he is one. Nay, fond mothers, as well as fathers, do more! they take for signs of extraordinary parts, the most usual and ordinary tokens; such are those lively sallies, and that subtle simplicity, which are characteristics of their years, and demonstrate that a child is but a child. Is it at all to be wondered at, that one who is made to talk much, and permitted to say what he pleases, who is restrained in no motive of fear or decorum, should throw out some lucky expressions? It would be much more surprising if it were not so, as it would be that an astrologer, among a thousand lies, should not tell some truth. They are so often in the wrong, said Henry IV. that they must be some time or other in the right. Whoever is desirous of saying some good things, has only to say a number of bad ones. How despicable are those who have no other pretensions to a good reception in the polite world!

The most brilliant thoughts may happen to enter into the heads of children; or rather the most striking expressions may drop from their lips, as diamonds of the first water from their hands, without either the thoughts or the diamonds belonging properly to them: there is in fact no property of any kind annexed to childhood. Whatever expressions children may make use of, they convey not the same meaning to them

them as to us. Their ideas, such as they have, are loose and unconnected: there is nothing fixed and determinate in any of their reflections. Examine your imaginary prodigy: you will sometimes conceive him possessed of an amazing genius, an active and penetrating spirit, capable of soaring to the clouds; and yet you will more often find this very genius inactive, indolent, insipid, dull, and, as it were, wrapt in a thick fog. Sometimes he will fly before you; and at others, remain motionless and immoveable. At one instant, you will admire him as a prodigy of wit and ingenuity; and the next, despise him for a fool: you will in both, however, be equally mistaken; he is neither a genius nor a block-head, but a child. He is a young eagle, that soars one moment up to the sky, and drops immediately after into his nest.

Treat him, therefore, agreeable to his age, notwithstanding appearances; and beware of exhausting his strength by an unseasonable desire to see him exert it. If you observe his young brain grow warm, if you see him overflow and confound himself, let his ideas at first ferment freely; but never excite or increase their fermentation, lest they should all evaporate. When the first agitation is over, and the more volatile spirits are exhaled, restrain and condense the rest, till, ripening with his years, the whole acquires genuine warmth and real spirit. You will, otherwise, lose both your time and pains; you will defeat your own designs, and, after having indiscreetly intoxicated yourself with these inflammable vapours, you will find remaining only

only an insipid, tasteless substance, without spirit and without vigour.

Forward, prating children, usually make but ordinary men: I know no observation more certain and general than this. There is nothing more difficult than to distinguish, in children, between real stupidity and that apparent dulness which is the usual indication of strong intellects. It may appear strange, at first sight, that two such different extremes should be indicated by the same signs, and yet it is nevertheless what we ought to expect: for at an age when we have as yet acquired no true ideas, all difference between a child of genius and one that has none, is, that the latter admits only of false ideas of things; while the former, meeting with none but such, refuses to admit any: both therefore appear to be equally dull; the one because he has no capacity for the comprehension of things, and the other because the representations of things are not adapted to his capacity. The only means to distinguish between them depend on accident, which may offer to the latter some idea within his comprehension; whereas the former is always the same in all places and circumstances. Cato himself, during his infancy, was esteemed by his whole family as almost a fool. He was particularly reserved and obstinate, which was all they could judge of him. It was in the anti-chamber of Sylla that his uncle first learned to know him better. Possibly, had he not been introduced thither, he might have passed for a mere brute till he had arrived at years of discretion: if Cæsar also had not survived, that very Cato might have been treated as a visionary and
a mad-

a madman, who had penetration enough to read his destructive genius, and to foresee at so great a distance his fatal projects. How subject are those who judge precipitately of children, to be egregiously deceived! They often betray, in this, less judgment than the children of whom they judge. I know a man, whose friendship does me honour, that passed among his friends and relations, even in a pretty advanced age, for a person of very ordinary understanding; his intellectual faculties, however, unfolded themselves, and grew mature in silence; when, on a sudden, he appeared the complete philosopher; and I doubt not that posterity will assign him an honourable place among the most acute reasoners and profound metaphysicians of his time.

We should respect a state of infancy, and not too precipitately judge either in favour or to the prejudice of children. If they are to be excepted in our general rules of education; let the motives for such exception be clearly indicated, and frequently confirmed, before we adopt particular methods. Let nature act a considerable time, before we take upon us to put ourselves in her place, lest we counteract her operations. You know the value of time, you perhaps will say, and will not lose it. But do you not lose much more by making a bad use of time, than by entirely standing still? Is not a child badly instructed, more incapable than he who is not instructed at all? You are alarmed at seeing a child pass its time in doing nothing. Is it nothing, then, to spend its time in freedom and happiness? Dancing, playing, and running about all day, is this doing nothing? Depend on

it, he will never be so fully employed again during life. Plato, in the system of his republic, which we esteem so severe, brings up the children only amidst feasting, mirth, songs, and amusements: one might say his whole scheme was to teach them how to divert themselves. Seneca, also, speaking of the youth of the ancient Romans, says, they were always upon their feet, and that nothing was taught them which required them to sit down to learn. Were they less qualified by all this, when they grew up to manhood? Do not be apprehensive, therefore, of any danger from this pretended loss of time. What would you think of a man, who, in order to make the most of life, should determine never to go to sleep: you would doubtless call him either a fool or a madman; he would not take the proper means to make use of his time, but to deprive himself of it: to avoid sleep, he would rush into the arms of death. Think this, then, a parallel case; infancy is the sleep of reason.

The apparent facility with which children seem to learn, operates greatly to their prejudice, and, though we do not observe it, is a plain proof they learn nothing. The delicate texture of their brain reflects, like a mirror, every object presented to them; but nothing penetrates the substance, or remains behind. A child retains the words, but the ideas accompanying them are reflected back again; those who hear him repeat, may understand what he means; but he himself knows nothing of the matter.

Although the memory and judgment are two faculties essentially different; yet the one cannot unfold itself without the other. Before a
child

child arrives at years of understanding, he entertains not the ideas, but simply the images, of things; the difference between which consists in that such images are only the direct paintings of perceptible objects, and ideas are the notions of such objects determined by their respective relations to each other. A single image may subsist in the mind that is sensible of it; but every idea necessarily supposes the concomitance of others. To simple imagination, or the mere formation of images, nothing more is necessary than to have seen objects; but to conceive any thing about their existence, or to form ideas of them, it is required that we should be able to compare them. Our sensations are merely passive, whereas our perceptions, or the ideas formed in consequence of those sensations, rise from an active principle capable of judging of them. This will be hereafter demonstrated.

I say, therefore, that children, being incapable of forming a judgment of things, have no real memory. They retain, it is true, sounds, figures, and sensations; but seldom ideas, and still more seldom the connections between them. In objecting to what I advance, that children may be taught geometrical elements, this instance may be supposed to make against me; on the contrary, however, it makes for me. It may be shewn, that, so far are they from being capable of reasoning of themselves, they are incapable of retaining the arguments of others; for, trace these little geometricians in the solving any problem, and you will see they retain only the exact impression of the figure, and the terms of the demonstration. On the least unforeseen ob-

jection, they are quite at a loss; vary the figure, and they are totally disconcerted; all their knowledge lies clearly in their sensations, and has not penetrated into the understanding. Their memory itself, however retentive, is as little perfect as their other faculties; as they are almost always obliged to learn, when they are grown up, the meaning of the words they got by rote in their childhood.

I am far, however, from thinking that children are capable of no kind of reasoning *. On the contrary, I observe that they reason very well as to things they are acquainted with, and which regard their present and obvious interest. But it is in the depth of their knowledge we deceive ourselves, in attributing to them what they have not, and setting them to reason about things they cannot comprehend. We are still farther deceived, in wanting to render them attentive to such

* I have an hundred times, while I have been writing, made this reflection, viz. That it is impossible, in a long work, to give always precisely the same meaning to the same words. There is no language rich and copious enough, to furnish as many terms, turns, and phrases, as our ideas may require modifications. The method of defining all our terms, and constantly substituting the definition in the place of what is defined, is very accurate; but it is impracticable; for how shall we avoid running round the circle? Definitions might be very useful, did we not make use of words in their construction. I am persuaded, however, a writer may be perspicuous and clear, notwithstanding the poverty of our language; not, indeed, by taking words always in the same acceptation; but in so managing the matter, that every time a word is made use of, the acceptation given it shall be determined by the sense of the period. In some places, I say, children are incapable of reasoning; in others again, I make them reason very acutely; and yet I do not think I am contradictory in my sentiments; tho' I cannot deny that I frequently contradict myself in my expressions.

such considerations as cannot in any degree affect them, such as their future interest, their happiness when they come to be men, the esteem in which they will be held when grown up, and so forth; all which pleas, when made use of to beings void of all foresight, absolutely signify nothing, nor can serve to any good purpose. Now, all the studies imposed on these poor unfortunates, tend to such objects as are entirely foreign to their minds. Judge then of the attention they are like to bestow on them.

The pedagogues, who make so circumstantial a parade with the instructions they pretend to give their scholars, are paid to talk in a different strain: one may see plainly, however, by their conduct, that they are exactly of my opinion; for, after all their mighty professions, what is it they teach them? Words; still words, and nothing but words. Among the various sciences they pretend to teach, they take particular care not to fall upon those which are really useful; because they would depend on the knowledge of things, and in these they would never succeed; but they fix on such as appear to be understood when their terms are once gotten by rote, *viz.* geography, chronology, heraldry, the languages, &c. all studies so foreign to the purposes of man, and particularly to those of a child, that it is a wonder if ever he may have any occasion for them as long as he lives.

It may seem surprising that I reckon the study of languages among the useless branches of education; but it should be remembered that I am here speaking of the early part of childhood; and, whatever may be said to the contrary, I

very much doubt whether any child, prodigies excepted, is capable of learning two languages, till it arrive at the age of twelve or thirteen.

I agree, that, if the study of languages consisted only in that of words, that is to say, of the figures and sounds that expressed them, it would be a proper study for children; but languages, in varying the signs, diversify also the modification of the ideas they represent. The memory charges itself with two languages; but our thoughts take a tincture of the different idioms. The judgment only is common to both; the imagination takes a particular form from every language; which difference may probably be in part the cause or effect of national characteristics: what appears also to confirm this conjecture, is, that among all nations in the world, their language changes with their manners, or remains unaltered with them.

Of these various forms of thinking and speaking, a child becomes habituated to one; and that is the only one he should make use of, till he comes to years of reason. In order to acquire two, it is necessary he should be able to compare his ideas; and how shall he compare these when he is hardly in a situation to conceive them? To every object he might learn to give a thousand different names; but every idea must have one determinate form; he cannot therefore learn to speak more than one language. Will it be told me, that children do actually learn several? I deny the fact. I have, indeed, seen little wonderful prattlers, who were imagined to talk five or six different languages. I have heard them successively talk German, in Latin, French, and Italian

Italian words. They made use, it is true, of the different terms of five or six dictionaries; but they still spoke nothing but German. In a word, fill a child's head with as many synonymous terms as you please; you will change his words only, but not his language, for he can know but one.

It is to conceal the incapacity of children in this respect, that preceptors prefer the use of the dead languages, in which there are no proper judges to find fault with them. The familiar use of those languages being long since lost, they are content to imitate, as well as they can, what they find written in books; and this they call speaking. If such be the Greek and Latin of the masters, it is easy to judge what must be that of their scholars. No sooner have they gone through the rudiments of grammar, of which they absolutely understand nothing, than they are set to render a discourse spoken in their native tongue into Latin words; when they are advanced a little farther, they are set to patch up a theme in prose by tacking together the phrases of Cicero, and in verse with centos from Virgil. They then begin to think themselves capable of talking Latin; and who is to contradict them?

In any study whatever, unless we possess the ideas of the things represented, the signs representing them are of no use or consequence. A child is, nevertheless, always confined to these signs, without our being capable of making him comprehend any of those things represented by them. Thus, while we imagine we are teaching him the description of the earth, we are only

ly teaching him to understand the map: we teach him the names of countries, towns, and rivers, of whose existence he has no other idea, than as they are marked on the paper before him. I remember somewhere to have seen a tract of geography which began as follows: *What is the world? — It is a globe of paste-board.* This is exactly the geography of children: for I lay it down as certain, that there is not a child of ten years of age, though he may have spent two years in the study of cosmography and the use of the globes, can tell, by the rules he has been taught, how to find his way from Paris to St Dennis; nay, I will venture to say, there is not one, who, by means of a plan of his father's garden, would be able to go through the several walks and windings without losing himself. Yet such are these learned geographers, who can tell to a minute the longitude and latitude of Pekin, Isfahan, Mexico, and all other countries in the known world.

I have heard it said, that children should be engaged in studies that require nothing more than that they should be able to see: this maxim may possibly be right, if there be any such studies; but, for my part, I know of none.

From a mistaken notion still more ridiculous, they are directed to the study of history: it is imagined that history is not above the capacity of children, because it is only a collection of facts: but may we not ask what is understood by the word *facts*? Is it conceived that the relations which determine historical facts are so easily taken in, that the ideas of them are formed without any trouble in the minds of children? Is it supposed

supposed that the knowledge of events is so easily separable from that of their causes, or that historical knowledge depends so little on moral, as that one can be obtained without the other? If, in the conduct of men, you see nothing more than merely external and physical actions, what is it you can learn from history? Absolutely nothing; but, divested of all that renders it interesting, this study would afford as little pleasure as instruction. On the other hand, if you would regard their actions as connected by moral relations, and endeavour to give your pupils an idea of those relations, you would soon see whether or not the study of history were above the capacity of children.

Forget not, readers, that the person who addresses you in this work, is neither a man of learning nor a philosopher, but a plain man, a friend to truth, attached to no system nor party; that he is a mere solitary, who, conversing little with mankind, has less opportunity of imbibing their prejudices, and more time to reflect on those things which appear more striking to him in his occasional commerce with the world. My arguments are less founded on principles than on facts; and I conceive that I cannot better enable you to judge of their validity, than by frequently illustrating them by such examples as my experience may suggest.

I engaged myself once to spend some days in the country, at the house of a very prudent mother, who took great care of her children, and of their education. While I was there, I happened one morning to be present when the elder was repeating his lesson. The preceptor, a man
of

of merit, who had instructed his pupil very well in ancient history, taking up that of Alexander, began to comment on the well-known story of his physician Philip, expatiating thereon, as it well deserved, at large. On this occasion he made many reflections on the intrepidity of Alexander, which by no means pleased me; but I avoided entering into any dispute about the matter, that I might not discredit him in the eyes of his pupil. Being afterwards at table, the company did not fail, agreeable to the French custom, of making the young gentleman talk pretty fluently on various subjects. The vivacity natural to his age, and the expectation of certain applause, made him throw a number of silly remarks; among which, however, now and then a lucky hit made up for the rest. At length the history of the physician was brought on the carpet, which he related very plainly and gracefully. After the usual tribute of applause expected by the mother, and expected by the son, the company began to make their observations on what had been related. The majority blamed the temerity of Alexander; while some few, after the example of the preceptor, admired his fortitude and courage: from all which I gathered, that not one person at table knew in what consisted the beauty of that passage. For my part, said I, it appears to me, that if there was the least courage or fortitude in that action of Alexander, it was only a piece of extravagance. On this every one agreed with me that it was indeed extravagant. I was going to reply, and grow a little warm, when a female friend, who sat next me, and had not before opened her mouth,

mouth, whispered me aside, Hold your tongue, Rousseau, they will not understand you. I looked at her, was reprov'd, and remained silent.

After dinner, conceiving, from several symptoms, that the young student comprehended nothing of the history he had been relating, I took him by the hand, and taking a turn with him in the park, where I could converse with him freely, I found that he admired the boasted courage of Alexander more than any of the company: but can you guess in what he thought that courage consisted? merely in that of swallowing, at one draught, a disagreeable potion, without hesitation or mark of disgust. The poor boy, whom they had oblig'd to take physic not a fortnight before, and who swallowed it with infinite reluctance, had still the taste of it in his mouth. As to the consequences, death, and the effects of poison, he conceived nothing more of them than as of disagreeable sensations, and analogous to a draught of senna. It must be confessed, that the fortitude of the hero had made a great impression on his young mind, and that he had resolv'd, the very next medicine he should be required to take, to rival Alexander. Without entering into such explanations as I saw were above his capacity, I endeavour'd to confirm him in his laudable dispositions, and return'd, smiling, within myself, at the great sagacity of those parents who pretend to teach history to their children.

It is easy for us to teach them to repeat the words *kings, emperors, wars, conquests, revolutions, laws*; but when we come to annex precise ideas to these terms, we shall stand in need
of

of such a conversation as we held with Robert the gardener, in order to make ourselves understood.

I foresee that some of my readers, dissatisfied with my having so readily consented to be silent, will be desirous to know what I myself find so great in the action of Alexander. Indeed, reader, you are to be pitied if you must be told. In what other light can you possibly view it, than that Alexander put a confidence in virtue? that he trusted in it, at the hazard of his life? that his great soul was formed for such a confidence? What a noble confession of faith was his taking off that medicine! Never did mortal make one more sublime: No. If we have any modern Alexander, let him shew himself by displaying the like instances of true heroism.

As no science consists in the knowlege of words, so there is no study proper for children. As they have no certain ideas, so they have no real memory; for I do not call that so which is retentive only of mere sensations. What signifies imprinting on their minds a catalogue of signs which to them represent nothing? Is it to be feared, that, in acquiring the knowledge of things, they will not acquire also that of signs? Why then shall we put them to the unnecessary trouble of learning them twice? And yet what dangerous prejudices do we not begin to instil, by imposing on them, as a science, a heap of words, which to them are without meaning! In the very first unintelligible sentence with which a child sits down satisfied, in the very first thing he takes upon trust, or learns from others, without being himself convinced of its utility, he loses

les part of his understanding; and he may figure long in the eyes of fools before he will be able to repair so considerable a loss*.

No; if nature has given to the texture of the brain in children that pliability which renders it proper to receive all impressions, it is not with a view that we should imprint thereon the names of kings, dates, technical terms, or any of those words or phrases with which we burden their infant memories, though unintelligible to them, and useless to every one else; but rather that we may give them all such ideas as are adapted to their capacity, and may be useful; all such as relate to their present happiness, and tend to enlighten their understandings concerning their future welfare: these should be made to sink deep into their minds, being early traced in indelible characters, as serving to influence their conduct in life in a manner agreeable to their being and faculties.

That kind of memory which is possessed by
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* The scholarship of most of the learned resembles greatly that of children. Great erudition is not so much the result of a multitude of ideas as of a multitude of images. Names, dates, places, and all single objects, or those unaccompanied by ideas, are retained only by the remembrance of signs; and it is seldom they are recollected, without our recollecting at the same time the form of the page whereon we have seen them printed, or the figure under which they first appeared. Such was in a great degree the science of the last age. That of the present is different. Men of science now neither study nor make observations; they only dream, and very gravely give out the visionary productions of a few restless nights, as profound systems of philosophy. It may be replied, perhaps, that I am only dreaming too. I will deny it: but then, I so far differ from others, that I publish my dreams as such; leaving the reader to determine, whether there may not be something useful in them to persons who are awake.

children, may, without setting them to study books, be fully employed. Every thing they see, or hear, appears striking, and they commit it to memory. A child keeps in his mind a register of the actions and conversation of those who are about him; every scene he is engaged in, is a book, from which he insensibly enriches his memory, treasuring up his store till time shall ripen his judgement, and turn it to profit. It is in the choice of these scenes and objects, in the care of presenting those constantly to his view which he ought to be familiar with, and in hiding from him such as are improper, that consists the true art of cultivating this primary faculty of a child. By such means also it is that we should endeavour to form that magazine of knowledge which should serve for his education in youth, and to regulate his conduct afterwards. This method, it is true, is not productive of little prodigies of learning, nor doth it tend to enhance the characters of the governess or preceptor; but it is the way to form robust and judicious men, persons sound in body and mind, who, without being admired while children, know how to make themselves respected when grown up.

Emilius shall never be set to learn any thing by heart, not even fables, not even the fables of Fontaine, simple and beautiful as they are; for the words of a fable are no more the fable itself, than those of a history are the history. How is it possible men can be so blind as to call fables the moral lectures for children, without reflecting that the apologue, in amusing, only deceives them; and that, seduced by the charms of falsehood,

hood, the truth couched underneath it escapes their notice? Yet so it is; and the means which are thus taken to render instruction agreeable prevents their profiting by it. Fables may instruct grown persons, but the naked truth should ever be presented to children: for if we once spread over it a veil, they will not take the trouble to draw it aside in order to look at it.

Children universally read the fables of Fontaine, and yet there is not one who understands them. It would be still worse, however, if they did understand them; for the moral is so complicated and disproportionate to their capacities, that it would rather induce them to vice than virtue. Here, again, you will say, I am at my paradoxes: be it so; let us see whether what I affirm be not true.

I advance, that a child does not comprehend the fables which he gets by rote; because, whatever pains we take to render them simple, the instruction we would deduce from them is attended with other ideas above his capacity; and because that even the poetic turn given them, in order to make them the more easily remembered, makes them, at the same time, the less easily comprehended; so that they are rendered entertaining at the expense of perspicuity. Not to mention many of these fables that are totally unintelligible and useless to children, and which nevertheless are indiscreetly taught them because they are found mixed with the rest, we shall confine ourselves to those which the author appears to have written expressly for children.

In the whole collection of Fontaine's fables,

I know of but five or six that are eminently distinguished for puerile simplicity: of these I shall, by way of an example, take the first; the moral of which is the most adapted to children, being that which they understand best, and learn with the greatest pleasure; it is that also which the author has, for this reason, placed at the beginning of his book. On the supposition that the object of this fable be intelligible to children, and capable of affording them instruction and amusement, it is doubtless his master-piece; I will take the freedom therefore to give it a short examination.

Le Corbeau at le Renard.

The Raven and the Fox.

Maitre Corbeau, sur un arbre perche,
Master Raven, on a tree perched,

Maitre! What is the signification of the word *Master*, in itself? what is the use of it before a proper name? and what is the particular meaning of it on this occasion?

We must next tell the child what is a raven. But what is, *sur un arbre perche*? We do not say, *on a tree perched*, but, *perched on a tree*. We must therefore talk to him of the transposition of words, by poetical licence, and instruct him in the difference between verse and prose.

Tenoit dans son bec un fromage.

Held in his beak a cheese.

What kind of a cheese? Was it a Swiss or a Dutch cheese? If a child has never seen ravens, what can you get by talking to him about them?
and

and if he has seen them, how will he conceive they could hold whole cheefes in their beaks? Let our descriptions be ever agreeable to nature.

Maitre Renard, par l' odeur alléché,
Master Fox, by the smell allured,

Master again! but this may be thought a good title for a fox, who may be supposed to have taken up his degrees in the arts of his profession. We must, however, describe the nature of the fox, and distinguish between his natural character and that which is given him in fable. *Alléché* is an obsolete word, and used only in verse: a child, being informed of this, will naturally ask, why we talk otherwise in verse than in prose? What answer will you make to such a question? Again, *Allured by the smell of a cheefe!* This cheefe held by a raven perched on a tree, must surely have a strong smell to be scented by a fox loking in a thicket or earthed in a burrow. Is this the method you would take to exercise the genius of your pupil; to teach him to suffer himself not to be imposed on, and to discern truth from falsehood in the relations of others?

Lui tint à peu-près ce langage :

Held with him nearly this discourse :

Ce langage! Do foxes talk, then? and do they speak the same language as ravens? Take care, sagacious preceptor; consider well before you reply to these questions of your pupil. It is of more consequence, perhaps, than you imagine.

Eh! bon jour, Monsieur le Corbeau!

Ha! good morrow, Mr Raven!

Monsieur! So, *Mr* is a title which the child hears turned into ridicule before he knows it is a mark of respect. Again, those who may read this passage, *Monsieur du Corbeau*, will have enough to do before they explain a child the meaning of the particle *du*.

Que vous etes charmant! que vous me semblez beau!

How charming you are! how beautiful you seem to me!

Wretchedly expletive and redundant! A child, hearing the same thing repeated in different words, will hence learn a loose and inaccurate method of speaking. If you say this redundancy is a piece of art in the writer, and agreeable to the design of the fox, who would seem to multiply his praises by making use of different terms; this excuse is sufficient with me, but is a very bad one to be given to my pupil.

Sans mentir, si votre ramage

Without lying, if your singing

Without lying! So, then it is usual to lie sometimes: But what would your pupil think, if you were to tell him the fox says this only because he is actually telling the raven a lie?

Repondoit à votre plumage,

Be answerable to your feathers,

Repondoit! What can the word mean? Endeavour to teach a child to compare two qualities so different as the plumage and the singing of a bird; and see how well he will understand you.

Vous seriez le phenix des hôtes de ces bois.

You are a phoenix among the lords of these woods.

A phœ-

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A phoenix! what is a phoenix? Behold us already entering upon the fictions of the ancient mythology. *The lords of the woods!* How figurative! The flatterer raises his language, and gives it more dignity, in order to render it the more seductive. How is a child to understand this finesse? Does he know, is it possible that he should know, the difference between an elevated and a mean style?

A ces mots, le Corbeau ne se sent pas de joie;
At these words the raven is out of his wits
with delight;

A child must have already experienced very lively and strong passions, to be able to comprehend this proverbial mode of expression.

Et pour montrer sa belle voix,
And, to display his fine singing,

It must not be forgotten, that, in order to understand this verse and the whole fable, a child ought to be previously made acquainted with the fine singing of a raven.

Il ouvre un large bec, laisse tomber sa proie.
He opens his large beak, and lets fall his prey.

Il ouvre, &c. This verse is admirable; the sound and the sense go incomparably well together. Methinks I see his wide beak open, and hear the cheese rattle down through the boughs: but this kind of beauty is lost on children.

Le Renard s'en saisit; et dit, Mon bon Monsieur,

The fox snapt it up; and then said, My
good Sir,

Good

Good Sir! See already goodness made synonymous to folly: is it not indeed mere loss of time thus to instruct children?

Apprenez que tout flateur
Learn that every flatterer

A general maxim! children know nothing of general maxims.

Vit aux depens de celui qui l'ecoute.

Lives at the cost of those who listen to him.

No child of ten years of age can understand the meaning of this line.

Cette leçon vaut bien un fromage, sans doute.

This lesson is worth a cheese, without doubt.

This line is intelligible, and the thought is good. There are, nevertheless, but few children who are capable of comparing a moral lesson to a cheese; and fewer who would not prefer the cheese to the lesson. They must be taught, therefore, to look upon this as a piece of raillery. What a deal of subtilty is here required of children!

Le corbeau, honteux et confus,
The raven, ashamed and confused,

Another pleonasm; but this is inexcusable:

Jura, mais un peu tard, qu'on ne l'y prendroit plus.

Swore, though somewhat too late, he would never be so deceived again.

Swore! Where is the preceptor weak enough

nough to explain to a child the nature of an oath?

You may think, perhaps, I have been here too circumstantial: I have been much less so, however, than would have been necessary to analyse all the complex ideas of that fable, and to resolve them into the simple and elementary ones of which they are composed. But who thinks such analysis necessary to make ourselves understood? We are none of us philosophers enough to put ourselves in the place of children. But to proceed to the moral of the fable:

I would ask, if there are any children of six years of age, whom it would be proper to teach, that mankind flatter and deceive each other through motives of self-interest? One might teach them, indeed, that there are satyrists who laugh at little boys, and privately ridicule their childish vanity: but the cheese spoils all; and they learn less to prevent its falling from their own mouths, than how to make it fall from the mouths of others. This is another paradox, and not the least important.

Trace the progress of children in learning fables, and you will find, that, when they are in a capacity to make any application of them, they almost always do it in a manner contrary to the intention of the fabulist; and that, instead of remarking the error or fault you are desirous of guarding them against, they fall in love with the vice of the party exposed. In reading the fable above cited, for instance, children laugh at and despise the silly raven; but they are fond of the fox. In the next fable of the same collection, you think also to set them an
ex-

example of the grasshopper : you are mistaken ; they prefer that of the ant. None are fond of humiliation ; all chuse to act the shining part : it is the choice of self-love, it is in every respect natural. But what a shocking lesson is this fable for children ? A covetous child would be the most detestable of all monsters, when sensible of what was asked of it, and what it refused. The ant in the fable does more than this ; he not only refuses to assist the suppliant in distress, but aggravates that refusal with raillery and reproach.

In all fables where a lion is introduced, as it is generally the most shining character, a child never fails to take upon himself the part of the lion ; and when he presides at any distribution, he generally profits by his model, and sweeps all to his own share. But when the gnat stings the lion to the quick, it is another affair : the child is then no longer the lion, but the gnat ; and learns thence in what manner he may some time or other kill those with the prick of a pin, whom he durst not attack openly.

In the fable of the lean wolf and the fat dog, instead of deducing from it the lesson of moderation designed, he is encouraged to licentiousness. I shall never forget the circumstance of once seeing a little girl, quite distressed by being teased with this fable, in order to make her docile and tractable. It was some time before the cause of her tears came to be known ; which, however, was at length discovered : the poor child was heartily tired of her chain ; she felt her neck galled, and was very sorry she was not in the condition of the wolf.

Thus

Thus the moral of the first fable, is to a child a lesson of the most servile flattery; that of the second, a lesson of inhumanity; that of the third, of injustice; that of the fourth, of satire; and that of the fifth, of independence. This last lesson is superfluous to my pupil, and not more expedient for yours: for when the precepts you instil are contradictory to each other, what good can you expect from them? But, perhaps, this defect in the moral of fables, which makes me object to them, may furnish a reason for your preserving their use. In the world, there is one kind of morality in discourse, and another in actions; both which never agree together. The first is to be found in the catechism, where we shall leave it: the other we meet with in Fontaine; in his fables, as to what regards children; and in his tales, as to what relates to their *mammas*. The same author suffices for both.

But I am willing to compromise this matter with La Fontaine. I promise you, for my own part, my dear author, to read and admire your fables, because I am not afraid of being mistaken in their design. But as for my pupil, you must excuse me, if I do not suffer him to read a line in your book, till you have convinced me that it is proper for him to get words by rote, of which he does not understand one fourth part; that the meaning which he may annex to some, cannot be false; and that, instead of profiting by the example of the dupe, he may not form himself on that of the knave.

In thus relieving children from the various obligations injudiciously imposed on them, I free them

them from their greatest source of uneasiness, that of poring over their books.

Reading is a vexation to children, and yet it is the only occupation they are usually employed in. Emilius will hardly know what a book is at twelve years of age: but you will say, he ought surely to learn to read, at least. Yes, he shall learn to read when reading will be of any use to him; till then, it is good for nothing but to disgust and fatigue him.

If nothing is to be required of children merely out of obedience, it follows that they will learn nothing, whether of use or amusement, unless they perceive some present advantage in it; for what other motive should induce them? The art of speaking to persons who are absent, of understanding them in turn, of communicating to those who are at a great distance our sentiments, our inclinations, and desires; this is an art the utility of which may be made known to the simplest understanding. Whence comes it, then, that an art so useful and agreeable should prove so tormenting to children? The reason is plain; the constraint they lie under of cultivating it against their inclinations, and the misapplication of it to uses they cannot comprehend. It cannot be expected a child should be very curious to perfect those means by which he is tormented: find out the way of making them useful to his pleasures, and he will then apply to them of his own accord.

It has been made a matter of great importance, to find out the best method of teaching children to read; to this end cards and other implements have been invented, so various and numerous, that

that they made the nursery resemble the workshop of a printer. Mr Locke would have a child taught to read by means of letters carved on dice. Is not this an excellent invention! A more certain method than any of these, and that which is nevertheless always neglected, is to excite in children a desire to learn. Give a child this desire, and do as you will with your cards and dice; any method will then be sufficient.

The grand motive, indeed the only one that is certain and effectual, is present interest. Emilius sometimes receives written invitations from his father, mother, and other friends, to dinner, to go on a party of pleasure, or to see some public entertainment. These invitations are short, plain, precise, and well written. When received, it is necessary for him to find somebody to read them to him: such a person is not always at hand, or complaisant enough to comply with his request. Thus the opportunity is lost: the billet, indeed, is read to him afterwards, but then it is too late to obey the summons. How ardently must he wish on such an occasion to be able to read himself! He receives others, equally short and interesting: he sets immediately about deciphering them; sometimes receiving assistance, and at others denied it. By dint of study, he at length hammers out that he is invited to go to-morrow to eat cream; but where or with whom he cannot discover. How many efforts will he not make to find out the rest! Emilius will learn to read by such means as these, without standing in need of horn-books, cards, or dice. I might here speak

of teaching him to write ; but I am ashamed of descending to such trifling objects in a treatise on education.

I will only add a word or two on this head : it is an important maxim, that children in general acquire speedily and certainly what they are not importuned to learn. I am almost certain, that Emilius will know perfectly well how to read and write before he is ten years old, because I give myself very little trouble whether he learn it or not before he is fifteen ; but I had much rather he should never learn to read at all, than to acquire that knowledge at the expence of every thing that would render it useful to him ; and of what use would be his knowing how to read, if so disgusted with learning it, that he should hate to look in a book ever afterwards ? *Id in primis cavere oportebit, ne studia, qui amare nondum poterit, oderit, et amaritudinem semel perceptam etiam ultra rudes annos reformidet **.

The more I insist on my inactive method, the stronger I perceive the objections that may be made against it. If your pupil, it may be said, learns nothing of you, he will learn it of others. If you do not prevent his falling into error, by teaching him the truth, he will give into falsehood ; the prepossessions you are fearful of giving him, will flow in upon him from every side : hence his understanding will be viciated before it is formed ; or his intellects, blunted by long inaction, will be lost in the corporeal functions of mere animal nature. The want of
being

* Quintil. lib. i. cap. 1.

being accustomed to think in his infancy, will deprive him of the faculty of thinking as long as he lives.

I believe I could obviate these objections; but why must I be ever answering objections? if they are answered by the method of education I prescribe, it is a good one; if not, it is defective and wrong. I leave it, therefore, to answer for itself.

If, proceeding on the plan I have begun to delineate, you follow rules directly contrary to those which are generally received; if, instead of exciting the attention of your pupil to distant objects, and perpetually bewildering him with different places, climates, and ages; if, instead of perplexing his mind in excursions to the extremities of the earth, and the distant regions of the skies, you keep him constantly attentive to what passes in and about himself; you will then find him capable of perception, memory, and reason: this is the order of nature. In proportion as the sensitive becomes an active being, he acquires a discernment proportional to his corporeal abilities: when he possesses more of the latter, also, than are necessary for his preservation, it is with that redundancy, and not before, that he displays those speculative faculties which are adapted to the employment of such abilities to other purposes. Are you desirous, therefore, to cultivate the understanding of your pupil? cultivate those abilities on which it depends. Keep him in constant exercise of body; bring him up robust and healthy, in order to make him reasonable and wise: let him work, let him run about, let him make a noise, in a word,

let him be always active and in motion. Make him once a man in point of health and vigour, and he will soon become a man in understanding.

It is true, you will check and disgust him, even with this method, if you proceed by way of directing him in every thing he is to do; by telling him when he is to come and go, to run about, or stand still, to do this thing or the other. If your head be always to direct his hands, his own will become useless. But remember, reader, the agreement already made between us; if you are a mere pedant, it is not worth your while to go through this treatise.

It is a wretched mistake, to think the exercise of the body prejudicial to the operations of the mind; as if the action of both were incompatible, or that the one could not always direct the other.

There are two kinds of men who live in a continual exercise of body, and think just as little of the cultivation of their minds: these are peasants and savages. The former, nevertheless, are clownish, brutal, and dull; while the latter are as remarkable for their strong sense, as for their subtlety. Generally speaking, nothing is so stupid as a clown, nor so cunning as a savage. Whence comes this difference? Doubtless it arises hence: the former being accustomed to do what he is bid, or what his father used to do before him, plods on in the same beaten track; and being little better than a mere machine, constantly employed in the same manner, habit and obedience stand with him in the place of reason.

As to the savage, the case is widely different; being attached to no one place, having no settled

ted task, obedient to none, and restrained by no other law than his own will, he is obliged to reason upon every action of his life; he makes not a motion, nor takes a step, without having previously considered the consequences. Thus the more his body is exercised, the more is his mind enlightened; his mental and corporeal faculties advance together and reciprocally improve each other.

Which would most resemble the savage, and which the peasant, Emilius, or the more polished pupil of a fashionable preceptor? The latter, subjected in every thing to dictatorial authority, does nothing but what he is commanded: he dares not eat when he is hungry, smile when he is pleased, or weep when he is sad; he dares not present one hand instead of the other, nor take a step otherwise than he is directed; in a little time he will scarce venture to breathe, except agreeably to some stated rules. To what purpose do you require him to think, when you always take the trouble to think for him? Being always assured of your forecast, what business hath he for any of his own? seeing that you charge yourself with the care of his preservation and welfare, he finds himself freed from that solicitude; his judgment reposes safely on yours; all that you do not expressly forbid him to do, he does without reflection, well knowing that he runs no risk.

What business hath he to learn to foretell rain? he knows that you are careful to preserve him from the shower. Why should he take care to regulate the length of his excursions? he is not afraid that you will let him lose his dinner. If

you forbid not his eating, he eats; when you bid him give over, he hath done: he obeys not his own appetite, but yours. You may enervate his body by inaction, and make it as delicate as you please, but you will not render his understanding the more acute and refined. On the contrary, you will only proceed to discredit the use of reason, by making him use the little he has on subjects which appear frivolous and useless. By never seeing what it is good for, he begins at length to conclude it is good for nothing. The worst that can happen to him, from his mistaken reasoning, is to be set right; and this happens so often, that he soon learns to think light of it.

Notwithstanding this, you conceive him to have wit, and he has just enough to prattle with the women in the manner I have already spoken of; but what would he do in a situation where such idle chatter would stand him in no stead? You would find him, in any case where in the exertion of his personal abilities should be required, an hundred times more stupid and incapable than the child of the most clownish peasant.

As to my pupil, or rather that of nature, being early reduced to serve and provide as much as possible for himself, he is not accustomed to apply continually to others, much less to make a display of his great learning. On the other hand, however, he judges for himself, reasons and provides for every thing relative to his own interest. He does not sport idly and capriciously about, but employs himself in action; he knows nothing of what other children of his age may

may do in the world, but he knows very well what is proper for him. As he is perpetually in motion, he is of course obliged to note many things, and observe a variety of effects; he acquires an early and extensive experience, taking his lessons from nature, not from men; and improves himself by so much the more, as he sees no professed design going forward for his improvement. Thus both his body and mind are at once kept in exercise. Acting always from his own thoughts, and not from the dictates of others, he constantly unites the operations both of his corporeal and mental faculties; and as he increases in stature and strength, becomes sensible and judicious. This is the way to acquire those qualities which are generally esteemed incompatible, and which have been united, nevertheless, in almost all great men; strength of body with that of the mind, the understanding of a philosopher with the nerves and agility of a wrestler.

I am teaching the young preceptor a very difficult art; that of instructing without precepts, and of doing every thing in the way of education by doing nothing. This art, I must confess, is not adapted to your age or views; it is not calculated to make an immediate display of your talents, nor to recommend you to the generality of fathers: it is the only one, however, in which you can succeed in the education of your pupil; you will never accomplish your design of forming sensible men, unless you begin by making playful children. This was the method of education among the Spartans: instead of tying down their sons to their books, they
were

were taught to look out sharp for their dinner. Were they the greater blockheads for this when they grew up? The force and keenness of their repartees are, on the contrary, well known. Formed for universal conquest, they triumphed over their enemies in every kind of warfare; the talkative Athenians being equally afraid both of their tongues and their swords.

In the usual method of education, the master commands, and thence imagines that he governs his pupil; whereas it is in fact the latter who governs him. A child makes use of what you require of him, to obtain what he pleases of you; and knows very well how to make you bestow on him eight hours of complaisance for one of his diligence. You are every moment obliged to enter into treaty with him; the covenants of which, as you propose them in your manner, and he executes them in his, always turn out to the gratification of his humours; particularly when you are so indiscreet as to make such offers to him as he is sure to obtain, whether he perform the conditions of the agreement or not. A child generally penetrates farther into the designs of the master, than the master into the inclinations of a child: this indeed is but natural; for the whole sagacity of a child, which, if left to himself, had been employed in the security of his person, is now employed in preserving his native liberty from the chains of his tyrant; whereas the master, having no such pressing occasion to penetrate the inclinations of the child, finds it sometimes expedient to indulge his idleness or vanity.

Take a contrary method with your pupil; let him

him always be his own master in appearance, and do you take care to be so in reality. There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the appearance of liberty; it is by these means even the will itself is led captive. The poor child, who knows nothing, who is capable of nothing, is surely sufficiently at your mercy. Do not you dispose, with regard to him, of every thing about him? Are not you capable of affecting him just as you please? His employment, his sports, his pleasures, his pains, are they not all in your power, without his knowing it? Assuredly, he ought not to be compelled to do any thing contrary to his inclinations; but then he ought not to be inclined to do any thing contrary to yours: he ought not to take a step which you had not foreseen, nor open his lips to speak without your knowing what he is about to say.

When you have once brought him under such regulations, you may indulge him freely in all those corporeal exercises which his age requires, without running the hazard of blunting his intellects. You will then see, that instead of employing all his subtle arts to shake off a burthensome and disagreeable tyranny, he will be busied only in making the best use of every thing about him. It is in this case, you will have reason to be surpris'd at the subtilty of his invention, and the ingenuity with which he makes every thing that is in his power contribute to his gratification, without being obliged to prepossession or opinion.

In thus leaving him at liberty to follow his own will, you will not augment his caprice.

By

By being accustomed only to do that which is proper for his state and condition, he will soon do nothing but what he ought; and, though he should be in continual motion of body, yet, while he is employed only in the pursuit of his present and apparent interest, you will find his reasoning faculties display themselves better, and in a manner more peculiar to himself, than if he was engaged in studies of pure speculation.

Hence, seeing you never intent on crossing him, having no reason to be suspicious or hide any thing for you, he would never deceive you; but would show himself such as he is, without fear or restraint. Thus you might study his character and disposition at leisure, and dispose him to receive such lessons as you might intend to give him, without his being sensible of receiving any at your hands. Add to this, that he would be no more tempted to keep a jealous eye over your actions, nor would take any secret pleasure in detecting you in a fault. This inconvenience, which is by these means prevented, is very great. One of the most material objects of a child's concern, as I observed before, is to discover the foibles of those who superintend his education. This propensity leads to vice indeed, but does not arise from it; its source is in the child's desire of getting rid of an authority which is burthensome to it. Oppressed and galled by the yoke imposed on them, children try all means to shake it off; to which end the faults they can find in their masters contribute not a little. At the same time, also, they acquire the ill-natured habit of observing people only by their faults, and take a pleasure in discovering them. This
is

is another cause of vice in the human heart, which in that of Emilius I take care to remove: having no interest in discovering my faults, he will not pry into my actions, and will be under little temptation to find faults in others.

All these directions seem difficult to put in practice, because they are not duly considered; but in reality they are not so difficult as may be imagined. I have a right to suppose you possessed of the necessary qualifications for the employment you have undertaken. It is to be presumed you are not unacquainted with the natural progress of the human heart; that you are capacitated for the study of mankind in general, and your pupil in particular; and that you know beforehand to which side he will incline on any interesting occasion. Now, what more can be required than to possess the implements of education, and understand the use of them?

Do you raise an objection on the capricious humours of the child? in this you are wrong. Caprice in children is never the work of nature, but the effect of wrong discipline: it arises from their being accustomed either to command or obey; neither of which, as I have already said an hundred times, ought to be the case. Your pupil, therefore, will have no more capricious humours than you may have instilled; and it is but just that you should take the trouble you have brought on yourself. But you will ask, How is this fault to be repaired? I answer, Only by a different conduct, and much patience.

I once undertook, for some weeks, the care of a little boy; accustomed not only to do as he pleased, but to make every body in the family
do

do so too; and thus, of course, very capricious and humourfome. The very first night, in order to put my complacency to trial, he insisted on my getting out of bed at midnight. I was in a sound sleep, when he leaped out of his own bed, put on his night-gown, and waked me. I rose accordingly, and lighted a candle: when I found this was all my young gentleman wanted; for in a quarter of an hour he grew sleepy, and went to his bed again, satisfied with his experiment. Two nights after, he repeated it with the same success, and without the least appearance of reluctance on my side. But as he embraced me in going to bed again, I said to him very gravely, *This goes very well hitherto, my good friend; but do not repeat this trick any more.* This, I suppose, excited his curiosity, and gave him an inclination to try if I should dare to disobey him. Accordingly, the next night, he waked about the same hour, and called me up as before. I now, therefore, asked him what he wanted? he told me, he could not sleep. *So much the worse*, said I, and lay still. He asked me, then to light the candle. *To what purpose?* said I, still remaining quiet in my bed. Being a little embarrassed at my answering him so laconically, he groped about the room for the tinder-box; which having found, I could not help smiling at hearing him hit his fingers with the flint and steel. After several fruitless attempts to strike a light, he brought the implements to me; when, telling him I had no occasion for them, I turned myself to the other side. Upon this he began to stalk about the chamber, singing, hallooing, and making as much noise as he could

could; running every now and then against the chairs and tables, which I found he took care not to hit too hard, though he did not fail every time to make loud complaints, in hopes of making me uneasy. All this, however, did not answer his end; and I saw that, reckoning upon my giving him good words, or falling into a passion with him, he was quite disconcerted at my indifference.

Being resolved, however, to overcome my patience by dint of obstinacy, he continued his noise till I grew quite angry; but reflecting that I should spoil all by expressing myself in anger, I took another method. I got up without speaking a word, and went to the table for the tinderbox; which not finding there, I asked him for it. This he readily gave me, chuckling for joy at the thoughts of having gained his point. Having struck a light, I took my little gentleman by the hand, and led him quietly into a neighbouring closet, whose window-shutters were well fastened, and where there was nothing he could break: there, locking the door upon him, I left him in the dark, and returned to bed without uttering a syllable. You need not ask if this proceeding did not occasion at first a terrible outcry: it was what I expected, and I did not trouble myself about it. After some time, however, the noise ceased; on which I listened to his motions, and finding him lay himself down to sleep, I went to sleep also. On opening the closet-door, by break of day next morning, I found my little rebel stretched out upon a couch, and in a profound sleep; of

which, after so much fatigue, he had doubtless some need.

But the affair did not end here. His mother soon learned that her dear child had spent two thirds of the night out of bed. This was thought enough to kill him; and indeed he was looked upon as good as dead already. The cunning rogue, thinking a fine opportunity afforded him of being revenged, pretended accordingly to be very ill, not foreseeing what would be the consequence, and that he would get nothing by his pretence. A physician was immediately sent for. Unhappily for the mother, the doctor was a wag, who to divert himself with her apprehensions of danger, only increased them. At the same time, however, he whispered me in the ear to let him alone. I promise you, said he, I will cure the child, for one while, of his whim of falling sick. In short, the doctor advised his being confined to his chamber, subjected him to a regimen, and turned him over to the apothecary. I could not help being grieved to see the poor mother thus deceived, and made the dupe of every one about her except myself, whom for that very reason she hated.

After reproaching me in pretty severe terms, she proceeded to tell me, that her child was of a delicate constitution; that being the only heir of the family, his life was very valuable; that it must be preserved at all events; and that she positively would not have him thwarted.

In the latter article I was of her opinion; but she did not know the difference between not thwarting him, and paying him implicit obedience in every thing. I saw it was necessary to talk

talk to the mother in the same strain as I had done to the child. Madam, said I very coldly, I know not probably in what manner an heir is to be educated, nor do I desire to learn; so that you will do well to take your own measures on that head. Having occasion for me, however, some time longer, the father reconciled matters; the mother wrote to hasten the preceptor's return; and the child, finding he could get nothing by disturbing my sleep or by falling sick, took it in his head to sleep soundly himself, and be in good health.

It is not to be imagined to how many similar caprices this little tyrant had subjected his poor preceptor; for he was educated constantly under the eye of his mother, who would not permit the heir of the family to be disobeyed in any thing. At whatever hour he had a mind to go abroad, his governor must be ready to go with, or rather to follow him; and he always took particular care to make choice of those times when he saw him most employed.

He wanted to exercise the same command over me, and to avenge himself in the day-time for the repose he was obliged to let me enjoy in the night. I entered at first very readily into all his designs, and set out with an endeavour to convince him of the pleasure I should take in obliging him. But having done this, I took different measures to cure him of his caprice.

It was necessary to confirm him first in the nature of his error, which was not difficult. Being sensible that children think only about the present, it was easy for me to take the advantage I had over him in point of foresight. I

provided for him one day an amusement within doors, of which I knew he was extremely fond; when, just as he was in the height of his enjoyment, I proposed to take a walk with him. This was rejected; in consequence of which, I insisted on it some time to no purpose. He would hear nothing of it; but grew so impatient, that I was obliged to give up the point; of which submission he took, as I intended he should, very particular and assuming notice.

The next day it was my turn. He begun to be tired of home, which I had contrived to make as irksome as I could, without his perceiving it; while I, on the contrary, seemed to be very earnestly employed. There needed no such preparation, however, to fix his determination, and induce him to call me in a great hurry from what I was about, to walk abroad with him. I refused to go, and he persisted in requiring it. No, said I; by your following your own inclination yesterday, you taught me to follow mine to-day: I will not go. Well then, returned he pertly, I will go alone. As you please, said I; and turned about to my work.

He then begun to dress himself; seeming a little uneasy that I did not follow his example. Being ready to go, he came to take his leave; when I readily returned his salutation; but, being desirous to alarm me, he proceeded to tell me whither he intended to go: to hear him talk, you would have thought he designed to have made a voyage round the world. Without appearing concerned, however, about the matter, I wished him a good journey, and applied myself again to my affairs. His embarrassment
now

now increased; but, resolved to put a good face on the matter, and being just ready to go out of the door of his apartment, he called his footboy and bade him follow him. The footboy, however, being previously warned, answered he had not time, and that, being employed in my business, he ought to mind me rather than him. At this refusal, the child knew no longer what to think or do. He could not conceive it possible that he should be permitted to go out alone; he, who imagined himself so vastly important in the eyes of every one, and thought both heaven and earth interested in his preservation. He began, nevertheless, to be sensible of his own weakness; and saw beforehand the risks he was to run in going abroad among people he was unacquainted with: his obstinacy, however, still supported him in his resolution; and he went down stairs; but very slowly, and with apparent reluctance. At length he ventured into the street, comforting himself a little in the consideration, that whatever harm came to him, I must be answerable for it.

All this being what I expected, every thing was prepared for it; and, as it was a kind of public experiment, I had obtained the father's consent to it. He had not gone far from the door before he heard the neighbours, on each side the way, taking notice and talking of him. A mighty pretty gentleman! cries one; where can he be going alone? he will certainly lose himself; I have a good mind to call him in. No, no, take care of that, says another; do not you see it is a little knave whom his father has turned out of doors, because he is good for nothing?

I would have nothing to do with him; let him go where he pleases. Well then, replied the other, God go with him, but I should be sorry he should come to any harm. A little farther he passed by some unlucky boys about his own age, who mocked and laughed at him. The farther he went, the more he found himself embarrassed. Being alone and without protection, he saw himself turned into ridicule by every body he met; and found, to his great surprise, that his fine cloaths did not entitle him to respect.

In the mean time, one of my friends, who was a stranger to him, and planted on purpose to keep an eye over him, followed him up and down, and at a proper time accosted him, and conducted him home. This scene, which resembled that of Monsieur Porceagnac in the play, required a man of wit and understanding; and indeed it was admirably well performed. Without making the child timid, by frightening him too much, he made him so sensible of the imprudence of his design, that he returned to me, in about half an hour, so submissive and confused, that he hardly durst look me in the face.

To complete the misfortune of this expedition, also, his father, who was just going out as he entered, met him on the stairs. He was now obliged to give an account where he had been, and the reason why I did not accompany him *.

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* In such a case as this, one runs no risk in requiring a child to tell truth; because he knows he cannot possibly disguise it; and that if he should tell a lie, he would be immediately detected.

This was such a mortifying stroke, that the poor child could almost have wished himself buried an hundred feet deep. Without taking the trouble of giving him a long reprimand, his father said to him, more coolly than I expected, Well, Sir, whenever you are inclined to go out alone again, you may; but, as I do not chuse to have any vagabonds in my house, I desire you will take care not to come in again.

For my part, I received him without reproach or raillery, but a little gravely and reserved; and lest he should suspect what had happened to be only a trick, I would not take him out all day. The next morning, I observed with pleasure, that he passed with an air of triumph along with me, in the face of those very people that had ridiculed him the day before when he was alone. Hence it is easy to conceive he never threatened to go abroad again without me.

By these means, and others of a like kind, I so far prevailed, during the short time I staid with him, as to make him do every thing I required of him, without any injunctions, prohibitions, lectures, or uselefs exhortations. So that whenever I spoke, he was satisfied; while my silence was what he was most afraid of, for then he understood something was wrong. I always left the circumstances themselves, however, to set him right. — But to return.

The continual exercise of a child left to the sole direction of nature, not only strengthens the body without weakening or blunting the mind; but, on the contrary, it tends to form the only species of reason the age of infancy is capable of, as well as that which is the most necessary to
persons

persons of any age whatever. It teaches us to become acquainted with the proper exertion of our forces, the relation our bodies bear to those which surround us, the use of those natural implements which are within our reach, and which are adapted to our organs. Can any stupidity equal that of a child, brought up always in the nursery, and under the wing of his mother; who, ignorant of the nature of weight and resistance, attempts to pull down a tree, or to lift a rock? The first time in my life that I went out of Geneva, I remember, I attempted to keep up with a horse on full gallop, and took up stones to throw over an hill two leagues distant: laughed at by all the children in the village, I appeared to them, doubtless, as a real idiot. At eighteen years of age, we learn, from the lectures of experimental philosophy, the nature of a lever; in the mean time, there is not a boy in the country, of twelve, who does not know the use of a lever better than the first mechanic in the academy of sciences. The lessons which school-boys learn of each other, in playing about their bounds, are an hundred times more useful to them than all those which the master teaches in the school.

Observe a cat, the first time she comes into a room: she looks about and peeps into every hole and corner, nor sits a moment still till she has carefully examined every piece of furniture therein. In the same manner doth a child examine into every thing, when he begins to walk about, and enters, if I may so say, the apartment of the world. All the difference is, that the fight, which is common both to the child and the cat,

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is in the first assisted by the feeling of the hands, and in the latter by that exquisite sense of smelling which nature has bestowed on it. It is the right or wrong cultivation of this inquisitive disposition that makes children either stupid or expert, sprightly or dull, sensible or foolish.

Our primary impulses, therefore, urging us to compare our forces with those of the objects about us, and to discover the sensible qualities of such objects as far as they relate to ourselves; the first study of mankind is a sort of experimental philosophy relative to self-preservation; from the prosecution of which we divert the attention of children by the premature introduction of matters of speculation. During the time that their supple and delicate organs are adapted to the making experiments on bodies; while their senses are as yet exempt from illusions; this is the interval in which we should exercise both the one and the other in their proper functions; this is the time to teach children the perceptible relations of things. As every thing that enters the human understanding is introduced by the senses, the first kind of ratiocination in man is a kind of sensitive reasoning; and this serves as the basis of his intellectual reason. Our first instructors in philosophy are our feet, hands, and eyes. In substituting books in their place, we do not learn to reason, but to content ourselves with the reasoning of others: we learn indeed to believe a great deal, but to know nothing.

To exercise any art, we must begin by procuring the necessary implements; and to employ those implements to any good purpose, they should be made sufficiently solid for their intended

ed use. To learn to think, therefore, we should exercise our limbs, and our organs, which are the instruments of our intelligence; and in order to make the best use of those instruments, it is necessary that the body furnishing them should be robust and hearty. Thus, so far is a sound understanding from being independent on the body, that it is owing to a good constitution that the operations of the mind are effected with facility and certainty.

Should I engage to show in what manner the long vacancy of childhood might best be employed, I should descend to particulars which might appear ridiculously circumstantial. Fine lessons, indeed! it may be said, that, according to my own confession, are confined to such things only as need not be taught. It may be asked me, Why so much time should be thrown away about instructions that will be suggested of themselves without trouble or assiduity? What child, twelve years old, will not know all that you intend to teach yours, and what his masters have taught him besides?

My good friends, you are mistaken: I instruct my pupil in an art, the study of which is tedious and difficult, and of which yours certainly knows nothing. This is the art of being ignorant; for the science of any person whatever, who does not pretend to more than he possesses, may be reduced into a very small compass. You instruct your child early in knowledge; I employ mine in perfecting the instruments to acquire it. It is said, that the Venetians having one day made a pompous display of their boasted treasure of St Mark to a Spanish ambassador, the latter paid them

them no other compliment than by looking under the tables, and saying with an affected surprise, *Qui non c' è la radice*. I never see a preceptor making a like display of his pupil's qualifications, but I am tempted to say the same thing.

All those who have made their reflections on the manner of living among the ancients, attribute to their gymnastic exercises that strength of body and mind which so eminently distinguish them from the moderns. The manner in which Montaigne hath dwelt upon this sentiment, serves to show how extremely sensible he was of its truth. In speaking of the education of a child, he says, in order to increase the vigour of the mind, we ought to increase the strength of the muscles; by using a child to labour, we inure him to pain; we must prepare him by exercise to bear the accidents of dislocation, the colic, and other evils attendant on the human frame. The sagacious Locke, the good Rollin, the learned Fleury, and the pedantic de Croufaz, however they differ from each other in every thing else, all agree in recommending bodily exercise to children. This is the most judicious of all their precepts; and yet is that which is, and always will be, the most neglected. I have already spoken sufficiently of its importance; and, as it is impossible to give better reasons, or lay down better rules for the practice, than are to be found in Locke, I shall content myself with referring to him, after having taken the liberty to add some observations of my own.

The limbs of a growing child should have room enough in its cloaths; he should have nothing

thing to restrain his motions or growth, nothing too tight, no ligatures about him. The dress of the French, too close and confined even for men, is particularly prejudicial to children. The blood and juices, retarded in their circulation, stagnate and grow foul; the disorders arising from which, increased by an inactive and sedentary life, bring on the scurvy; a distemper, common to us, and hardly known among the ancients, whom their dress and manner of living preserved from it. The tight hussar-dress, which mothers sometimes affect for their sons, instead of remedying, augments the inconvenience; as, in order to prevent a few ligatures in different parts of the body, it confines and compresses the whole. The best way is to let them go as long as possible in loose vests; and, afterwards, to let their cloaths be made large enough; and not to stand upon their displaying a fine shape, by means which will only serve to destroy it. Their defects, both in body and mind, arise almost all from the same cause; we are desirous of making men of them before their time.

With respect to the colour of their cloaths, children are generally fond of the gay and lively; they suit them better also, and I see no reason why we should not in such cases consult their natural inclinations; but, as soon as ever they begin to prefer one stuff to another because it is rich and costly, their hearts are infected by luxury and the caprices of opinion. This kind of taste, assuredly, they have not acquired of themselves. It is not easy to say what an influence the choice of cloaths, and the motives for that choice, have on education. We not only see
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fond mothers ridiculously promising their children fine cloaths, as a recompense for their good behaviour; but often hear foolish preceptors threatening their pupils with coarser and plainer cloaths, as a punishment for their faults. "If you do not mind your book better, if you do not keep your cloaths cleaner, you shall go dressed like a ploughboy." Is not this as much as to tell them, that the merit and importance of a man lie in his garb, and that theirs consist entirely in their dress. Is it to be wondered at, that youth profit by such wise lessons? that they hold nothing in esteem but dress, and judge of merit by external appearances?

If it were my business to correct a child that had been spoiled in this manner, I would take care that his richest cloaths should be the most inconvenient; that he should be hardly able to stir his arms and move about in them; I would take care that his liberty and gaiety should in every shape be sacrificed to his magnificence: if he at any time joined in the play of other children more plainly dressed, they should give over and disappear immediately: in a word, I would so tire him out with his finery, and render him so great a slave to his laced cloaths, that he should soon think them the plague of his life, and prefer his being shut up in a dungeon rather than put them on. If a child be not subjected to our own idle notions and prejudices, his chief desire is to be easy and at liberty. The most simple, the most convenient dress, is always the most prized.

There is an habit of body proper for persons who take much exercise, and another more suitable

table to the sedentary and inactive. The latter, preserving an equal and uniform circulation of the fluids, should be defended against the alterations of the air and the weather: the former, passing from labour to rest, and from heat to cold, ought, on the contrary, to inure themselves to such alterations. Hence it follows, that studious and indolent people ought always to go warmly clothed, in order to preserve the body in the same temperature, as near as possible, at all times and seasons. Those, on the other hand, who come and go, in the wind, the sun, and the rain, who take a good deal of exercise, and pass most of their time in the open air, ought to be clothed lightly, in order to habituate themselves to all the vicissitudes in the temperature of the air, without injury. I should advise both one and the other not to change their dress with the seasons; this also shall be the constant practice with Emilius: not that I mean he shall wear a winter's habit in summer, like sedentary persons; but that he shall wear a summer's dress in winter, like the labouring-people. The latter, we are told, was the custom of Sir Isaac Newton, who lived to be fourscore.

I would have little or no covering on the head in any season. The ancient Egyptians went always bareheaded; the Persians wore tiaras, and still wear thick turbans: the use of which, according to Chardin, the air of the country renders necessary. I have elsewhere remarked a distinction that Herodotus made in the field of battle between the skulls of the Persians and those of the Egyptians. As it is of consequence, therefore, that the bones of the skull should become

come hard and compact, the better to defend the brain, not only against contusions and fractures, but also from cold and defluxions; you should accustom your children to go, both winter and summer, by day and by night, bareheaded. If, for the sake of neatness, and to keep their hair in order, you would put on them a cap at night, let it be made of thin light net-work. I know that the generality of mothers, more influenced by the observation of Chardin than with my reasons, will conceit the air of Persia universal; but, for my own part, I have not made choice of an European pupil to make him an Asiatic.

Children, in general, are too warmly clothed; particularly in their earliest infancy. It is much better to inure them to bear cold than heat. The former will never hurt them, if they are exposed to it early; but the loose and porous texture of their skin, leaving too great an opening for perspiration, subjects them to an inevitable waste of strength and spirits from extreme heat. Hence it is observable, that more people die in August than in any month in the year. Besides this, it is evident, on a comparison between the northern people and the inhabitants of the southern climates, that mankind grow more robust by supporting excessive cold than they do by bearing excessive heat. As your child grows up, however, and his fibres gather strength, you should inure him by degrees to bear the rays of the sun; which you may thus easily effect, till he should run no risk even from the scorching heat of the torrid zone.

It is remarkable, that Mr Locke, amidst a

number of manly and sensible rules which he lays down for the government of children, falls into such flagrant contradictions as we should not expect in so exact a reasoner. The same person, who advises that children should in the heat of summer go into the cold bath, is against their drinking cold liquors when they are warm, or sitting in moist places on the cold ground *. But, as he would have their shoes always take water, can it be supposed they will take it less when the child is hot? And may not we draw the same inferences concerning the whole body from the feet, as he does, about the feet and body, from the hands and face? If he is desirous his pupil's body should be all face, wherefore should not I desire mine to be all feet?

To prevent children drinking when they are hot, he advises us to use them to eat a piece of bread before they drink. This is surely very strange! When a child is famished with thirst, we must give him something to eat! I should rather, when he is starving with hunger, give him something to drink. I shall never be persuaded, that our natural appetites are disorderly, and that we may not gratify them without endangering our health and lives. If this were really the case, the human race might have been destroyed before they had learned the precautions necessary to self-preservation.

Whenever Emilius is thirsty, I would have him

* Is it to be supposed the little peasants take such particular care to sit or lie down only in dry places? and did we ever hear of the damp of the earth doing them any harm? To hear the physicians talk on this subject, one would think the savages must be all laid up with the rheumatism.

him drink, and that only pure water, without any mixture or preparation, even were he all over in a sweat, and though it were in the depth of winter. The only precaution I would recommend, is to make a distinction between the qualities of the water. If it be river-water, give it him as it comes directly from the river; if spring-water, it ought to stand some time in the air before it be drank. In warm seasons the rivers are warm; but it is not so with the springs, which are not in contact with the external air. Such water ought not to be drank, therefore, till it acquire the temperature of the atmosphere. In the winter, on the contrary, spring-water is less dangerous than that of the stream. But it is neither natural nor frequent to be in a sweat in winter, particularly in the open air; because the cold air compressing the skin, repels the moisture, and prevents the pores from opening sufficiently for a very free perspiration. Now, it is not my intention that Emilius shall exercise himself in the winter by the side of a good fire, but in the open fields amidst the frost and snow. Let him heat himself as much as he will in making and throwing snow-balls, he may safely venture to drink whenever he is dry; especially if he returns to the same diversion afterwards. Should he ever be put into a sweat; also, by any other violent exercise, and be at the same time thirsty, he may even then drink cold water without danger. Take care only to lead him gently at some little distance to fetch it, and he will be cooled sufficiently to drink. But be sure to take these precautions without his perceiving it. I had much rather he should be sometimes sick,

than to be perpetually attentive to the preservation of his health.

Children require a good deal of sleep, because they use much exercise. The one serves to counterbalance the other; so that hence we see they have need of both. The proper time for rest is pointed out by nature, and is in the night. It is a certain observation, that our sleep is more tranquil and agreeable when the sun is below the horizon; the air, heated by its direct rays, never involving our senses in so profound a calm. Hence the most salutary habit is certainly to rise and lie down with the sun; and hence it follows, that, in these climates, men, as well as all other animals, require in general more sleep in winter than in summer. But the state of civil life is not sufficiently simple and exempted from accident, for us to think of using a child to such an uniformity, so far as to render it necessary. He ought, without doubt, to be subject to some regulations in this respect; but our chief rule should be to enable him to depart from them when occasion requires, without endangering his health. Do not enervate your pupil, therefore, by indulging him in soft and uninterrupted slumbers. Let him enjoy his rest at first without restraint, as the law of nature dictates; but forget not, that in society it is frequently necessary to be above that law: he should be used, therefore, as he grows up, to sit up late, and rise early; to be waked unexpectedly out of his sleep, and to sit up occasionally all night without inconvenience. By beginning with him early, and proceeding gently and gradually, we may thus form his constitution to bear

bear those things which might destroy it if already formed.

It is of great consequence to accustom ourselves betimes to indifferent lodgings; it is the way to prevent our ever meeting with bad beds: and in general an hardy way of living, when we are once used to it, increases the number of agreeable sensations; whereas a soft and luxurious life prepares us for an infinity of displeasing ones. Persons tenderly brought up cannot go to sleep but on a couch of down; those who are accustomed to lie on the floor, can sleep any where. The man who falls asleep as soon as he lies down, feels not the hardness of his bed.

A soft bed, in which we lie buried in feathers or elder-down, dissolves, as it were, the whole body. The back and reins are overheated; whence come the stone and gravel, painful diseases, and infallibly an enervated constitution, which nourishes all others.

The best bed is that which procures the best sleep. Emilius and I are preparing for ours all day. We stand in no need therefore of Persian slaves to make our beds; as, in turning up the earth, we are in effect shaking up our mattresses. I know by experience, that, when a child is in health, we may make it go to sleep or keep it awake almost as we please. When children are put to bed, and the nurse is tired with their prattle, nothing is more common than for the latter to bid them go to sleep: but this is much the same thing as if she should bid them be well, when they are sick. The right way to make children go to sleep, is to weary them, and not ourselves. Keep talking to them, there-
fore,

fore, incessantly; so that they must be forced to keep silence themselves, and they will soon fall asleep. Long discourses, thus, you see, are good for something; and preaching a sermon is as good as rocking the cradle: but, though you make use of this narcotic in the night, I would have you be careful how you employ it in the day-time.

I shall sometimes awaken Emilius, lest for fear he should get a habit of sleeping too long, than to accustom him to every thing, even to the circumstance of being awakened suddenly. Let me add to this, that I should be very ill qualified for the office I have undertaken, if I did not know how to make him wake of himself, and rise, in a manner, at my pleasure, without saying a single word to him about the matter.

If, for instance, I thought he did not sleep enough, I should let him foresee over night that he would have but a disagreeable morning; in consequence of which, he would think all the time clear gain that he spent of it in sleep. On the contrary, did he sleep too much, I would provide for him some amusement he was fond of against he should wake. Am I desirous of teaching him to wake at a certain hour? I say to him, "To-morrow morning at six o'clock I propose the diversion of angling, or I shall take a walk to such a place; will you be of the party?" He consents, and desires me to wake him; this I either promise or not, as occasion may require. If he wakes too late, he finds that I am gone out. Hence he feels his misfortune if he does not soon learn to wake another time without being called.

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When it so happens, which however is very rare, that an indolent child gives itself up to sloth and inactivity, it should not be indulged in such a vitious propensity, but stimulated by some powerful motives to action. It will be readily conceived that I do not mean we should proceed to use absolute force, but only to employ the stimulus of some appetite that may answer that end: by which means also, if we follow the direction of nature, we shall effect two purposes at once.

For my own part, I conceive there is hardly any thing in the world, for which we might not, with a little address, excite an inclination, or even an ardent desire, in children, without vanity, jealousy, or emulation. Their vivacity and turn for imitation may suffice, and particularly their native cheerfulness, by which we may always have a sure hold of them, although no preceptor has ever known how to make use of it. In their sports and diversions, while they think they are only at play, they will suffer without complaint, and even sometimes laugh at injuries they would not otherwise have borne without shedding tears. Fastings, stripes, burnings, and fatigues of every kind, are the ordinary amusements of the young savages; which is a proof, that even pain itself will admit of a seasoning to give a relish to its bitterness. Every master, however, has not the art of making this dish palatable, nor every disciple the appetite to taste it without grimace. But I shall again, if I do not take care, bewilder myself with exceptions.

What is not long to be borne, however, is our
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subjection to pain, to the evils incident to our species, to accidents, dangers, and death: the more we familiarise ourselves to these ideas, the more we diminish that importunate sensibility which adds to the evil the impatience of enduring it. The more we revolve in our minds the various sufferings we have reason to expect, the more we deprive them of their sting; the more we strengthen the soul, and render it invulnerable. The body thus becomes the armour that repels all the shafts which might otherwise wound to the quick. Even the approaches of death, as they are not death itself, are hardly felt. A man, so armed, cannot be said to die: he is living till the very instant he is dead: he knows no interval. One might say of such a man, as Montagne said of an emperor of Morocco, that no one ever lived so long in death. Resolution and fortitude are, like the other virtues, to be learned in infancy: but it is not by teaching children those terms, that they are taught to be bold and resolute. They must be made to taste and experience them, without which they will never know what they mean.

But, *a-propos*, as we are now on the subject of dying, how are we to act with our pupil in regard to the small-pox? Shall we have him inoculated while ye is young, or shall we let him take it in the natural way? The former is most agreeable to our practice, as it is calculated to save our lives at an age when life is most valuable, at the risk of losing them at that age when life is of least account; if indeed we may be said to run any risk at all in inoculation skilfully performed. The latter, however, is more conform-
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able to our general principles, of leaving every thing to nature, in cases where she chuses to operate alone, and which she gives up as soon as man interferes. Man, in a state of nature, is always prepared for inoculation; let us leave the operation therefore to nature; she knows her own time better than we. It must not hence be concluded, however, that I condemn inoculation: for the very same reason that I exempt my pupil, you ought perhaps to take a contrary method with yours. Your method of education prepares him for not escaping the small-pox, whenever it attacks him: if you wait, therefore, till he takes it by accident, it is very probable he may die of it. I observe that the practice of inoculation meets with opposition, in various countries, in the exact proportion as it is necessary for them to adopt it: the reason of it, also, however contradictory to common sense, is easy to be perceived.

I shall hardly think it worth while to determine this point, therefore, with regard to *Emilius*: he shall either be inoculated or not, as time, place, and circumstance, require: it is to him almost a matter of mere indifference. If we inoculate him, it is true, we shall have the advantage of knowing his distemper, and providing for it beforehand; which to be sure is something: but then, if, on the other hand, he takes it naturally, we shall have no occasion for the physician; which is a great deal more.

In a particular or exclusive method of education, calculated only to distinguish persons so educated from the vulgar, those instructions are always preferred which are the most costly; while

while the more common, which by the way are the most useful, are neglected. Thus young gentlemen, politely educated, go through the exercises of the riding-school, because this course is expensive; but hardly any of them learn to swim, because it costs nothing, and a common peasant may know how to swim as well as the first lord in the land. And yet we see the traveller, without having learned to ride the great horse, mounts his nag, and manages him very well; but whoever falls into the water and cannot swim, must be drowned: and nobody can swim without having learned it. Besides, I know not that any one is obliged on pain of death to ride on horseback; whereas no one is certain of avoiding the danger to which we are so often exposed from the water. Emilius shall learn to move in the water, as well as on land. Why should he not be taught to live in all elements? Could I teach him to fly in the air, I would make him an eagle; and, if to bear the fire, a salamander.

We are generally afraid children should drown themselves in learning to swim; but whether they drown themselves in learning, or are drowned when they have grown up for having never learned, it is the fault of those who have the care of them when young. It is vanity only that inspires temerity; we are never fool-hardy, or run ourselves in danger, when alone; nor would Emilius be so, though the eyes of the whole universe were upon him.

As exercise does not depend on running into danger, he might learn, in the canal of his father's park, to cross the Hellespont; but it is
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necessary to familiarise him in some degree to danger itself; that he may not be over-solicitous about it. This is a necessary part of that apprenticeship I shall speak of hereafter. Being attentive also to adapt the risk he may run to his strength, and by sharing the danger with him myself, I shall have nothing to fear from his imprudence, while I regulate my care of his preservation by what I owe to my own.

A child hath neither the strength nor the judgment of a man; but he is capable of seeing and hearing as well, or at least nearly so. His palate also is as sensible, though less delicate: and he distinguishes odours as well, though not with the same nicety. Of all our faculties, the senses are perfected the first: these therefore are the first we should cultivate: they are, nevertheless, the only ones that are usually forgotten, or the most neglected.

To exercise the senses, is not merely to make use of them; it is to learn rightly to judge by them; to learn, if I may so express myself, to perceive; for we know how to touch, to see, to hear, only as we have learned.

Some exercises are purely natural and mechanical, and serve to make the body strong and robust, without taking the least hold on the judgment; such are those of swimming, running, leaping, whipping a top, throwing stones, &c. All these are very well: but have we only arms and legs? have we not also eyes and ears? and are not these organs necessary to the expert use of the former? Do not only exercise your strength, therefore, but all the senses that direct it; make the best possible use of each, and let

the impressions of one confirm those of another. Measure, reckon, weigh, and compare. Exert not your force till you have estimated the resistance you are going to encounter; always so contriving it, that an estimation of the effect may precede the use of the means. Let your pupil see his interest in never making superfluous or insufficient efforts. By thus using him to foresee the effect of all his motions, and to correct his errors by experience, is it not clear, that the more extensive and various his exercise, the more judicious he will grow?

Let us suppose him going to move an heavy body by means of a lever; if he takes one too long, he will find it unmanageable with his short arms; if too short, he will not have sufficient force: experience will teach him to chuse one of the proper length. This kind of knowledge is not above his age. Does the matter in question regard the lifting a burden? If he would take up one as heavy as he could carry, and not make a fruitless endeavour to raise one he could not lift, is he not under a necessity of estimating the weight by his eye? When he knows how to make a comparison between masses of the same matter, but of different bulk, let him learn to do the same between masses of the same bulk, but of different matter; he will then experience the difference of their specific gravity. I remember a young man, very well educated, who could not be persuaded, till he had made the experiment, that a tub, full of cleft wood, was lighter than the same tub filled with water.

We are not all equally expert in the use of our senses. There is one, to wit, the touch, whose

whose action is never suspended while we are awake, and which is extended over the whole surface of the body, as a continual guard to give us notice of every thing that may be offensive. It is by means of the continual and involuntary exercise of this sense, that we acquire our earliest experience, which makes it the less needful for us to give it any particular cultivation. We find, however, that blind people have a much stronger and more delicate sense of feeling than we; because, having no information from the sight, they are obliged to deduce the same conclusions from the former sense only, which we are furnished with by the latter. Why then should we not learn to walk, like them, in the dark, to know bodies by the touch, to judge of the objects that surround us; to do, in short, by night without candles, all they do by day without eyes? While the sun is above the horizon, we have the advantage of them, and lead them about; but in the dark they are our guides, and take the lead in turn. We are blind as they during one half of our lives, with this difference, that those who are really blind can at all times find their way about, whereas we that have eyes hardly dare to stir a foot in the night. Will it be said, We may call for candles and torches? We may so: but this is to be always recurring to machines; who can assure us they will always be at hand? For my own part, I had much rather Emilius should have eyes at his fingers ends than in the chandler's shop.

Should you be shut up in a house in the middle of the night, clap your hands, and you may perceive by the eccho whether the room you

are in be large or small; whether you are in the middle or in one corner. Within six inches of the wall, the very air will give a different sensation to your face to what it does in the middle of the room. Turn yourself round successively, facing every part of the room, and if there be a door open, you will perceive it by a gentle draught of air. Are you in a vessel upon the water? you may know by the manner in which the air strikes against your face, not only which way you are going, but whether you go fast or slow. These observations, and a thousand others of a similar kind, can be made only in the night; for, whatever attention we bestow on them in the day-time, we are always so far either assisted or prevented by the sight, that the experiment escapes us. We here make use neither of hands nor sticks; indeed, we might acquire a considerable share of ocular information by the touch, even without touching any of the objects in question.

I would have a variety of diversions for the night. This piece of advice is of much greater importance than it may at first appear. The night naturally strikes a terror into men as well as brute animals*. Reason or knowledge, wisdom or courage, deliver few persons from paying this tribute to darkness. I have seen casuists, free-thinkers, philosophers, and even soldiers, whom nothing could daunt by day, tremble by night, like women, at the rustling of the leaves of a tree. This timidity is usually attributed

* This terror has been very remarkable in some great eclipses of the sun.

buted to the idle tales told us when young by our nurses. This, however, is a mistake: it is founded in nature; the cause of it being the same as that which makes deaf people mistrustful, and the vulgar superstitious; that is, our ignorance of the things that surround us, and of what is passing about us †. Being accustomed to

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perceive

† A philosopher, whose book I have often quoted, and whose extensive views have more often afforded me instruction, assigns another cause for this fear, as follows.

“ When we are prevented, by any particular circumstance, from forming a true idea of the distance of objects, and are enabled to judge of them only by the angle, or rather the image, under which they appear to the eye, we necessarily deceive ourselves as to the magnitude of such objects. Every one knows, that, in the night, it is common to mistake a shrub which is near us for a tree at a distance, *et vice versa*. In the same manner, if we know not an object by its form, and therefore cannot by that method judge of its distance, we are again of course mistaken: a fly, passing swiftly before our eyes, at some little distance, will appear the same as a large bird farther off: an horse, in the middle of a field, placing itself in the attitude of a sheep, will be taken for a large sheep, till we discover it to be an horse; when it will appear as big as that animal; the first judgment we passed on it, being instantly rectified.

“ Whenever we are benighted in strange places, where we cannot judge of distances, nor discover the form of objects, on account of the obscurity of the medium, we are every moment in danger of falling into mistakes concerning those things which present themselves: hence arises the terror, that kind of innate fear, which almost every body is sensible of in a dark night. Here also we trace the foundation of those apparitions of gigantic and formidable figures, which so many people affirm they have seen. They are usually told indeed, on these occasions, that those figures existed only in their imagination; they might, however, really exist in their eyes, and it is very possible that they actually saw what they declare themselves to have seen: for it must necessarily happen, when we can judge of an object only by the angle it forms in the eye, that such unknown object must increase in magnitude in proportion as it approaches that organ: so that if it at first appears to the spectator (ignorant of what he sees, and incapable of judging its distance)

perceive objects at a distance, and to anticipate their impressions, how can I help supposing, when I no longer see any thing of such objects, that there may be a thousand hurtful things in motion around me, from which I cannot guard myself? It is to no purpose that I am convinced of my security in the place where I am; I can never be so fully persuaded, as if I had ocular proof of it: I have, therefore, always a motive for fear in the night, which I should not have in the day-time. I know, it is true, that in general, another body cannot act against mine, without

stance) to be a few feet high at the distance of twenty or thirty paces, it would appear several fathoms high when at the distance only of a few feet; a circumstance that might very naturally strike terror into the spectator, till he should go up close to it, and, by touching it, discover what it was: in which case this object, which before appeared so enormous and gigantic, would be diminished to its natural size. But if, through fear, he should not go up to such object and be undeceived, it is certain he could form no other idea of it, than that arising from the image which it formed in his eye; and would believe he had really seen something terrible both for its size and form. Thus the notion of spectres is really founded in nature, and those appearances do not depend altogether, as the philosophers suppose, on the imagination." Buffon hist. nat. tome vi. p. 22. 12^{mo} edit.

I have endeavoured to shew in the text, how far these appearances do always depend on the imagination, in part; and as to the causes set forth in the above citation, it is clear that the custom I recommend, of walking about in the dark, will learn us to distinguish the appearances which the resemblance of forms and the diversity of distances give to objects in the night. For when there is just light enough to enable us to perceive the outlines of objects, as we know there is the greater quantity of air between us and objects at the greater distance, those outlines should appear less distinct than if those objects were nearer. Thus habit, we see, is sufficient to prevent us from falling into the mistake pointed out by M. Buffon: but whatever explication be preferred, my method is efficacious, and perfectly conformable to experience.

out giving me notice of its approach by some noise; for this reason it is, that in the dark the ear is always listening. At the least noise that I cannot immediately account for, the interest I take in my own preservation makes me directly suppose every thing which tends to make me be on my guard, and, of course, every thing that tends to increase my fears.

Is every thing silent around me? I am not the more tranquil on that score; for, after all, it is possible for me to be surprised without noise. It is necessary for me, therefore, to conceive every thing about me in the state it was before, to conceive them to be as they ought still to exist, and that I see what I actually do not. Being thus reduced to bring imagination into play, I soon lose the mastery of it; but the method I take to encourage myself serves only to alarm me the more. If I hear a noise, I am alarmed for fear of robbers; if all is in profound silence, the imagination is haunted with spectres and phantoms: that vigilance which self-preservation inspires, excites only suggestions of fear. Every thing that tends to give me encouragement depends on my reason; whereas instinct, more powerful, speaks in a different strain. To what end, therefore, should we reflect that we have no cause to fear, when in that case we have also nothing to do?

The cause of the evil being found, it sufficiently indicates the remedy. Habit, in every thing, destroys the effects of imagination: these are excited only by the novelty of the object. The imagination is never employed in those which are familiar to us; these affect only the me-

memory; and hence we see the reason of the axiom, *Ab assuetis non fit passio*; for the passions are lighted up only at the fire of the imagination. Never argue, therefore, with those whom you are desirous to cure of the fear of being in the dark; but entice them often into it; and be assured, that all the philosophical arguments in the world will be of less avail than that practice. A bricklayer, or a tyler, is never made giddy by looking down from the roofs of houses; nor do we see those who are accustomed to go about in the obscurity of the night, under any terrors on that score.

Here, then, is another advantage arising from our nocturnal entertainments, to be added to the former: but, in order that such diversions should answer the end proposed, I cannot too much recommend cheerfulness and gaiety. Nothing is more dismal than to be in darkness: never shut up a child, therefore, to remain in a dungeon. On the contrary, let him go laughing into the dark, and come laughing out again, taking care that the notion of the amusement he had just left, and is going again to partake of, may defend him from those fantastic ideas which might otherwise intrude on his imagination.

There is a certain term of life, beyond which we go backward even in advancing. I perceive that I myself have reached that term. I have begun, as it were, a new career. In growing old, I become again a child; and recollect with greater pleasure what I did at ten years of age than at thirty. Forgive me, readers, if I sometimes draw an example from myself; for to write
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this book as it should be, it is necessary I should do it with pleasure.

When I was a boy, I boarded in the country, under the care of a clergyman whose name was Lambercier. I had for my companion, at the same place, a cousin, whose parents being much richer than mine, he was treated like the heir of a family, while I, at a distance from my father, was slighted like a poor orphan. This great cousin of mine was a remarkable coward, particularly in the night: on which account, I used to jeer and laugh at him so much, that Mr Lambercier, being wearied with my boasting, took it into his head to put my courage to the proof. Accordingly, one very dark evening, in the autumn, he gave me the key of the church, and bid me fetch the Bible that he had left in the pulpit; adding some reflections on my boasted magnanimity, that made it impossible for me to recede.

I set out, therefore, without taking a light; and perhaps if I had taken any, it had been only so much the worse. I went through the church-yard very manfully; for, in the open air, I never was fearful by night. In unlocking the church-door, however, I heard an echoing sound, that I thought resembled the human voice, and which began to stagger my resolution. Having opened the door, I went in a little way, but soon stopped. The profound and silent darkness that reigned throughout the vast space before me, made my hair perfectly stand on end; I turned back, therefore, and ran trembling out of the church. In my return, however, meeting with a little dog, which we used to call Sul-
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tan, the notice he took of me revived my spirits; and, being ashamed of my fears, I returned back toward the church, endeavouring, though to no purpose, to entice Sultan to follow me. Pushing open the door boldly, I went in; but had hardly taken three steps farther, before I was again seized with affright, and that so powerfully, that my head fairly turned round: for though the pulpit stood to the right, and I knew the circumstance very well, yet, having turned about without perceiving it, I poked about a long time to the left, and bewildered myself among the forms: not knowing where I was, or how to find either the door or the pulpit. At length, however, I perceived the door, and made again out of the church, fully determined never more to set foot in it, unless in the day-time.

Being returned to the house, and just ready to open the door, I overheard Mr Lambercier laughing very heartily, as I supposed, at my expence: I therefore stopt to listen, and heard Miss Lambercier bid a servant fetch a lanthorn, while her father rose up, in order to look after me, attended by my intrepid cousin, on whom I did not doubt would devolve the honour of the expedition. At this instant my fears disappeared; at least I had no other than that of being overtaken before I reached the church: I flew back, and without any hesitation mounted the pulpit, snatched up the Bible, jumped down again immediately, and in two or three strides was out of the church. I did not stay to lock the door; but making the best of my way home, threw down the Bible on the table. I was out of
breath,

breath, and frightened enough, you may suppose, but was secretly rejoiced to find I had prevented the assistance intended me.

It will be asked me, if I lay down this example as proper to be followed, and as an instance of that mirth and cheerfulness which I think required in these nocturnal amusements? I answer, No. But I bring it as a proof that nothing is so proper to encourage those who are fearful of being in the dark, as the circumstance of hearing company laughing and talking cheerfully in the next room. Instead of amusing myself with Emilius alone in these cases, I would get together several good-humoured children of his age, none of which I would at first send into the dark alone, but two or three, or more together; nor would I ever venture any one absolutely alone, without being first pretty well assured he would not be too much frightened.

I do not conceive any thing more diverting and useful than such kind of amusement, especially if managed with a little address. I would, in a large saloon or dark antichamber, make a kind of labyrinth, with stools, tables, screens, &c. In the most inaccessible part of these, I would place eight or ten little boxes, all of a sort and size, one of which only should be filled with sweatmeats: I would then describe in short and plain terms the place where this box lay; and after making the little candidates cast lots for precedency, each should go in his turn, till the prize should be found. I would give directions that should appear plain enough to persons in any degree more attentive and less blundering than

than children *; and should increase the difficulty of finding the box in proportion to their dexterity. Figure to yourself a little Hercules coming in with a box in his hand, elated with the supposed success of his expedition. It is laid down on the table, and opened with a deal of ceremony. Methink I hear hither the peals of laughter and hisses of the joyous little company, when, instead of the expected sweetmeats, nothing is found in it but a snail-shell, a coal, an acorn, a little turnip, or some such trifle, carefully wrapt up in moss or cotton.

At other times, I would hang some little toy against a wall newly white-washed, and send them in the dark to fetch it without touching the wall. We should presently see, when they came into the light, whether they had fulfilled the conditions prescribed; the corners of their hats, the skirts of their coats, or their sleeves, would betray their want of dexterity. These hints, I conceive, will be sufficient; perhaps some will think them more than necessary, to give the reader an idea of these kind of amusements. Those who require me to be more particular, should not read me at all.

What advantages would not a man, educated in this manner, have, in the night, over others? His feet accustomed to tread firm and secure, his hands exercised in the touch of surrounding objects, are capable of conducting him with ease through

* To use children to be attentive, never talk to them about any thing in which they are not very sensibly interested; but, above all, avoid amplification and prolixity. At the same time, also, beware of being ambiguous or obscure.

through the thickest darkness. His imagination, full of the nocturnal amusements of his youth, is easily diverted from terrifying objects. If he hears the fits of unexpected laughter, instead of conceiving them to be the effects of ludicrous spirits, they recall to mind those of his former companions: if his imagination raises up a nocturnal assembly, it is not a meeting of witches, but that he formerly attended in the apartment of his preceptor. The night, recalling to his mind nothing but cheerful ideas, will never appear hideous: on the contrary, having nothing to fear, he will delight in it. Is he required to go on a military expedition? he will be ready at any hour, either with his company, or alone. He will be able to go into the camp of Saul, to explore every part of it, without bewildering himself; to march forward even to the king's tent, without awakening the guard, and to return unperceived by any one. Are you to carry off the white horses of Rhesus? apply boldly to him. Among persons differently educated, you will not easily find an Ulysses.

I have known people endeavour to cure children of being fearful in the night, by using them to frequent surprises. This method, however, is a very bad one, and productive of a contrary effect to that for which it is calculated; rendering them in fact only the more timid. Neither reason nor habit can possibly make us perfectly easy concerning an object of present danger, of which we know neither the kind nor the degree; much less can they deprive us of the fear arising from those surprises we may have often experienced.

To secure my pupil, however, in the best manner I could, from such accidents, I should give him the following advice. "You know, *Emilius*, that, in this case, you have always an undoubted right to stand on your own defence; for as the aggressor does not give you time to judge whether he intends to injure or only to terrify you, and as he has taken his advantages, you may possibly find no safety in flight. Seize fast hold, therefore, boldly, of whatever surprises you in the night; whether it be man or beast, it is no matter. Grasp and squeeze him with all your force; if he resists, strike him; be not sparing of your blows; but whatever he may say or do, let him not go, till you know who and what he is. On explanation, you will find probably you had no great cause to be afraid: this method of treating jesters, also, will naturally disgust them with the sport."

Although the touch is more constantly exercised than any other of our senses; the judgment immediately formed from it, is, as I before observed, more gross and imperfect than that which is formed on any other; because persons who enjoy their eye-sight, are continually making use of that sense instead of it; and as the eye reconnoitres a body much more easily and speedily than the hand, we almost always judge of bodies without employing the latter. On the other hand, however, the judgment of the touch is more certain; and that purely because it is more confined: for this sense not extending itself to bodies beyond the reach of our hands, it serves to rectify the mistakes of the others, which, lanching forth to a great
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distance, are exerted on objects barely perceptible; whereas, whatever is perceived by the touch is fully and completely so. Add to this, that, joining, when we please, the force of the muscles to the action of the nerves, we unite in one simultaneous sensation, the temperature, magnitude, figure, weight, and solidity of the object perceived. Thus the touch being, of all our senses, that which informs us best of the impression which other bodies make on ours, it is that for which we have the most frequent use, and which more immediately supplies us with the knowledge necessary to our preservation.

As our sense of feeling, when properly exercised, becomes a supplement to sight, why may it not also supply that of hearing to a certain degree; especially as sounds are known to excite, in sonorous bodies, vibrations sensible to the touch? Lay your hand upon the body of the violencello, and you will be able, without the assistance of either eyes or ears, to distinguish, by the manner in which it vibrates, whether the sound it gives be grave or acute, whether it arise from the treble string or the base. Were the senses exercised, with attention, in this manner, I doubt not but, in time, we might acquire such a degree of sensibility as to be able to distinguish a whole air by means of the fingers. On this supposition, it is plain, we might easily talk to deaf persons by music: for notes and time being no less susceptible of regular combinations than articulate words, they may be made use of in the same manner as the elements of speech.

There are some exercises, however, that impair

pair the sense of feeling, and make it dull; others again render it more fine and delicate. The former, uniting a good deal of motion and force to the continual impression of hard bodies, make the skin hard and callous, depriving it of its natural sensibility: the latter are those which vary the same sensation, by light and frequent contact, in such a manner that the mind, intent on such impressions incessantly repeated, acquires a facility of comprehending all their modifications. This difference is very sensible in the use of musical instruments: the hard and destructive touch of the violoncello, the bass-viol, and even of the violin, in rendering the fingers more flexible, hardens their extremities; whereas the slight and smooth touch of the harpsichord or spinnet, at the same time that it makes them pliant and flexible, makes them also still more sensible. The spinnet, therefore, is in this respect to be preferred.

It is requisite that the external skin should be so far hardened, as to endure the impressions and alterations in the air: for this it is that defends all the rest. After this, however, I would not have the hands applied too long and often to the same kind of labour, as by this means the skin becomes callous, and loses that exquisite degree of sensibility which enables us to judge of bodies by slightly passing the hand over them, and which, according to the different species of contact, makes us, in the dark, frequently to shudder.

Where is the necessity for my pupil to have his feet always secured by the hide of an ox? Where would be the harm, if his own skin should

should serve him instead of the soles of his shoes? It is evident, that the delicacy of the skin, in this part of the body, can never be useful, tho' it may be sometimes hurtful. When the citizens of Geneva were alarmed in the night, in the depth of winter, by the enemy, they found their muskets sooner than their shoes. Had none of them ever been used to walk barefoot, who knows if their city might not have been taken?

A man should always be armed against unforeseen accidents. Emilius, therefore, shall accustom himself to run barefoot, in all seasons, about his chamber, up and down stairs, and into the garden: so far from blaming him for it, I would imitate him, taking care only to keep the way clear of broken glass. I shall treat of his manual sports and labour presently; in the meantime, I would have him learn all those steps which favour the various turnings and windings of the body, and to assume an easy and firm position in all its various attitudes. He should learn to leap well, both as to distance and height, as well as to climb up a tree, and to spring over a wall; he should acquire the knack of being always master of his equilibrium in these exercises, all his motions and gestures being regulated by the laws of gravity, long before I should trouble him with an explanation of the principles of statics. By the manner in which his foot rests on the ground, and his body on his leg, he should feel whether it were well or ill placed. A steady posture is always graceful, and the firmest attitudes are ever the most elegant. If I were a dancing master, I would not

teach the monkey-tricks of Marcel*; though it must be said they were well enough adapted to the country where he taught them: but, instead of employing my pupil perpetually in cutting capers, I would lead him to the foot of some steep and rugged rock: there I would instruct him in the various attitudes it might be necessary for him to assume; in what manner to carry his head, his body, and where to rest his hands and his feet, as occasion required, to leap from point to point, both in ascending and descending. I would rather make him emulous of a roebuck, than of a dancer at the opera.

As the operations of the sense of feeling are confined within the reach of our hands, so those of the sight are extended beyond it. It is this circumstance which renders the latter so delusive: at one view, the sight comprehends the various objects contained in half the horizon; how is it possible it should not be sometimes deceived, amidst that multitude of simultaneous sensations, and the judgment they excite? The sight is, indeed, the most defective of all our senses; and that precisely because it is the most comprehensive, and that, leaving the rest at so
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* A celebrated dancing-master at Paris, who, knowing very well with whom he had to do, affected to play the extravagant, and to give his art an air of importance, which people pretended to think ridiculous; but for which, nevertheless, they in reality held him in great respect. There is at present another instance of the like kind, in an art not less frivolous; a comedian takes upon him the man of importance, affecting the enthusiast in his profession, and succeeds in the same manner. This is a sure method of succeeding in France. Real abilities, more simple and less empirical, are not encouraged there; modesty being supposed only an indication of folly.

great a distance behind it, its operations are too extensive and instantaneous to be corrected by them. We may add further, that the very illusions of perspective are necessary to enable us to form a right notion of extension, and compare its several parts and relations. Were there no deception in the appearances of things, nothing would seem to exist at a distance: without the gradations of magnitude and shade we could not perceive any distance; or rather, with regard to us, there would in fact be none at all. If of two trees of equal height, the one at an hundred paces distance should appear as tall and as distinct as the other which stood but ten paces off, we should naturally place one close by the side of the other. If we were to perceive the dimensions of all objects, such as they really are, we should perceive no space, but every thing would appear immediately in the eye.

The sense of seeing has but one standard whereby to judge of the magnitude and distance of objects; and this is the angle they make in the eye; and, as this angle is the simple effect of a compound cause, the judgment immediately excited thereby, leaves every particular cause undeterminate, or necessarily defective. For how is it possible for us to tell, on mere inspection, whether the angle, under which I see one object less than another, is so, because the first object is really less, or because it only exists at a greater distance.

We must in this case take a method different from the preceding: instead of reducing the sensation to its simplest form, we must double it, or confirm it by another; subjecting the visual
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to the tactile organ, and repressing, if I may so express myself, the impetuosity of the former sense, by the more precise and regular operations of the latter. For want of being accustomed to this practice, we estimate heights, distances, and magnitudes, very inaccurately. A proof, also, that this is not the defect of the sense, but of the use of it, is, that engineers, surveyors, architects, masons, and painters, have generally more dexterity this way than any other people, and estimate dimensions and distances much more exactly. Their profession affording them that experience which we neglect to acquire, they correct the ambiguity of the angle, by those more determinate appearances which accompany it.

It is easy to prevail on children to engage in any thing that requires them to move freely about. There are a thousand ways, therefore, to interest him in measuring and estimating distances. Let us suppose we have a very high cherry-tree; what must we do to gather some cherries from the top? is the ladder in the barn long enough? Here is a rivulet too wide for us to jump over; how shall we get across? will one of the planks that lie in the court-yard reach from side to side? We have a mind to fish, out of our chamber-window, in the moat that surrounds the house; how many fathoms must be our line? I would make a swing to reach from tree to tree; how many yards of rope is necessary? They tell me that our room in the other house is to be five and twenty feet square: do you think it will be big enough for us? is it bigger than this? We are out on a ramble, and are very hungry: there are two villages in sight;
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at which shall we dine?—These and a thousand other occasions of the like kind might be laid hold of to effect this purpose.

Do you want to excite an indolent and lazy child to the exercise of running, when he has no natural inclination for that or any other, though perhaps intended for the army? He is persuaded, we will suppose, I know not how, that persons of his birth and expectations ought to do and know nothing; and that his rank will serve him instead of arms, legs, and every kind of abilities. The address of Chiron himself might hardly suffice to make such a gentleman an Achilles. The difficulty would, indeed, be so much the greater to me, as I would prescribe him absolutely nothing. I have already deprived myself of the means of exhortations, promises, menaces, and emulation: how then am I to excite him to run, without saying any thing to him? To run myself, would not be a very certain, and it would also be an inconvenient method. Besides, it is necessary that he should, at the same time, deduce from this exercise some object of instruction; in order to accustom the operations of the corporeal machine, and those of the understanding, to proceed in concert. This therefore should be my method, that is, if I should take upon me to act, in such an instance.

In walking out with my young sluggard after dinner, I would sometimes put a couple of cakes, such as he should be most fond of, in my pocket; we would each of us eat one *, and return contentedly

* The reader will easily understand these walks are meant to be taken in the country. The public walks of great cities are destructive

tentedly home. I would after some time let him see that I had taken out three cakes with me. As he could very easily eat half a dozen, he soon dispatches his own, and asks me for the third. No, say I, I can eat it very well myself, or we will divide it; or, stay, we had better let those two little boys there run a race for it. I call them to us, show them the cake, and propose the terms. The boys desire no better conditions; and the cake is accordingly placed on a great stone which serves for the goal. The distance being marked, we go and sit down: at the signal given, the racers set off; the victor seizing the cake, and devouring it without mercy, before the faces of the vanquished and the spectators.

This amusement is certainly of more value than the cake; but supposing he does not take to it, and that this first essay produces nothing, I am neither offended nor impatient; the education of children is a profession in which we must study to lose time in order to gain it. We continue our walks as usual; often taking three cakes, sometimes four; and giving from time to time one, and sometimes two, to the racers. If the prize were not considerable, those who disputed it would not be ambitious of obtaining it; the winner, therefore, is always highly com-
mended

destructive to children of both sexes. It is there they imbibe the principle of vanity, and a desire of being admired. It is at the Luxembourg, the Tuilleries, and particularly in the gardens of the Palais-royal, that the young people in Paris go to learn those foppish and impertinent airs, which render them so ridiculous, and make them so much hissed at and so detestable in every part of Europe.

mended and careſſed, as having done ſomething extraordinary. To diverſify the ſcene, and render it more intereſting, I make the courſe longer, and admit ſeveral candida-tes. They are now hardly entered the liſts, before the paſſengers ſtop to look at them, animating them, as they run, with acclamations, ſhout- ing, and clapping of hands; at the ſame time, I ſee my little gentleman, every now and then, eagerly take part with one or the other of the runners, riſing up and crying out when one is getting before another. Theſe afford to him the amuſement of the Olympic games.

The runners, however, are ſometimes guilty of foul play; they lay hold of each other, tumble one another down, or throw ſlints in their way to cut their feet. This furniſhes me with a juſt pretext to ſeparate them, and to make them run from different places equally diſtant from the goal. The reaſon of this precaution will appear preſently; for this important affair muſt be treated circumſtantially.

Being ſo frequently mortified at ſeeing his favourite cakes thus devoured by others before his eyes, my young gentleman at length begins to ſuſpect that to run well is of ſome uſe; and ſee- ing that he has two legs as well as other boys, he begins in ſecret to make ſome trials of his abilities. I take care to ſeem not to obſerve him, but find that my ſtratagem takes. After ſome time, he begins to think himſelf equal to the enterpriſe; and, as I foreſaw, affects to impor- tune me for the remaining cake. I, of courſe, re- fuſe him; on which he ſeems to take pet, and ſays, “ Well, Sir, lay it down on the ſtone;
“ mark

"mark the distance, and we will see who wins "it." Mighty good! I reply ironically; can so fine a gentleman as you run? You will only whet your appetite, and get nothing to eat. Piqued at my raillery, however, he exerts his strength, and bears off the prize; which is the more easy for him to do, as I have made the course but short, and have taken care to exclude one or two of the best runners. It is readily to be conceived that my point thus gained, it is not difficult for me to keep him up to this exercise. Indeed he acquires, in a short time, so great an inclination for it, that, without partiality, he is able to beat almost all his companions, be the course as long as it will.

This advantage gained, is productive of another which I did not think of: when he won the prize but seldom, he used to eat it up alone, as did the others; but being accustomed to win it often, he becomes generous, and lets the vanquished partake of it. This circumstance furnishes me with a moral observation, and teaches me the true principle of generosity.

By continuing to make my little runners set out from different places at one time, I contrive the distances, without his perceiving it, to be unequal; so that one having farther to run than another, has a visible disadvantage: but, though I leave my disciple to his own choice, he knows not how to profit by this inequality. Without troubling himself about the distance, he always prefers the smoothest ground; so that, foreseeing his choice, I can make him win or lose the cake at pleasure: this piece of address answers more ends also than one. As my design, however,

is, that he should perceive the difference in question, I endeavour to make him sensible of it: but, however indolent at other times, he is so animated in his diversion, and distrusts me so little, that I have all the trouble in the world to make him perceive I have tricked him. At length, nevertheless, in spite of his inattention, I gain my point; and he reproaches me accordingly for the deception. To this I reply, by asking him, what right he has to complain? "If I give you a cake, have not I a right to make my own conditions? Who obliges you to run? Did I promise to make your distances all equal? Have not you, besides, always your choice? Take the shortest; who will hinder you? Do not you see that I favoured you in this matter, and that the difference you complain of is to your advantage, if you know how to make use of it?" All this is very plain; my young gentleman understands it; and, in order to make a proper choice, looks more narrowly after the distances prescribed. He sets out with measuring each by the number of steps: this method, however, he finds slow and defective: besides, I take it into my head to diversify and increase their number, on the same day; by which means the amusement of running becomes a kind of passion; and it is with regret that time is lost in measuring the several distances, which should be employed in running the race. The vivacity of infancy ill agrees with such delays; he learns, therefore, to see better, and to estimate distances by his eye. In a word, after repeated trials for some months, and correcting a few of his mistakes, I succeed so well

in thus teaching him to measure by his eye, that when I place a cake on any object, he knows its distance as well by looking at it as if he had measured it with a chain.

As the judgment is more inseparably attached to the sight than to any other of the senses, it requires a great deal of time to learn to see: a long time is requisite for us to compare the sensations of the sight with those of the touch, in order to habituate the former of those senses to make a faithful report of figures and distances. The most penetrating sight in the world can give us no idea of extension without the touch or a sense of progressive motion. The whole universe must appear to an oyster but as a single point; nor would it seem otherwise were that oyster animated by a human soul. It is only by means of walking about, touching, counting, and taking the dimensions of objects, that we learn to judge of them: but if we accustom ourselves always to measure them, the sense confiding on the instrument, acquires no accuracy to estimate without it. Neither is it proper for a child to pass immediately from the mensuration of objects to estimate them; he should begin to estimate by parts what he cannot comprehend altogether; comparing such imaginary divisions to aliquot parts of admeasurement: these again he should learn to apply by the sight only, and not by the hand. I would have him, however, confirm his operations at first, by taking afterwards the real admeasurement, in order to correct his errors, and that, if any false appearance remained in the sense, he might be able to rectify it by his judgment. There are natural mea-

measures, which are nearly the same in all places; such are the step of a man, the extent of his arms, his height, &c. When a child can estimate the height of a story, his preceptor may make him employ it as the measure of a fathom; so that when he would estimate the height of a steeple, he may measure it by the stories of an house. If he would know how many leagues he has travelled, let him reckon the time he has been in going; which will serve him very well, particularly if you give him no assistance in any of these things, but let him discover them all himself.

It is impossible to judge accurately of the dimensions of bodies, unless we learn also to know their figures, and even to imitate those figures: for this imitation is founded on nothing else but the rules of perspective; and we cannot estimate the extension of bodies by their appearance, unless we have some knowledge of those rules. Children, being great imitators, all attempt to design: I would have my pupil cultivate that art, not for the sake of the art itself, but only to give him a good eye and a supple hand. It is to be observed, indeed, in general, that it is of little consequence whether he be expert at any of the exercises he partakes of, provided he acquires that perspicacity and agility which they are calculated to teach him. I shall take particular care, therefore, he shall have no drawing-master, who will only teach him to imitate imitations, and design after designs. I would have him have no other master than nature; no other model than the objects themselves. He should have before his eyes the

original itself, and not the paper representing it: thus he should design an house from an house, a tree from a tree, a man from a man, that he might be accustomed to observe minutely and accurately the appearances of bodies, and not take false and artificial imitations, for true and genuine. I would even discourage him from endeavouring to trace any thing from memory, till, by frequent and repeated observations, its figure should be strongly imprinted on his imagination; lest he should otherwise, by substituting some fantastic image instead of the real one, lose the knowledge of proportion, and a taste for the genuine beauties of nature.

I know, that, by going to work in this manner, he will continue to blot and scratch a long time, without producing any likeness: that it will be long before he acquires by these means an elegance in sketching the outlines, and the light touches of the master; nay, it is possible he may never attain any discernment in the fine effect of painting, or a good taste for design. By way of recompense, however, he will certainly contract a juster sight, and a more steady hand; he will acquire the knowledge of the true relations of size and figure between animals, plants, and other natural bodies, and a more perfect experience in the effects of perspective. This is the very point I am at; my intention being, not so much that he should know how to imitate objects, as to become fully acquainted with them. I had much rather, for instance, that he should shew me the acanthus in the plant itself, and that he should be less expert in drawing the leaves of a chapiter.

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In this exercise, as well as in all the rest, I intend not that my pupil should amuse himself alone. I would make it still more agreeable, by constantly partaking it with him. I would have him have no other rival than myself; such, however, I would always be, without relaxation or risk: this would make our employment interesting, without exciting jealousy. I would follow his example, in taking up the crayon, and in drawing at first as bad as himself. Though I were an Apelles, I would appear to him as a mere dauber. I would begin by sketching out the figure of a man, as boys do against the wall; an horizontal stroke for each arm, and a vertical one for each leg, and the fingers as big as the wrists. After some time, we should both of us observe the disproportion of this wretched sketch; we should observe that a man's leg is not equally thick all the way, that the length of the arms bears a certain proportion to the height of the body, &c. In his progress in this art, I take care to keep pace with him as closely as I can; or, if I advance a little, it is so much only as to give him room easily to overtake me, and sometimes to go before me in his turn. Being properly provided with pencils and colours, we endeavour to imitate the appearance and colouring of objects as well as their figure and outlines. The artist will readily perceive, that, by this method of proceeding, we must make strange work. In our rudest sketches, however, and amidst the worst of our daubings, there is some resemblance of nature, as we never fail to keep our eye on the works of our great master. We were some time ago concerned about ornamen-

tal furniture for our apartment; at present, you see, we are provided with the means of supplying ourselves. I get our drawings framed and glazed, to the end that they may receive no additional touches, but be preserved in their primitive imperfection. Hence each of us is interested in executing our works at first as well as possible. These are accordingly arranged in order round the room: each design is repeated perhaps twenty or thirty times, and displays the progress of the artist, from the time when his draught of a building was only that of a shapeless front, till it received its just proportions of figure, lights, and shades. The gradations of this progress give us occasion to make many curious and interesting comparisons, that always excite our emulation.

Our first and grossest daubings, I take care to have set in fine gilt frames, which serve as a foil to their deformity; and, in proportion as the design itself is improved, and the imitation becomes more exact, I diminish the lustre of the frames; giving as a reason, that when the painting is good, it requires no ornament to set it off, and that it would be a pity the frame should engage the attention that should be bestowed on the picture. Hence we both aspire to the honour of having our pieces set in plain frames; and when either of us despises the performance of the other, he condemns it, of course, to a gilt one. Some time or other, no doubt, our conduct in this particular will become proverbial with us; and we shall admire how fond many people are to do themselves justice, by having their pictures so finely framed.

I have said that geometry is above the capacity of children; but that it is so, is our own fault. We do not perceive that their method is not ours; and that what is the art of reasoning in us, is nothing more than the art of perceiving in them. Instead of teaching them, therefore, our method, we ought to study theirs. For our way of learning geometry is as much an affair of the imagination, as of reasoning. When once the proposition is laid down, we set about conceiving the demonstration of it; that is, we endeavour to find from what proposition already known, the other is a necessary consequence; and, from all the consequences which may be drawn from such proposition, to fix on that which is precisely sought.

By this method, however, the most exact reasoner in the world, unless he is also possessed of invention, must soon be obliged to stop short. And what is the consequence? Instead of being instructed to trace out demonstrations, we only receive those which are dictated to us; instead of being taught to reason, the master reasons for us, and exercises only our memories.

If you cut out and form exact geometrical figures, combine them, place them one upon another, and examine their relations, you will soon make yourself master of the elements of geometry; without ever troubling yourself about definitions, problems, or any other theoretical modes of demonstration. For my part, I do not pretend to teach Emilius geometry; but design that he shall teach it me. I will search for the proper relations, and he shall find them; which he will the more easily do, as I shall look for them

them merely with that view. Instead of taking a pair of compasses, for example, to describe a circle, I would do it with a piece of thread, turning on a point. By which means, when I should come afterwards to compare the length of the different radii of such a circle, Emilius would naturally laugh at my simplicity, and give me to understand, that the same thread being constantly extended from the centre, in tracing the periphery, it is impossible that all the parts of the latter should not be at equal distances from the former.

Were I desirous of measuring an angle of sixty degrees, I would not describe only a segment, but a whole circle; for with children nothing should be left to supposition. By doing thus, I find that the segment bounded by the two sides of the angle is just a sixth part of the whole circle. After this, keeping the point of the compasses in the same centre, I would describe a second circle; of which I should find the segment to be also a sixth part of the whole, as before: I would then describe a third, and so go on with describing concentric circles, and measuring the angle on each, till Emilius, struck with my stupidity, should inform me, that, whether the arch be greater or less, the same angle would be always the sixth part of a circle. By this example alone my pupil would become perfectly acquainted with the use of a protractor.

To prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, they are usually described in a circle. I, on the contrary, would so contrive it that Emilius should first observe this in the circle itself; when I would observe

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to him, that, if the circle were rubbed out, and the right lines only remained, the angles would remain still the same.

It is common to neglect the nicety of geometrical figures, as they are supposed perfect in the demonstration. But, as we shall never trouble ourselves about demonstrations, our most important concern will be to draw our figures exactly; to make a square as perfectly square, and a circle as completely round, as possible. To prove the accuracy of the figure, we should examine it by all its perceptible properties, and this would give us every day an opportunity of discovering new ones. We should compare the two halves of a circle, by folding it together in the line of its diameter; and of those of a square, by doubling it in that of its diagonal. We should dispute whether the equality observable in the circle and square thus folded, obtained also in the parallelogram, the trapezium, and other figures. Sometimes, also, we should attempt to foresee the success of the experiment, before we made it; to endeavour to assign the reasons, &c.

Thus geometry would be, to my pupil, only the art of using the scale and compass; nor should he be ever suffered to confound it with the art of design, in prosecuting which he should use neither of these instruments. These indeed should be always kept under lock and key; and Emilius be very seldom, and but for a short time, indulged with them, that he might not acquire a slovenly way of sketching his designs: we should, however, frequently take out our drawings in our excursions, and discourse on what we had

had done, or might design to do, at our return.

I shall never forget having seen a young man at Turin, who was taught, in his infancy, the various relations between the outlines and surfaces of bodies, by having cakes set before him, cut into all manner of regular solids; by which means he exhausted the science of Archimedes, in studying which form contained the greatest quantity.

When a child plays at battle-door and shuttle-cock, he exercises his eye and arm; when he whips a top, he acquires fresh strength by exerting what he possesses: but in this exercise what does he learn? I have often asked, why children are not made to apply themselves to many of those games of skill and dexterity which are practised by men, such as tennis, fives, and billiards, or to play on musical instruments? To this question it hath been constantly replied, that some of these diversions are above their capacity, and that their limbs and organs are not sufficiently formed for the others. These reasons, however, appear to me very unsatisfactory; a child, it is true, has not the stature of a man, and yet he wears cloaths made in the same form and manner. I do not mean that he should play with the same maul, or at a billiard-table three feet high; that he should make one in a party at our tennis-courts, or that we should load his little arm with our heavy rackets: he might exercise himself, however, in a saloon, where means should be previously taken to secure the windows; he might at first make use of soft balls, his rackets might be made of light wood, afterwards of parchment, and at length of cat-gut, as he in-
creased

creased in strength. You prefer the shuttlecock, because it is less fatiguing and dangerous. For both these reasons, however, you are in the wrong. This is mere womens play: but you will find no woman who is not frightened at the motion of a tennis-ball. Their white and delicate skins are not adapted to bruises, nor are their complexions and features to be marred by contusions. But men, destined to be hardy and vigorous, must not expect to become such without peril; and what defence can we be supposed capable of making, if we are never attacked? We always indulge ourselves in those amusements at which we may remain inexpert without danger; a shuttlecock, in falling, hurts nobody: but nothing renders the arms so active as the necessity of securing the head, nor the sight so quick as that of preserving the eyes. To spring from one side of a tennis-court to the other; to judge of the rebounding of a ball while it is in the air; and to return it with a sure and steady arm; these are diversions less adapted to the amusement of grown persons, than proper to form them in youth.

The fibres of a child, it may be said, are too soft: his muscles may indeed be less elastic, but they are more supple; his arm may have less force than that of a man; it is nevertheless an arm, and capable of doing every thing, proportioned to its size and strength, of which any other machine of the like kind is capable. Children, it is said, have no dexterity in their hands and arms; it is for this reason I would teach it them: a man with as little exercise would not have a jot more. The use of our organs is to be known

known only by employing them. Nothing but long experience can teach us how to turn them to the greatest advantage: we cannot also too much apply ourselves to the acquirement of this experience.

Every thing that has once been done is certainly practicable. Now, nothing is more common than to see sprightly and dextrous children have as much activity of body as grown men. At the fairs, we see the little æquilibrists dance upon the wire, walk on their hands, leap, and tumble about with great agility. For how many years together hath not the attention of the public been engaged, by the Italian comedy, with the performances of children? Who hath not heard, throughout Germany and Italy, of the little pantomimical company of the famous Nicolini? Did any one ever remark that the motions of those children were less free, their attitudes less graceful, their ear less nice, or their dancing less easy, than those of performers full grown? At first, indeed, our fingers are generally short, thick, and stiff in their motion; our hands are plump, and little adapted to grasp any thing: all this, however, doth not hinder many children from learning to write and draw at an age when others are equally incapable of holding the pen or the crayon. All Paris must remember the little English girl, who at ten years of age performed such wonders on the harpsichord; and I shall never forget, that I myself one saw, at the house of a certain magistrate, a little boy, his son, whom the placed, like a statue, on the table, in the middle of the dessert; while he played on the violin almost as big as him-

himself, and surpris'd even the best artists by the compass of his execution.

These, and an hundred other examples that might be given of the like kind, appear to me convincing proofs, that the supposed inaptitude of children for the various exercises of grown persons, is merely imaginary; and that, if we do not see them succeed in many, it is because they have not practis'd them.

It may be here objected, that I fall into the same error, with respect to the premature cultivation of the corporeal powers of children, as I have condemned in those of their minds. There is, however, a very material difference; for in the one case the progress they make is only apparent, and in the other it is real. I have already proved that they do not actually possess the degree of understanding they appear to have; whereas in their actions, whatever they appear to do, they actually effect. Besides this, it should always be remembered, that what we propose in this way is merely as an amusement, as an easy and voluntary exertion of those powers which nature requires to be exerted. It is the art of varying the amusements of children in order to render them more agreeable, without laying any such restraint on their young minds as would turn their diversions into labour. For, after all, in what manner can they amuse themselves, without my being able to convert the object of their pleasure into that of instruction? and tho' this should not be always the case, yet provided their time pass'd away in innocence, their progress in any kind of knowledge would not be of any great consequence: whereas, when they

are laid under a necessity of learning this thing or the other, it is impossible, in the usual method of instruction, for the preceptor to carry his point, without trouble, vexation, and restraint.

What I have already said concerning those two senses, whose use is the most constant and important, may serve as an example in the manner of exercising the rest. The sight and the touch are equally applied to bodies in motion and at rest: but, as a vibration in the ambient air is necessary to affect the organs of hearing, nothing less than a body in motion can excite in us the sensation of sound; and if all the bodies that surround us were constantly at rest, we should never hear the least sound. In the night, therefore, when moving ourselves as little as we please, we need be apprehensive of danger only from other moving bodies, it is necessary that we should have a quick ear, and be able to judge from the sensation that affects us, whether the body causing it be great or little, near or at a distance, weak or violent in its motion. The air, when so agitated as to produce sounds, is subject to repercussions that reflect its vibrations: Hence arise echoes, that repeat the former sensation, and make the sonorous body appear to exist in a different place to that in which it really is. On a plain, or in a valley, also, if we lay our ear close to the ground, we shall hear the voice of men and the trampling of horses much farther than if we should stand upright.

As we have compared the sight to the touch, it will be proper to compare it also to the sense of hearing, and to know which of the two im-

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pressions is made the soonest on the organs by the same object. When we see the fire of a piece of ordinance, it may be yet time enough to avoid the ball; but when you hear the report, it is too late; the ball hath already done its execution. One may judge of the distance of the clouds in a storm, from the interval of time between the flash of lightning and the clap of thunder. Take care to make a child acquainted with this sort of experiments; let him make all those which are not above his capacity, and find the others by induction; but I had rather an hundred times he should be ignorant of them, than that you should give him the information.

We have an organ which answers to that of hearing, *viz.* that of the voice; but we have none that answers in the like manner to that of the sight, nor can we imitate colours as we do sounds. Hence we have one method more of cultivating the former sense than the latter: this is by exercising the active and passive organs reciprocally on each other.

Man hath three kinds of voice; the speaking or articulate voice, the singing or melodious voice, and the pathetic or accented voice, which is the language of the passions, and animates both our singing and our speech. A child hath these three kinds of voice, as well as a grown person, but without knowing how to conjoin them in the same manner: he displays, like us, laughter, cries, complaints, exclamations, &c. but he is incapable of modifying these with the various inflections of the other two modes of voice. In the most perfect union of these three voices,

consists the most complete music. Children are incapable, therefore, of this music, and thus have no expression in their singing. It is the same with their verbal discourse, in which they have no emphasis: they cry out, it is true, but they lay no accent on their words; and as there is little energy in what they say, there is nothing emphatic in their voice and language. Our pupil will be still more plain and simple in his speech and discourse, because his passions, not being as yet excited, will not mix their language with his. Never set him, therefore, to recite speeches out of plays, nor teach him the arts of declamation. He will have too much good sense to know how to give an affected tone to the words he does not understand, or expression to sentiments he has never felt.

Teach him to speak plainly, articulately, and to pronounce his words clearly, and without affectation; to know and practise the grammatical accent, to speak always loud enough to be heard; but never to raise his voice higher than the occasion requires, which is a common fault in the schools. In every thing avoid what is superfluous.

In the same manner, in singing, you should endeavour to render his voice clear, equal, easy, and sonorous; and his ear susceptible of measure and harmony: but nothing more. Imitative and theatrical music is above his capacity. I would not have him even make use of words in singing; or if it were required, I would endeavour to compose songs on purpose for him, which should be adapted to his years, interesting and equally simple with his ideas.

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It will be easily imagined, that, as I am not very pressing to teach him to write, I shall not be more so to make him learn music. No, we shall not require him to pay a very earnest attention to any thing, nor to be in too much haste to exercise his judgment on signs. In this particular, I must own, this delay seems attended with some difficulties; for, though the knowledge of notes may not at first appear more necessary for those who learn to sing, than that of letters to such as learn to read, there is however this difference, that in speaking we make use of our own ideas, and in singing of the ideas of others. Now, to express the ideas of others, it is necessary we should first be able to read them.

But, in the first place, instead of reading, we may hear them, and a tune is more faithfully conveyed to us by the ear than by the eye. Add to this, that to understand music, it is not sufficient to be able to play or sing; we must learn to compose at the same time, or we shall never be masters of this science. Exercise your little musician at first in regular, harmonious periods; join them afterwards together by a very simple modulation, and at length mark their different relations by correct punctuation, which is done by a good choice of stop and cadence. Above all things, avoid any thing fantastical and whimsical, nor ever affect the pathetic in your expression; but chuse a melody always easy and simple, always naturally arising from the chords essential to the tune, and indicating the base in such a manner as that he may easily perceive and follow it: for, to form the voice and the ear, it is

to be observed, he should never sing to any instrument but the harpsichord.

For the better distinction of the sound of the notes, they are pronounced articulately; hence the custom of sol-fa-ing, by means of certain syllables. To distinguish the degrees on the scale, it is necessary to give appellations to those degrees, and also to the fixed terms of their difference; hence the names of harmonic intervals, and also the application of those letters of the alphabet, which are marked on the keys of the harpsichord, &c. and the notes of the gamut. *C* and *A* signify certain fixed and invariable sounds, always made by the same stops. *Ut* and *la* are very different. *Ut* is constantly the fundamental note of a greater mode, or the mediant of a lesser. *La* is constantly the fundamental of a lesser mode, or the sixth note of a greater. Thus the letters denote the invariable terms of the relations in our musical system, and the syllables express the terms of similar relations in different tunes. The letters indicate the stops on the keys, and the syllables the degrees of the mode. The French musicians have strangely perplexed these distinctions; confounding the intent of the syllables with that of the letters, and by multiplying without necessity the signs of the stops, they have left none to express the chords: insomuch, that with them *Ut* and *C* are always the same thing; which is not, nor ought to be, the case; for to what purpose then should *C* find a place in the scale? Hence the French manner of sol-fa-ing is extremely difficult, and quite useless, conveying no precise ideas to the mind; as by their method the two
syllables

syllables *ut* and *mi*, for example; may either stand for a third greater or lesser. By what strange fatality is it that a country productive of the finest books of music in the world, should be that wherein this science is the most difficult to be attained?

Let us accompany our pupil in a more simple and clear method; let him know only two modes, the relations of which should always be the same, and always indicated by the same syllables. Whether in learning to sing, or play on an instrument, let him learn to sound his mode on every one of the twelve tones, and whether he fix *D, C, G,* &c. to make the final always *ut* or *la*, according to the mode. By this method he will always form a right conception of what you are teaching; the essential relations of the mode, whether in singing or playing, will be always present to his mind, his execution will be more correct, and his progress more speedy. There is nothing more whimsical and extraordinary than the French method of sol-fa-ing, as they call it, *au naturel*; as by this, they substitute ideas foreign to the thing, instead of those which properly belong to it. Nothing is more natural than to sol-fa by transposition, when the mode is transposed. But enough on this subject: you may teach him music in what manner you please, provided you only let him consider it as an amusement.

We are already well acquainted with the state of external bodies with relation to our own, of their weight, figure, colour, solidity, magnitude, distance, temperature, motion, and rest. We are informed concerning those which should
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be suffered to approach us, or should be kept at a distance; of the methods we are to take to overcome their resistance, or to make use of other bodies in our own preservation. All this, however, is not enough: our own bodies are constantly wasting, and stand in need of being perpetually recruited. Although we are capable of converting some other bodies into the substance of ours, we are not indifferent as to the choice of them. Every thing that offers itself doth not yield aliment for the human body; and all those substances that do, are more or less proper to this end, as they are adapted to the constitution of our species, the climate we inhabit, our own particular temperament, and manner of living.

We should be poisoned, or might perish with hunger, if, in order to make choice of proper aliment, we were obliged to wait till experience had instructed us: but that Supreme Goodness, which hath made the pleasures of sensible creatures the instruments of their preservation, informs us, by that which is pleasing to the palate, what will agree with the stomach. There is naturally no physician so infallible as the appetite; and I doubt much whether, in our primitive state, those aliments which were the most agreeable to our taste, were not also the most wholesome.

Add to this, that our Creator has not only provided for the necessities he hath laid us under, but also for the wants we bring on ourselves; and that it is with a view of making our desires go hand in hand with our necessities, that our taste and inclinations change and alter
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with our manner of living. The farther we depart from a state of nature, the more we lose of our natural taste and inclinations; or rather, habit constitutes a second nature, which we so substitute in the place of the former, that none of us discover the difference.

It follows hence, that the most natural tastes are the most simple: for these are the most easily transformed; whereas, by whetting and irritating them by our caprices, they become inflexible and unchangeable. The man who is as yet of no country, will easily fall into the customs of any country whatever; but one countryman cannot become another.

This appears true to me in all senses, but more particularly in that of taste, properly so called. Our first aliment is milk; we are even disgusted at first with strong flavours, and accustom ourselves to them by degrees. Fruits, pulse, herbs, and at length broiled meat, without salt or seasoning, were the aliments of primitive mortals. The first time a savage tastes wine, he is disgusted with it, and spits it out; and, even among us, we find, that those who attain their twentieth year without tasting fermented liquors, can never bring themselves to relish them afterwards. We should have been all abstemious, if wine had not been given us in our younger years. In a word, the more simple our taste, the more universal; the most common disgusts are entertained against compounds. Did we ever know a person entertain a distaste against bread or water? Hence we see the path indicated by nature; this therefore is what we shall follow. Let us endeavour, as much as possible,
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to preserve the taste of children in its primitive and unvitiated state; let their nutriment be ordinary and simple, nor familiarise their palates to any thing that is high flavoured.

I do not inquire here whether such a manner of living is healthful or not, as this is not to my present purpose. It is sufficient for me to give it the preference, to know that it is most conformable to nature, and that it is the most easily convertible into any other. Those who say we ought to accustom children to those aliments which they are to make use of when grown up, reason, in my opinion, very improperly. Why should their nutriment be the same, when their manner of living is so very different? A man, whose spirits are wasted with care, labour, and fatigue, stands in need of succulent aliments that may furnish him with new spirits; whereas a child that is growing, and always sporting about, requires an abundant nourishment, productive of good chyle. Besides this, a grown person hath already some settled rank, employment, and residence; but who can be certain what may happen to be the future circumstances of a child? Take care, in every case, not to give him too determinate a form, lest it should cost him too dear to change it when occasion requires. Let us not so educate him that he must perish with hunger in a foreign country, unless he travel with a French cook; nor that he may be induced to say hereafter, that the people know how to eat only in France. Have not I occasionally introduced a mighty pretty encomium! For my own part, however, I am of a different opinion, and say, on the contrary, that
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it is in France only people know not how to eat, as so much art is required to make their victuals eatable.

Of all our various sensations, those we receive by means of the taste affect us most: for we are more interested to judge of those substances which are to become part of our own, than of those which barely exist around us. A thousand things are indifferent to the touch, the hearing, and the sight; but there is hardly any thing indifferent to the taste. Add to this, that the activity of this sense is altogether physical; it is the only one which has nothing to say to the imagination; at least, it is that into which the imagination enters less than into any other; whereas imitation and fancy often unite a moral impression to the physical in all others. Thus, generally speaking, voluptuous and susceptible characters, easily affected by the other senses, are cold and indifferent to this. For this reason alone, which seems to place the taste below them, and to render our desire of gratifying the palate contemptible, I conclude, on the contrary, that the best method to govern children, is to lead them by their mouth. The motive of gluttony is at worst preferable that of vanity; in that the first is a natural appetite, depending immediately on the gratification of the sense; whereas the second arises only from opinion, is subject to the caprices of mankind, and to all manner of abuse. Gluttony is the passion of children; nor takes place of any other, but disappears presently when others make their appearance. Believe me, a child will cease but too soon to think of what he is to eat; when his heart is fully engaged,

gaged, his palate will have but little to do. As he grows up, a thousand impetuous sentiments will divert his attention from eating to excite his vanity: for this latter passion is that which profits by the others, and at length engrosses them all. I have sometimes made my observations on those persons who hold good eating to be of so much importance; who begin to think, as soon as they wake in the morning, what they shall have to eat during the day, and describe a feast with more exactness than Polybius describes a battle. I have always found, that such pretenders to manhood were only great boys, thirty or forty years of age, without vigour and without consistence; *fruges consumere nati*. Gluttony in grown persons is the vice of those who have no hearts. The soul of a glutton lies always in his palate; he is formed for nothing but to eat. Incapable of every other enjoyment, he is nothing but when at table, and is incapable to judge of any thing in the world but made dishes. There let us leave him, without regret, to his brutal employment; it is fitter for him than any other, as well for his sake as our own.

To be fearful lest gluttony should take root and grow up in a child of any capacity, is the effect of a narrow way of thinking. In childhood, we think only on what we are to eat; in youth, we think little on this subject; every thing goes down, when we have other affairs to mind. I would not, however, advise an indiscreet use to be made of so mean a motive, nor that we should render the honour of doing a noble action dependent on sweetmeats and biscuits.

But

But I see no reason, as childhood is, or ought to be, employed in mere amusements, why exercises purely corporeal should not be attended with a perceptible and material prize. When the little Majorcans were used to fetch down a basket from the top of a tree, by flinging stones at it, was it not very just that a good breakfast should repair the strength they had exhausted in the enterprise *?

When the young Spartan, at the risk of having his bones broke, slipt into the kitchen and brought off a young fox alive, and actually suffered the rapacious animal to eat into his bowels, without making the least complaint, for fear of a discovery, was it not very right that he should profit by his dear-bought prey, and that he should make a meal of the cub that had made a meal of him? A dainty repast ought not indeed to be made a reward, but why should it not be made the effect of the pains taken to procure it? Emilius does not regard the cake I lay on the stone as the reward of having run well; he knows only that he hath no other way of getting the cake than by arriving first at the end of the course.

This doth not contradict the maxims I advance concerning the wholesome simplicity of viands: for to flatter the appetite of children, it is not necessary to make them nice, but only to satisfy them; and this may be done by the most simple and common things in the world, if we do not endeavour to refine their taste. That con-

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* It is now some ages since the Majorcans have given up this custom, which was usual in the time of their famous slingers,

stant appetite which is excited in them by their tendency to growth, is a certain sauce which supplies the place of many others. Fruits, milk-meats, cakes somewhat better than common bread, and particularly the art of dispensing these things moderately, are sufficient to lead a whole army of children round the world, without giving them any taste for high-flavoured meats, or running the risk of spoiling their palates.

One proof that the taste of meat is not natural to the human palate, is the indifference which children have for that kind of food, and the preference they give to vegetable aliments, such as milk-meats, pastry, fruit, &c. It is of the utmost consequence not to vitiate this primitive taste in children, to make them carnivorous. Were even their health not concerned, it would be expedient on account of their disposition and character; for it is sufficiently clear from experience, that those people who are great eaters of meat, are in general more ferocious and cruel than other men. This observation holds good of all times and all places. The English * barbarity is well known; whereas the
Gaures

* I know that the English boast much of their humanity, and of the good disposition of their nation; that they call themselves *good-natured people*: they may cry themselves up, however, for this good quality as much as they please; there is nobody else will join with them.

—[Our author appears, in this note, to have forgotten, what he maintains elsewhere, that strength of body and of mind are essential to the constitution and character of a man. If he should ever have an opportunity of being better acquainted with the English nation than he appears to be at present, he may know that they do not pride themselves on that weakness of humanity, or that meek species of *good nature*, which is characteristic of milk-sops.]

Gaures * are, on the contrary, the meekest creatures in the world. All savages are cruel; and as their manners do not tend to cruelty, it is plain it must arise from their aliments. They go to war as to hunting, and treat their fellow-creatures as they treat bears. Even in England itself, butchers are not admitted on a jury: familiarity with blood hardens abandoned wretches to murder.

Homer hath made the Cyclops, who were flesh-eaters, horrid monsters of men; and the Lotophagi a people so amiable, that, when strangers had once become acquainted with them, and tasted the fruits on which they lived, they even forgot their native country, to take up their abode with their hosts.

"You ask me," says Plutarch, "for what reason Pythagoras abstained from eating the flesh of brutes? For my part, I am astonished to think, on the contrary, what appetite first induced man to taste of a dead carcase; or what motive could suggest the notion of nourishing himself with the flesh of animals, which he saw the moment before, bleating, bellowing, walking, and looking about them. How could he bear to see an impotent and defenceless creature slaughtered, skinned, and cut up for food? How could he endure the sight of the convulsed limbs and muscles? how bear the smell arising from their dissection? Whence comes it that he was not disgusted and struck with horror when he came to

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* The Banians, who abstain from flesh more strictly than the Gaures, are almost as meek as they; but as their system of morals is less pure, and their religious worship less rational, they are not, on the whole, so good a sort of people.

handle the bleeding flesh, and clear away the clotted blood and humours from the wounds. Poetical fiction might imagine,

*The hides still crawling, and the mangled beasts
Half-raw, half-roasted, bellowing their complaints.*

“ Such a picture might even naturally enough have represented itself to the man who first conceived an appetite for the flesh of a living animal, and directed the sacrifice of the helpless creature, that all the while might stand licking the hand of its murderer. We should, therefore, rather wonder at the conduct of those who first indulged themselves in this horrible repast, than at such as have humanely abstained from it. And yet the first flesh-eaters, perhaps, might justify themselves, by pleading an act of necessity, and the want of that plenty of other provision of various kinds, which luxury has introduced in our times, and which renders our conduct in this respect by so much the more inexcusable.

“ Happy mortals! might they exclaim, in addressing the men of our days; how highly favoured by the gods, in comparison with your predecessors! How fertile are your fields, your orchards, your vineyards, in comparison with ours! In our unhappy times, the earth and atmosphere, loaded with crude and noxious vapours, were intractable to order, and obeyed not the due return of the seasons. The uncertain course of the rivers broke down on every side the insufficient banks; so that lakes, bogs, and deep morasses, occupied three fourths of the surface

face of the globe, while the other quarter of it was covered with woods and barren forests. The earth produced not spontaneously delicious fruit; we had no implements of agriculture; we were strangers to the art of husbandry; and employing no seed-time, we had no harvest. Thus famine was perpetually at our heels. In the winter, moss and the bark of trees was our ordinary food. The fresh roots of dog's-grass and broom were a feast for us; and when, by chance, we found a repast of nuts and acorns, we danced for joy round the hazel and the oak, to the sound of some rustic music, calling, in our grateful transports, the earth our nurse and mother. Such were our only festivals, such our only sports: all the rest of our lives was made up of nothing but sorrow, pain, and misery.

"At length, when the impoverished earth no longer afforded us subsistence, we were compelled to commit an outrage on nature for our own preservation; and thus we began to eat our companions in misery, rather than perish with them. But you, cruel mortals! what motive have you for shedding innocent blood? Behold what affluence on every side surrounds you! How liberal is the earth of fruits! How bounteous are your fields and vineyards! The animals afford you milk in plenty for aliment, and wool to clothe and keep you warm. What can you require more? What barbarous rage induces you to commit so many murders, when already loaded with viands and sated with plenty? Why do you falsely accuse your mother earth of being incapable of affording you nourishment? Why do you rebel against Ceres, the inventress

of laws, against Bacchus the comforter of mankind, as if their lavish bounties were not sufficient for the preservation of the human race? How can you have the heart to mix, with the delicious fruits of the earth, the bones and flesh of dead carcases, and to eat with the sweetest milk the blood of the very cattle that afford it you. The lion and the panther, which you call wild beasts, act necessarily from a natural instinct, and destroy other animals to preserve their own life. But you, an hundred times more wild and cruel than they, act contrary to instinct, without any such plea of necessity, and only to indulge yourselves in your barbarous delicacy. The animals which you devour, are not those which devour others; you do not eat carnivorous animals, but imitate their savage nature. You have no appetite but for meek and innocent brutes that hurt nobody, but, on the contrary, fondly attach themselves to your persons, who faithfully serve you, and whom you devour in return for their services.

“Unnatural murderers! if you still persist that you are made to devour your fellow-creatures, creatures of flesh and blood, living and sensible as yourselves, suppress at once that horror which nature inspires against such cruel repasts: kill, yourself, the animals you would eat; I say, kill them with your own hands, without knives or cleavers. Tear them to pieces with your own fingers, as the lions and bears do with their claws: set your teeth into the ox, and pull him to pieces; stick your nails into his hide: eat the tender lamb up alive; devour his flesh yet warm, and drink up his soul with his blood. Do
you

you shudder? Dare you not hold a piece of living flesh in your teeth? Despicable mortals! you kill the animal first, and eat him afterwards, as if you endeavoured to kill him twice. Nor is even this sufficient; even raw flesh disgusts you; your stomach cannot digest it; it must be transformed by cookery over the fire; it must be boiled, roasted, and seasoned with salt and spices that entirely disguise its natural taste. You must be furnished with butchers, bakers, and cooks, with people whose business it is to dispel the horror of murder; and dress up the limbs of dead carcases in such a manner, that the palate, deceived by the artificial preparation, may not reject what is so unnatural, but find a pleasure in the taste of cadaverous morsels, which the eye can hardly look on without horror."

Although the above citation be something foreign to my subject, I could not resist the temptation of transcribing it; and I imagine few of my readers will be displeased at the perusal of it.

As to what relates farther to the regimen of children, provided you accustom them only to simple and common aliments, you may let them eat, run about, and play as much as they will, without any danger of their eating too much, or of being incommoded by indigestions. But if you let them go famished one half of their time, and they can possibly escape your vigilance, they will doubtless indemnify themselves, and eat till they are almost ready to burst. Our appetites are irregular only because we would impose rules on them that are not dictated by nature. Being for ever busied in regulating, prescribing, adding or retrenching, we do nothing without a pair of scales

scales in our hands; but these scales serve only to weigh our own caprices, and are not the balance of our appetite. Among the peasants, the cup-board and orchard are always open, and we do not find that either the old or young among them know any thing of indigestions.

If it should ever happen, however, that a child is given to eat too much, which I hardly think possible in my way of education, it is very easy so far to divert his attention, by such amusements as he is fond of, that he may become almost famished without even thinking of his victuals. Is it not strange, that such simple and easy means should have escaped all those who have treated this subject of education?

Herodotus relates, that the Lydians, being oppressed by a great famine, invented and instituted certain games and other amusements, in order to divert their attention from the cravings of appetite, and enable them to pass away whole days without thinking of any thing to eat *. Ye learned governors and tutors! you have read this passage probably an hundred times, without ever thinking of what application might be made of it to children. Some of you, probably, will tell me, that a child will never voluntarily leave his dinner to go to his lesson. Most grave preceptor, you are certainly in the right of it: but this

* The ancient historians present many useful things to our view, were even the facts on which they are founded confessedly false. But we know not how to make any good use of history. Critical erudition ingrosses every thing, as if it was of more consequence to know the truth of a fact, than to draw from it any useful instruction. Sensible men ought to look upon history as a collection of fables, whose morals may be useful to mankind.

is not the kind of amusement I should recommend in such a case.

The sense of smelling is to the taste, what that of the sight is to the touch: it precedes, and informs the taste of the manner in which different substances will affect it; and thence disposes it to seek or shun such substance, according to the previous impression it thus receives. I have been told, that this sense, in savages, is affected very differently from ours, and that they judge quite otherwise of good and bad scents. For my part, I am apt to believe it. Odours are in themselves feeble sensations: they affect the imagination more than the sense; and influence us less by those sensations they actually excite, than by such as they give us reason to expect. This being supposed, the taste of some persons becoming, from their manner of living, so different from the taste of others, they ought to form a very different judgment of the same flavours, and of course of the odours that accompany them. Thus a Tartar may as luxuriously feast his nose on a stinking quarter of a dead horse, as our lovers of game snuff up the steams of putrefaction that arise from a tainted hare or partridge.

Persons who are always hungry cannot take any great pleasure in scents that do not accompany something to eat. Our feeble and indolent sensations should therefore be almost imperceptible to those who walk too much to love walking, and labour too little to find any great pleasure in rest.

The smell is a sense intimately connected with the imagination. By its bracing the nerves, it should

should more strongly agitate the brain: hence it is that odours first relieve the spirits, but afterwards, by continued use, are destructive. Their effect is well known in the passion of love: the sweet effluvia that perfume the toilette of a fine lady are not so despicable a snare as may be imagined; and I know not whether to felicitate or lament the man of great sense, and little sensibility, whose heart never felt a palpitation from the scent of the roses in the bosom of his mistress.

The sense of smelling cannot be very active in the first age of youth, in which the imagination, little animated by the passions, is hardly susceptible of emotion; and in which we have not acquired experience enough to know, by the information of one sense, what is promised by another. This observation is confirmed by experience; for it is certain that this sense is very dull in most children. Not that the sensation itself is not as subtile, and perhaps more so than in men; but because, annexing to it no idea, they do not easily derive from it a sense of pain or pleasure, and are not delighted or offended as we are.

I believe, that, without departing from this system, or having recourse to the comparative anatomy of the two sexes, it would not be difficult to give a reason why women in general are more affected by odours than the men.

It is said that the savages of Canada acquire, in their infancy, so subtile a sense of smelling, that, notwithstanding they have good dogs, they disdain to make use of them in the chace, and are their own dogs when they go out a-hunting.

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I can easily conceive, that if we should educate children to scent or smell out their dinner, in the same manner as dogs are used to scent the game, we might possibly bring that sense to the same degree of perfection in men as in dogs: not that I see, in fact, that they can deduce any great use from such a degree of perfection in this sense, unless in regard to the relations between this and that of the taste. Nature hath taken care to make us experience these relations; having almost inseparably united the action of the latter sense to that of the former, by placing their organs near to each other, and opening an immediate communication between both, so that we can taste nothing perfectly without smelling it at the same time. What I would advise is, that we should not alter these natural relations, to cheat a child by concealing, for example, under some agreeable aromatic, a disagreeable medicine: for the discord of the two senses is then too great to be easily abused; the most active sense absorbing the effect of the other, and rendering the medicine not the less disgusting. This disgust extends itself, also, to all the sensations that affect us at the same time; the imagination is excited by the weakest to recall the stronger: thus a perfume too sweet, becomes only disgusting; and thus it is that our indiscreet precautions augment the sum of our displeasing sensations at the expence of those which are agreeable.

It remains for me to treat, in the succeeding books, of the cultivation of a kind of sixth sense; called *common sense*; not so much because it is common to all men, as because it results from
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the well-regulated use of the other senses, and instructs us in the nature of things from their concurrent appearances. This sixth sense has, of course, no particular organ; but resides in the brain; its sensations, which are purely internal, being called *perceptions* or *ideas*. It is the number of these ideas that limits the extent of our knowledge; it is their perspicuity that determines the clearness of the understanding; and it is the art of comparing them with each other, that is called human reason. Thus, what I call sensitive or puerile reason, consists in forming simple ideas from the concurrence of various sensations; and what I call intellectual or human reason, consists in forming complex ideas from the concurrence of many simple ideas.

On the supposition, then, that my method is natural, and that I am not deceived in the application, I have conducted my pupil through the region of sensation to the confines of puerile reasoning: the first step we take beyond these limits, ought to be that of a man. But before we enter on this new career, let us cast our eye, for a moment, over that through which we have passed. Every age, every state of life, has its particular degrees of perfection, a kind of maturity peculiar to itself. We have often heard talk of a full-grown man; let us consider a little what is a full-grown child: this object will be more new to us, and perhaps not less agreeable.

The existence of finite beings is so poor and limited, that when we see them only as they are, we are little affected. The real object is

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aggrandized by chimeras; and if the imagination added no charm to those which actually strike our senses, the barren pleasure we should take therein would be confined to the organ, and would leave the heart unaffected. The fields and vineyards, adorned with all the treasures of autumn, present a scene which the eye naturally admires: but this admiration is cold and unaffecting; if it pleases, it is more from reflection than sentiment. In the spring, the country appears bleak and naked; the woods afford no shade, and the verdure is hardly perceptible on the plain; and yet the heart is immediately affected with the prospect. At the sight of re-animated nature, it feels itself re-animated; the images of delight are excited all around; the companions of its pleasures, those tears of joy which are ever ready to accompany delightful sentiments, stand already in our eyes. But the prospect of harvest, however animated, lively, and agreeable, we always behold with different sensations.

Whence is this difference? It is, that, to the prospect of the spring, the imagination joins that of the succeeding seasons; to the tender buds which the eye just beholds, it adds the flowers, the fruits, the spreading shades, and sometimes the mysterious pleasures they spread themselves to conceal. The imagination presents, in one point of view, various, successive scenes, and takes a prospect of objects, not as they really are, but as it could wish them to be. In autumn, on the contrary, nothing more is to be seen in idea than exists in fact. If we would anticipate the spring, cold winter intervenes,

and the imagination is chilled amidst frost and snows.

Such is the source of those charms which are presented us by promising infancy, in preference to the perfection of maturer age. When do we conceive any real pleasure in taking a view of the situation of a man? It is then only when the remembrance of his actions enables us to take a retrospect of his life, and to represent him in the time of his youth. If we are reduced to the necessity of considering him such as he is, or to suppose him such as he will be in old age, the idea of declining nature effaces all our pleasures. We can take no delight in seeing a man advance with hasty strides to the tomb; the image of death involves every thing in deformity.

But when I take a view of a child, ten or twelve years of age, robust, and well-formed, every idea that his situation excites is agreeable, whether relative to the present or the future. I see him animated, lively, active, sporting about without care, and undisturbed by the thoughts of futurity; capable of enjoying all his faculties; and so full of life, as to seem desirous to infuse it into every object around him. I foresee him in a more advanced age, exerting that sense and genius which his faculties are daily displaying: I contemplate the object before me; as a child, he gives me great delight; as a future man, he delights me still more; his youthful blood seems to give fresh motion to mine; I catch from him a new portion of life, and grow young again in his vivacity.

But the clock strikes; the school hour is come:

come: what an alteration! In a moment his eyes lose their fire, his chearfulness is at an end: farewell to joy and play. A severe and crabbed preceptor takes him by the hand, and saying gravely, *Come, Sir*, forces him away. The chamber he is led into is furnished with books. Books! Dull furniture indeed for a child of his age; but the poor infant suffers himself to be dragged thither, casting in silence an eye of regret on every object around him, his eyes swimming in tears he dares not shed, and his heart swelling with sighs he dares not vent.

O thou, who hast nothing of this kind to fear; thou, who art always a stranger to trouble and restraint; thou, who passest the day without disquietude, the night without impatience, and reckonest the hours only by thy pleasures; come, my happy, my amiable pupil, and comfort me, by thy presence, for the departure of this little unfortunate. He comes—I feel at his approach a sensation of joy, of which I see him with pleasure partake. It is his friend, his comrade, the companion of his sports, who called him; he is certain, that, whenever he sees me, he shall not be long without some agreeable amusement: we never are dependent on each other, yet always agree; and are never so happy with any other person, as when we are together.

His figure, attitude, and countenance, speak assurance and contentment; his face is the picture of health; his firm step gives him an air of strength and vigour; his complexion, delicate without being pale and wan, has nothing in it of effeminate softness; the sun and the wind ha-

having already given to his skin the honourable teint of his sex: his features, though still plump, begin to show some distinguishing marks of physiognomy; his eyes, as yet unanimated by the glow of sentiment, have all their natural serenity; they are not grown dull and heavy, from care or sorrow, nor have incessant tears made furrows in his cheeks. On the contrary, you may see, in his alert but steady motions, the vivacity of his age, the firmness of his independence, and the experience he hath gained from the many and various exercises to which he has been accustomed. He has an open and liberal mein, without the least air of insolence or vanity: as he has not been kept poring over his books, his looks are not directed downwards, nor is there any occasion to bid him hold up his head; neither fear nor shame ever made him hang it down.

Make room for him, Gentlemen, in the midst of an assembly; examine him, ask him what questions you please: you need neither fear his impertinence, his prate, nor his indiscretion. You need be under no apprehensions that he will expect to ingross your employment or conversation, or that you should not be able to get rid of him at pleasure.

At the same time, you must as little expect of him smart repartees, or witty and agreeable discourse. You must not think he will retail to you a set of pretty phrases that I may have taught him by rote. All that you have to expect from him, is simple and native truth, without ornament, without preparation, and without vanity. He will as readily tell you his evil thoughts and actions, as his good ones, without giving

giving himself any concern about the effect it may have on those to whom he is speaking. He will use the privilege of speech with all the simplicity of its first institution.

We are fond of forming good presages of children, and always feel regret at that torrent of impertinence, which usually overturns those hopes that are so apt to be excited when any lucky hit escapes them. If mine should seldom excite such hopes, he will in return never occasion such regret; for he will never make use of an useless word, nor waste his breath in talking what nobody will listen to. His ideas, it is true, are confined, but clear; if he knows nothing by rote, he knows a great deal by experience. If he hath read less than other children in printed volumes, he hath read much more in the volume of nature. His understanding does not lie on his tongue, but in his brain. He hath less memory than judgment: he can speak only one language, but then he understands what he says; and though he may not talk of things so well as others, he will do them much better.

He knows nothing at all of custom, fashion, or habit: what he did yesterday, hath no influence at all on what he is to do to-day *: he

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* The influence of habit arises from the natural indolence of man, and this indolence increases in proportion as he indulges himself in it. It is less trouble to do as we have done before, than to strike out any thing new: the road is beaten, and it is easier trod. Thus it is remarkable that the influence of habit is very great over old men and idle persons, and very little over youth and such as are active and lively. Habit is convenient only for weak minds, which it enfeebles daily more and more.

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pursues no formula, is influenced by no authority or example, but acts and speaks from his own judgment. Hence you must never expect of him studied discourses nor affected manners; but always the faithful expression of his ideas, and a conduct influenced only by his inclinations.

You will find in him a few moral notions relative to his actual state, but none on the relative situation in which he stands to society: and indeed of what use would the latter be to him, as, while a child, he is not yet become an acting member of the community? Talk to him about liberty, property, or even the right of convention, he will so far understand you: he knows why that which belongs to him, is really his own; and why that which does not belong to him, is not his own. But go beyond this, and he will understand nothing of the matter. Speak to him of duty and obedience, and he will not know what you are talking about. Command him to do any thing, he will not understand what you mean by it: but tell him, that, if he will do you such or such a favour now, you will return it on some other occasion, he will fly immediately to oblige you; for he desires nothing more than to increase his rights, and to acquire over you those which he thinks inviolable. Perhaps he will not even be sorry to be held in estimation, and be looked
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The only habit that can be useful to children, is to accustom them to submit without reluctance to necessity; and the only useful one to grown persons is that which teaches them to submit in like manner to reason. Every other habit is a vice.

upon as of some consequence ; but if you discover this last motive, he hath already deviated from nature, and we have not taken care to close up all the avenues of vanity.

If, on his part, he should have any occasion for assistance, he will ask it indifferently of the first person he meets, of a king as well as a footboy : all men are, in his notions, equal. You would see, by the manner of his request, that he thinks nothing due to him. He knows that which he asks is a favour, and also that it is humanity to grant it him. His expression is simple and laconic: his voice, his looks, his gestures, are those of a being equally accustomed to meet with compliance and refusal. He affects neither the mean and servile submission of a slave, nor the imperious tone of a master ; but displays a modest confidence in his fellow-creature, the noble and affecting complacence of a free, sensible, and feeble being, who desires the assistance of another being, equally free and independent, but powerful and beneficent. If you comply with his request also, he will not thank you for so doing ; but will be sensible that he has contracted an obligation which he will ever be ready to repay. If, on the contrary, you refuse him assistance, he will not complain, nor insist on your compliance ; he knows that will be needless ; but he will say to himself, " It could not be ;" and, as I have observed already, we never refuse to submit to an acknowledged necessity.

Leave him alone at full liberty, and take notice of his actions, without speaking to him ; observe, in such a situation, what he does, and how

how he goes about it. As he is under no temptation or necessity to convince himself of his freedom, he will do nothing out of wantonness, or merely to exert an act of power; he is very sensible he is always master of himself. He is alert, light, and active; his motions have all the vivacity of his age, but you will see none of them but what are directed to some end. Whatever he may have a mind to do, he will undertake nothing above his abilities; for these he has tried, and knows them perfectly well: the means he makes use of, also, are always duly adapted to his designs, and he seldom attempts any thing without being assured of success. He hath an attentive and accurate eye; he never goes about idly, asking other people concerning what he sees; but examines it himself, and will rather take a great deal of trouble to find out what he hath a mind to know, than ask about it. If ever he falls into unforeseen embarrassments, he is less perplexed, and, if there be danger, still less frightened, than others would be in the like circumstances. As his imagination remains as yet inactive, he only sees what is true in reality; he rates the danger at what it is, and always preserves a coolness of temper. He has been obliged too often to submit to necessity, to think of opposing it now; he hath felt its yoke from the cradle, and is prepared for the worst that can happen.

Whether he is at work or at play, he knows no difference; both are alike to him; his diversions are his business. In every thing he does, he is gayly interested, and pleasingly at liberty;

berly; displaying at once the turn of his genius and the compass of his knowledge. Is it not a most delightful picture, to see a well made youth, with a lively and cheerful eye, a contented and serene air, and an open smiling countenance, taking a delight in the most serious occupations, or profoundly busied in the most frivolous amusements?

Would you take a view of this object in the light of comparison? Let him mix in the company of other children, you will see presently which is most completely formed, and comes nearest to the perfection of their age. Among the children educated in town, none will be found more acute and expert than he, and yet he will surpass them all in point of strength. Among those which are brought up in the country, he will equal the young peasants in strength, and surpass them greatly in address and ingenuity. With respect to every thing within the capacity of young persons of his age, he will judge, reason, and foresee, better than all those who are educated in the common methods either in town or country. In running, leaping, moving or lifting bodies; in estimating distances, inventing amusements, and carrying off the prize at each; one would imagine all nature at his command; he knows so well how to carry his point in whatever he undertakes. He is formed to guide, to govern his equals; ingenuity and experience serve him in the place of right and authority. Give him what garb and name you please, it is no matter; he will be always at the head of his companions, and they will ever be sensible of his superiority over them. Without
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the desire of commanding, he will be their master; without believing they obey, they will be obedient to him in every thing.

He is arrived at the maturity of infancy, he hath lived the life of a child, and has not purchased the perfection he hath attained at the expence of his happiness; on the contrary, both have concurred in his education. Even in acquiring the knowledge and understanding of his age, he hath been as free and happy as his constitution would permit him: So that if Providence should deprive us of him in the blossom of our hopes, we shall not have at once to lament both his life and his death; our sorrows will not be aggravated by the remembrance of those which we have occasioned him: we shall have it to say, at least, that he enjoyed life in his infancy, and that we did not deprive him of any of those good things nature bestowed on him.

The great inconvenience in this mode of education, is, that the effects of it are not perceptible to any but persons of discernment; and that children, educated with all the care I have been speaking of, would appear to vulgar eyes only as so many blundering uncultivated boys. A preceptor usually studies more his own interest than that of his pupil; he endeavours to make it appear that his time and pains are not thrown away, and that he deserves a much better salary than he is paid. He furnishes his disciple, therefore, with acquisitions pompous in their form, and easily displayed: he does not trouble himself whether the instructions he gives his pupil be useful or not, provided what he teaches

teaches him is calculated to make a figure in the eyes of others. To this end, he indiscriminately stuffs the memory with a heap of paltry literature, not more burdensome than useless.

When the child is to be examined, he is made to exhibit his stock of merchandise; he displays it at large; we admire it for a while; and then he packs up his bale again, and marches off. My pupil is not so rich; he has no such packet of baubles to display; he hath nothing to exhibit but himself. Now, a child is no easier to be known at first sight than a man. Where are the penetrating observers, who can fix in a moment on those features by which they are characterised? Doubtless there are such; but there are very few, and not to be met with in one father in a hundred.

A multiplicity of questions tire and disgust every body, much more children. They are fatigued in a few minutes, and pay no longer attention to the obstinate inquisitor who continues to question them; answering him only at random. This method of examination, therefore, is futile and pedantic; a single word, sometimes, let fall by chance, gives us a better insight into their genius and character than a tedious conversation: but we must be careful to mark that such word was neither accidental nor acquired. It requires a good deal of judgement in one's self to estimate that of a child.

I remember a story, which I heard related by the late Lord Hyde, concerning one of his friends, who, returning from Italy after an absence of three years, had a mind to examine into the progress of his son, a boy about nine or
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ten years old. To this end he took an opportunity, as he was walking out one evening, with the child and its governor, in a field where the scholars were amusing themselves with flying their kites. Observing the shadow of one of the kites in the path along which they were walking, the father asked the son, "Where was the kite of which they saw the shadow?" To which the boy, without hesitating or lifting up his head, readily answered, "In the highway." And in reality, added my Lord Hyde, the highway was situated between us and the sun. The father embraced the child in rapture at his reply, and so finished the examination. The next day he settled an annuity also on his governor, independent of his other allowance.

How sensible a father! how promising a child! The question asked was precisely adapted to his age; the answer was certainly very simple; but do you see what an accuracy of infantine judgement it supposes? Thus it was that the pupil of Aristotle managed the celebrated courser that none of his equeries could tame.

B O O K. III.

ALTHOUGH, till the age of puberty, the whole course of life be one continued series of imbecility, there is a certain period in this first age of life, in which the progress of his passions exceeding that of his necessities, the growing animal, though absolutely weak, becomes relatively strong. His wants not being wholly displayed, his actual abilities are more than sufficient to provide for those which he really feels. Considered as a man, he is very weak; but as a child, he is abundantly strong. Whence proceeds the weakness of man? From the disproportion he finds between his faculties and his desires. It is our passions that render us feeble; because, to gratify them, requires greater powers than nature has furnished us with. Diminish, then, the number, check the extravagance, of your desires, and you increase your powers of gratification. He who can compass more than he requires, hath ability to spare, and is certainly a powerful being. Here begins the third stage of infancy, of which I am now about to treat; it being that state of childhood which approaches nearly to puberty, without being quite arrived at the term.

At twelve or thirteen years of age, the faculties of a child display themselves more rapidly than his wants. The most impetuous, the most coercive of all physical necessities he hath not yet experienced. The very organs that pre-

vide for its gratification are as yet imperfect, and seem to wait the exertion of the will to capacitate them for action. Unaffected by the inclemency of the weather, or the change of seasons, his natural heat supplies the artificial warmth of apparel, and his keenness of appetite the provocatives of fauce. At his age, whatever is but nourishing, is good; if he be drowsy, he stretches himself on the ground, and falls asleep. Whatever he hath occasion for, is within his reach; he craves not after imaginary dainties; he feels no disgust from prepossession. His desires confined within the sphere of his abilities, he is not only capable of providing for himself, but possesses superfluous faculties for which he has no use. This, however, is the only time, during life, in which he will be in such a situation.

It may be objected, that, though I have not supposed the wants of my child fewer than they really are, yet that I attribute to him too great a power of satisfying them. It should always be remembered, however, that I am speaking particularly of my own pupil, and not of those enervated puppets, who make it a journey to waddle out of one room into another; who gasp for breath in strait-laced stays, or labour under a load of whale-bone or buckram. It may be said, that manly abilities are displayed only in a state of manhood; that the animal spirits duly prepared and distributed in their proper channels through the whole body, are only capable to give that consistence, activity, tone, and elasticity to the muscles which constitute real strength. Such, indeed, is the philosophy of the closet; but

but I appeal to experience. I see sturdy boys daily employed in the fields about the most laborious parts of husbandry; so that they might be taken for grown men, if their voices did not betray them. Even in our cities, we see the young artificers frequently as robust as their masters, and equally expert for the time they have served. If there be any difference in their capacity and abilities, and I confess there is some, it is much less, I say again, than that between the impetuous desires of a man and the confined inclinations of a child: for, it is to be observed, we are not here speaking of mere corporeal abilities; but more particularly of those mental faculties and talents by which the former are directed and supplied.

This interval, in which the individual is able to effect more than he requires, though it be not the period of his greatest absolute strength, is, as I before observed, that of his greatest relative ability.

This interval contains the most precious moments of his life; moments never to return, few and transitory; hence the more precious, as to employ them well becomes of the greater importance.

To what use, then, is it proper a child should put that redundancy of abilities, of which he is at present possessed, and hereafter will stand in need of? He should employ it on those things which may be of utility in time to come. He should throw, if I may so express myself, the superfluity of his present being into his future existence. The robust child should provide for the subsistence of the feeble man; not in laying

up his treasure in coffers, whence thieves may steal, nor by intrusting it in the hands of others; but by keeping it in his own. To appropriate his acquisitions to himself, he will secure them in the strength and dexterity of his own arms, and in the capacity of his own head. This, therefore, is the time for employment, for instruction, for study. Observe also, that I have not arbitrarily fixed on this period for that purpose: Nature itself plainly points it out to us.

So circumscribed is human intelligence, that we are not only denied the power of attaining universal knowledge, but it is impossible even to know perfectly the little that is attained by others. As the reverse of every false proposition is true, the source of truth must be as inexhaustible as that of error. A proper choice therefore should be made of the subjects, as well as of the time, for instruction. Of the arts and sciences within our acquisition, some are fallacious, others useless, and others again serve only to flatter the vanity of their respective professors. The small number of such as really contribute to our well-being, are those only that merit the attention of a wise man, and of course of the child that we are solicitous to make so. The point in view, therefore, is not what may be true, but what is useful.

From this scanty proportion of useful knowledge, we must yet farther subtract those truths which require an understanding already formed, such as presuppose the knowledge of those different relations and circumstances with which a child cannot be acquainted, and which, though true

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in themselves, dispose an unexperienced mind to form a wrong judgment on other occasions.

Thus are we reduced, in our system of education, to a very small circle, compared with the system of things. This, however, appears an immense sphere to the contracted faculties of a child: so dark are the clouds that obscure the dawn of the human understanding! Where is the man who hath temerity enough to attempt their dissipation; what an abyfs hath fruitless knowledge dug round the hapless youth! Tremble, presumptuous man! thou who art about to conduct him through its dangerous paths, and to draw from before his eyes the sacred curtain of nature; be first well assured of his capacity and your own, lest the intellects of one or the other, and perhaps both, be perverted in the attempt. Beware of the specious allurements of falsehood, and the intoxicating fumes of pride. Remember, constantly remember, that mere ignorance hath never been hurtful; that error alone is destructive; and that we do not err in things we are professedly ignorant of, but in those which we conceive we know.

The progress which your pupil makes in geometry, will serve both as a proof and guide in the display of his capacity. As soon, however, as he is capable of distinguishing what is useful, it requires great address and circumspection to introduce speculative subjects. Are you desirous, for instance, that he should know how to find a mean proportional between two given lines? Begin by inducing him practically to find a square equal to a given rectangle. If the question be, to find two mean proportionals, it

will be requisite to make the problem of doubling the cube peculiarly interesting. Hence you see, in what manner we might approach by degrees those truths on which are founded the moral distinctions of good and evil. Hitherto we have been governed by no law but that of necessity; at present we begin to consider what is useful, and shall not be long before we come to the consideration of what is good and proper.

The various faculties of men are excited by the same instinct. To the activity of the body, making constant efforts to display its abilities, succeeds that of the mind, as constantly seeking after information. Children, when very young, seem endowed only with a capacity and inclination for motion: they afterwards become inquisitive and curious; and this curiosity, well directed, becomes, at the age they have now attained, their chief spring of action. Let us be always careful to distinguish those propensities which are implanted by nature, from those which are ingrafted by the dictates of prejudice and opinion. A thirst after knowledge may proceed merely from the vanity of desiring to be thought learned; it may also arise from that curiosity which naturally excites us to inquire after every thing in which we may be either directly or indirectly interested. Our innate desire of happiness, and the impossibility of our fully gratifying that desire, are the cause of our constant researches after new expedients to contribute to that end.

This is the first principle or motive of curiosity: a principle which is natural to the heart of man, but which displays itself only in obedience
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to our passions, and in proporoion to our acquirements of knowledge. Let us suppose a philosopher cast ashore on a desert island, together with his books and instruments, and that he was under an absolute certainty of spending in that solitude the remainder his days. He would never trouble himself farther about the system of the universe, the laws of attraction, or the fluxionary calculus. It is probable he would never after look in a book, during his whole life; but he certainly would not fail to explore the island, however extensive, even to its remotest corners. Let us, therefore, in our early studies, reject those sciences for which man has not a natural turn, and confine ourselves to those which instinct directs us to pursue.

The earth is the island on which mankind are cast, and the most striking objects of their observation is the sun. As soon as our ideas begin to extend beyond ourselves, our attention will therefore naturally be ingrossed between two such interesting subjects. Hence the philosophy of almost every savage nation is confined solely to the imaginary divisions of the earth, and the divinity of the sun. "What an excursion!" cries the reader. "We were but just now employed about objects that immediately surround us, and we are now traversing the globe, and soaring to the distant extremities of the universe." This excursion, however, is the simple effect of the progress of our faculties, and the bent of our understanding. During our infant state of weakness and incapacity, all our thoughts, influenced by self-preservation, are confined within ourselves. On the contrary, in a more advanced age,

age, as our abilities increase, the desire of improving our existence carries us out of ourselves, and our ideas extend to their utmost limits. As the intellectual world, however, is as yet unknown to us, our thoughts cannot extend farther than we can see; but our comprehension dilates itself with the bounds of space.

Let us convert our sensations into ideas; but let us not fly at once from sensible to intellectual objects. It is by a due and rational attention to the former we can only attain the latter. In the first operations of the understanding, let our senses then always be our guide, the world our only book, and facts our sole preceptors. Children, when taught to read, learn that only; they never think; they gain no information; all their learning consists in words.

Direct the attention of your pupil to the phænomena of nature, and you will soon awaken his curiosity; but to keep that curiosity alive, you must be in no haste to satisfy it. Put questions to him adapted to his capacity, and leave him to resolve them. Let him take nothing on trust from his preceptor, but on his own comprehension and conviction: he should not learn, but invent the sciences. If ever you substitute authority in the place of argument, he will reason no longer; he will be ever afterwards bandied like a shuttle-cock between the opinions of others.

You intend, we will suppose, to teach your child geography, and for that purpose provide for him maps, spheres, and globes. What an apparatus! Wherefore all these mere representations of things? Why do you not rather begin
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by shewing him the object itself, that he may at least know what it is you are talking about?

Walk out with him some fine evening to a convenient spot, from whence an extensive horizon may give you a full view of the setting sun; and then take particular notice of such objects as mark the place of its going down. Return the next morning, with a professed design only of taking the fresh air, to the same place, before the sun rises. There you will see the fiery rays it scatters among the clouds, as harbingers of its approach. The illumination increases, the east seems all in flames, and you expect the glorious orb long before it discovers itself above the horizon; you think you see it every moment; it at length appears. Its rays dart like lightening over the face of nature, and darkness vanishes at the sight. Man glories in his habitation, and sees it embellished with new beauty. The lawn is refreshed by the coolness of the night, and the light of the morn displays its increasing verdure: the dew bespangled flowers that enamel its surface glitter in the sun beams, and, like rubies and emeralds, dart their colours on the eye. The cheerful birds unite in choirs, and hail in concert the parent of life: not one is silent, at this enchanting moment none are mute, though in feeble notes, more slow and soft than those they chaunt all day, as if from peaceful slumbers scarce awoke, they join in languid harmony. The assemblage of so many pleasing objects imprints a glowing sensation that seems to penetrate the soul. Who can withstand the rapture of this short interval of enchantment? it is impossible so grand, so beautiful, so delightful a scene,
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can be ever beheld with indifference. Full of that enthusiastic rapture with which a preceptor is inspired on such an occasion, he endeavours perhaps to communicate it to his pupil; he expects to excite the same emotions in the child, by attracting its attention to those sensations which he experiences within himself. Ridiculous expectation! it is the heart only that contemplates the beauties of nature: to be seen, they should be always felt. A child indeed may perceive the several objects, but their connection is to him invisible; he is insensible to the harmony of the spheres. He requires an experience he hath not yet attained, and sentiments to which he is as yet a stranger, to be susceptible of that complex impression which is the general result of all these sensations. If he has not travelled over deserts; if his feet have never been parched by burning sands; if he never hath felt the scorching sun-beams reflected from the surrounding rocks, how can he taste the fresh air of a fine morning? How should he be enraptured with the fragrance of the flowers, the refreshing verdure of the grass, the dew-drops sparkling in the sun, or the soft carpet of the downy moss? How should the warbling of birds inspire him with glowing raptures, who is a stranger to the soft accents of love and delight? How can he behold with transport the dawn of so lovely a day, whose imagination cannot paint to itself the joys it is capable of bestowing? In a word, what tender sensations can be excited by the charms of nature, in him who is ignorant by whose hand she is so beautifully adorned? Talk not to children in a language they do not comprehend; make use

use of no pompous descriptions, no flowers of speech, no tropes and figures, no poetry; taste and sentiment are at present quite out of the question: simplicity, gravity, and precision are all that are yet required; the time will come but too soon when we must assume a different style.

A pupil educated agreeable to these maxims, and accustomed to receive no assistance till he has discovered his own inabilities, will examine every new object with a long and silent attention. He will be thoughtful without asking questions. Content yourself, therefore, with presenting proper objects opportunely to his notice, and when you see they have sufficiently excited his curiosity, drop from leading laconic questions, which may put him in the way of discovering the truth.

On the present occasion, having for some time contemplated the rising sun, and made your pupil observe the hills and other neighbouring objects on that side, permitting him the while to talk about them without interruption, stand silent a few moments, and affect a profound meditation. You may then address him thus: "I am thinking that, when the sun set last night, it went down yonder behind us; whereas, this morning, you see, he is risen on the opposite side of the plain here before us. What can be the meaning of this?" Say nothing more; and, if he asks you any thing about it, divert his attention, for the present, by talking of something else. Leave him to reflect on it himself, and be assured he will think of your observation.

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To accustom a child to give attention to objects, and to make sensible truths appear striking to his imagination, it is necessary to keep him some time in suspense before they are explained or discovered to him. If he should not sufficiently comprehend the nature of the present question by the means proposed, it may be rendered still more obvious by diversifying the terms of it. If he cannot comprehend in what manner the sun proceeds from its setting to its rising, he knows at least how it proceeds from its rising to its setting: he hath ocular information of this. Explain the first question, then, by the second; and if your pupil be not extremely dull indeed, the analogy is too obvious to escape him.

Such is our first lecture in cosmography.

As we proceed slowly from one sensible idea to another, making ourselves familiarly acquainted with each as we go on, and as our pupil's attention is never required upon compulsion, the distance will be very considerable, from the object of this first lesson, to the knowledge of the sun's course and the figure of the earth: but as the apparent motion of all the heavenly bodies depends on the same principle, and as the first observation naturally leads to all the rest, it requires less capacity, though more time, to proceed from the diurnal rotation of the earth to the calculation of an eclipse, than to acquire clear ideas of the phenomenon of day and night.

As the sun turns round the earth, he describes a circle, and every circle hath a centre; this we already know. This centre, also, must needs be

be invisible, because it is in the middle of our globe; but we can suppose two points on the surface so corresponding with it, that a road passing through all three, and extended both ways to the heavens, would be at once the axis of the earth and of the sun's apparent diurnal motion. A whirl-bone or globular totum, turning upon one of its points, may serve to represent the heavens turning upon their axis, the two points of this plaything being the two poles; one of which may be pointed out to our pupil, near the tail of the little bear. This would furnish us with an amusement for the night; by which means we should become gradually acquainted with the stars, and thence in time grow anxious to distinguish the planets and constellations.

Emilius and I have seen the sun rise at midsummer: we shall next take a view of his rising, some fine morning, in the depth of winter. We are neither of us idle, you know, and both despise the cold. I have taken care to make the second observation on the very same spot where we made the former; so that, in consequence of a little preparatory discourse to introduce the remark, one or other of us will infallibly cry out when the sun first appears above the horizon, "Ha! this is pleasant enough! the sun does not rise in the place it used to do. Here, you see, are our old marks to the left; and now he rises yonder, to the right. So it seems there is one east for the summer, and another for the winter." These examples will be sufficient to shew the unexperienced preceptor the way to bring his pupil acquainted with the sphere, by making use of the earth it-

self instead of a globe, and the apparent revolution of the sun instead of any imperfect representation of it. It ought, indeed, to be laid down as a general rule, never to substitute the shadow unless where it is impossible to exhibit the substance; for the representation ingrossing the attention of the child, generally makes him forget the object represented.

The armillary sphere appears to me a very ill-contrived and disproportioned machine. Its confused circles, and the strange figures delineated thereon, give it an air of necromancy, which is enough to frighten children. The earth is, besides, too small; the circles too wide and numerous; while some, particularly the two colures, are entirely useless. Each circle exceeds in breadth the diameter of the earth, and their thickness gives them such an air of substance and reality, that when you tell your pupil they represent only imaginary circles, you confound him; he neither knows what he sees, nor comprehends what you say to him.

We never know how to suppose ourselves in the place of children; we never enter into their manner of thinking. On the contrary, we attribute to them our ideas; and, pursuing our own method of argumentation, fill their heads, even while we are discussing incontestable truths, with extravagance and error. It is disputed, whether the sciences are best taught by the synthetic or analytic method. It is not always necessary to abide by either. We may sometimes compound and resolve in the same disquisition, and instruct a child by the former mode of argument, while he thinks himself employing the latter.

latter. Add to this, that, by making use of both methods indifferently, they serve reciprocally to confirm each other. Setting out at the same time from two different points, without seeming to take the same route, he will be surprised to find himself directed two ways to one and the same object; and that surprise cannot fail of giving him great satisfaction. In teaching him geography, for example, I would begin at its two extremes; and, with the study of the apparent astronomical revolutions, unite that of the divisions and measurement of the earth. While he is studying the sphere, and thus transporting himself in imagination to the heavens, I would call back his attention to the divisions of the earth, and point out to him their relation to his own place of abode.

The two first objects of his geographical studies should be the town where he resides, and his father's seat in the country. After having well observed the situation of these, he should take the like notice of the neighbouring villages and country-seats on the road, together with the adjacent rivers; observing the situation and aspect of each object, in regard to the rising and setting of the sun. This is the point of reunion. He should make a map from this survey; beginning simply with the two first objects before mentioned, and inserting the others by degrees, as he comes to know, or estimates their position and distance. You see, already, the advantages he will have in this respect, by having accustomed him to measure objects and distances by his eye.

Notwithstanding this advantage, however, it

will be necessary to direct a child in these operations a little; but this should be very little and imperceptibly. If he falls into a mistake, let him. Be in no haste to set him right; but wait with patience till he himself in a state to discover and correct his error; or at most take occasion only, at a favourable opportunity, by some distant hint, to make him sensible of it. If he should never mistake, he would make but little improvement. It is not necessary that he should know at present the topography of the country, but the means whereby such knowledge is obtained; it is of no importance to him to have a number of maps in his head, provided he knows what they serve to represent, and has clear ideas of the art by which they are constructed. Here you see the difference between Emilius and the pupils of others. Their knowledge lies in maps and charts, that of my pupil in the science of geography. His progress in the art of map-making will hence furnish new ornaments for his apartment. You will remember it is my constant maxim, not to teach a child a multiplicity of things, but to prevent his acquiring any but clear and precise ideas. His knowing but little is of no consequence, provided he imbibes no false principles. I store his head with truth, only to prevent the entrance of error. Reason and judgment advance but slowly, while prejudice attacks with early impetuosity; we must carefully guard therefore against the latter. If you regard science, indeed, for its own sake, and aim at knowledge in general, you enter upon an unfathomable ocean, without a shore, to founder among the rocks. When
I see

I see a man enamoured by the charms of universal knowledge, and flying from the pursuits of one science to another, I think I see a child gathering shells on the sea-shore. He first loads himself indiscriminately with as many as he can carry; when, tempted by others of a gayer appearance, he throws the former away, taking and rejecting, till, fatigued and bewildered in his choice, he hath thrown all away, and returns home without a single shell.

During the first term of childhood, we endeavour only to lose time, to avoid the ill employment of it. The case is now altered; and we have not time sufficient for every thing that might be useful. The passions advance upon us apace, and the moment they give notice of their arrival, your pupil will give no ear to any other monitor. The term of dispassionate intelligence is short and transitory; and is, besides, employed on so many subjects of present utility, that it is a folly to think it sufficiently long for a child to acquire much learning or wisdom. It is not our business at present to make him an adept in the sciences, but to give him a taste for them, and point out the method of improving it. This is most certainly the fundamental principle of a rational education.

The present is also the proper time to accustom your pupil by degrees to fix his attention, for some time, on one and the same object. This attention, however, must always be accompanied by pleasure or inclination, and never be the effect of compulsion. We must be careful, also, not to keep it too long upon the stretch, lest weariness and disgust should ensue.

Keep, therefore, a watchful eye over your pupil, and by no means permit him to fatigue himself by too intense application. He had better learn nothing, than learn upon compulsion.

When he asks a question, be your answer always calculated rather to keep alive than satisfy his curiosity; especially when you observe he has a mind to trifle rather than be instructed. You ought to pay less regard to the terms of interrogation, than to his motives for enquiry. This conduct becomes of the greatest importance when a child begins to reason.

The sciences are connected together by a series of propositions, all dependent on some general and common principles, which are gradually displayed. The philosophers make use of these; with us they are as yet out of the question. There is another chain of reasoning, of a different construction, by which every particular object is connected to some other, and points out that which succeeds it. This order of succession, which, from our natural curiosity, keeps alive our attention, is generally made use of by grown persons, and is peculiarly adapted to children.

Before we begin to delineate our map, we must trace a meridian. The two points of intersection found by shadows of equal length in the morning and evening, will give an excellent meridian for an astronomer of thirteen. To find these, however, will require time, and oblige us to work constantly on the same spot. This method might be too troublesome and disgusting; having foreseen this inconveni-

venience, therefore, we have provided against it.

But I am now fallen again into my usual custom of being tediously circumstantial. I hear your murmurs, grumbling reader, and disregard them. I am determined I will not sacrifice the most useful part of my book to your impatience. Act as you please with regard to my prolixity, I am, for my part, perfectly easy about your complaints.

My pupil has long since observed, that amber, glass, wax, and several other bodies, on being rubbed, attract bits of straw, feathers, and the like; and that other bodies in general have not that quality. Among them, however, we have accidentally discovered one, which is possessed of a yet more singular property: it attracts steel-filings and bits of iron, not only at a distance, but without friction. This discovery engages our attention for some time, without answering any other purpose than amusement. At length, we perceive it communicates its attractive property to iron and steel. About this time, I take my pupil to see the diversions of a neighbouring fair, where, among other wonderful performances, a juggler produces a duck of wax, swimming about in a basin after a piece of bread, which he holds in his hand. We are greatly surprised at this strange phenomenon; but as we are unacquainted with the fables of witchcraft, we charge not the artist with being either a wizard or conjuror. As we are daily accustomed to various striking effects, of whose causes we are confessedly ignorant, we are not very anxious to account for every thing we see;
but

but rest contented till some fortunate event affords us information.

At our return home, however, our conversation very naturally turns on this extraordinary duck, and accordingly a thought suggests itself of imitating it. We take a large needle, and touching it on the loadstone, cover it with wax, which we mould as well as we can into the shape of a duck, the needle passing through its body from the beak to the tail. We then set it afloat in a basin of water, and presenting a key to its beak, we find, to our great joy, the duck follows it, in the same manner as that of the juggler followed the bread. As to the line of direction in which the body of the duck remains when at rest, we may observe that some other time: at present we are too much taken up with the first object of attention, to think of any thing else. In the evening we repair to the juggler's booth, with a piece of bread, properly prepared, in our pocket; when the boasting artist having performed his trick, my young philosopher, who had with difficulty so long contained himself, tells him there is nothing in it, and that he himself can do as much. He is taken at his word; and instantly pulls the bread with the concealed iron out of his pocket. His heart flutters as he approaches the table, and his hand trembles as he presents the bread. The duck, however, follows it; on which he leaps for joy, and triumphs in the applause of the spectators. The juggler, though a little confounded, embraces him; felicitates him on his success, and begs he will honour him with his presence the next day, when he promises to collect a more

nume-

numerous assembly to witness and applaud his abilities. Our young naturalist, in the mean while, so proud of his science, is just on the point of discovering the secret, when I hurry him away from the scene.

Full of the applause he is to receive to-morrow, he counts the moments, in the mean time, with ridiculous impatience. He invites every one he knows, and would be glad the whole world should be witnesses of his triumph. At length the appointed hour is come; we hasten to the place of rendezvous, and find the room already crowded with spectators. His young heart is elated with joy at the sight. Other tricks in their course preceding ours, the juggler surpasses his usual dexterity, and performs wonders. My pupil, however, pays no attention to what is doing; but keeps fumbling all the while in his pocket, with his piece of bread in his hand, fetching his breath short, and sweating with impatience and anxiety. At length it is his turn to exhibit: the artist pompously introduces the apparatus, and prepares the spectators for the trick. Emilius, though somewhat abashed, approaches the table, and offering his bread to the duck—what a new turn in human affairs! tame as it was yesterday, it is become a mere wild-duck to-day: instead of presenting its beak, it turns tail and swims away, flying from the bread, and the hand presenting it, as fast as it before had followed them. After many fruitless trials, for which he is constantly hissed by the company, my pupil complains that he is imposed on, and that this is not the duck he practised on yesterday; defying the juggler

gler himself to draw this about in the same manner.

The artist, without making a reply, takes up a piece of bread, and presenting it to the duck, draws it immediately after his hand. Emilius takes up the same piece of bread; but instead of succeeding better than with the former, has the mortification to see the duck turn regardless from him, and make circles round the bason. On this he retires in confusion, unable to stand the hisses of the company any longer.

The juggler now takes the piece of bread my pupil had brought, and makes use of it with as much success as he did his own: he takes the iron from within it; and exposing it to the company, raises another laugh at our expence: he even draws the duck about, as before, with the bread thus separated from the iron. He performs the same trick, also, with another piece, cut from the loaf by a third person; he does the same thing with his glove, and with the bare end of his finger. He next advances into the middle of the room, and declaring aloud, with that emphatic tone so peculiar to these gentry, that his duck would obey his call as well as his motions; he speaks to it, and it immediately obeys the word of command. If he bids it move to the right, to the right it goes; if to return, it returns; if to turn about, about it turns; its motion constantly obedient to his order. The repeated shouts of applause that follow these specimens of his art, are so many insults upon us; we therefore privately slip out, and making the best of our way home, shut ourselves up in our apartment, instead of going about,

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as we had projected, to tell every body of our success.

The next morning somebody knocks at the door; who should this be but our friend the juggler? He enters, and modestly complains of our conduct; he cannot think what he has done to us, that we should endeavour to discredit his tricks, and deprive him of his bread; or that there is any thing so very wonderful in the art of drawing about a duck of wax, that we should be ambitious of that honour at the expence of a poor man's subsistence. Faith, Gentlemen, continues he, if I could get a living by any other talent, I should never be proud of this. You should reflect, that a man who has spent great part of his life in the exercise of this pitiful industry, must of course know more of the matter than you who only throw away a few minutes on it. If I did not exhibit the masterpieces of my dexterity at first, it was because one should not be in haste to make an unnecessary display of one's knowledge: I have always taken care to preserve my best tricks for particular occasions; and have, besides what you have seen, many others to check young and indiscreet observers. I am come, nevertheless, Gentlemen, very readily to acquaint you of the secret that so much embarrassed you; at the same time hoping you will make no ill use of it to my prejudice, and that you will another time be more reserved.

He produces his machine; when, to our very great surprise, we see it consists only of a powerful loadstone, which a child, hid under the table

ble for that purpose, moved about without being perceived.

As he is putting his loadstone up again, we thank him, and, excusing ourselves for what is passed, offer to make him a present, which he refuses. No, Gentlemen, says he, you do not deserve so well of me, that I should accept your favours; you shall be obliged to me against your will; this is all the revenge I shall take. You may learn hence that there are men of spirit in all conditions of life: I am paid for the exercise of my hands, and not of my tongue. In going out, he addresses to me, particularly, the following reprimand. "I can easily excuse the child, says he aloud, as he offended only through ignorance: but you, Sir, who ought to have known his error, why did you permit him? As you both live together, you, as the elder, owe him your advice and direction; your experience should be the authority for his conduct. In reproaching himself, as he grows up, for the faults of his youth, he will doubtless reproach you for those of which you did not advise him."

Having said this, he departs, leaving us both in a good deal of confusion. I blame myself for my own easy and pliant temper; promising my pupil to sacrifice it another time to his interest, and to warn him of his faults before he commits them. For the time is now approaching when our relation to each other must change, and the severity of the master give place to the complacency of the companion. This change ought to be effected by degrees; and, like every other, be timely and early provided for.

We return the next day to the fair, to see the
trick

trick repeated, of which we are let into the secret. We accost our Socratic juggler, with a profound respect; hardly daring to look him in the face. He, on the other hand, loads us with civilities; and in seating, mortifies us with the most humiliating marks of distinction. He performs his usual sleights, and amuses himself a long time with the trick of the duck, casting every now and then a severe and confident look at us. In the mean time, we, though privy to the whole, keep the most profound silence. Should my pupil dare but to open his mouth on such an occasion, I should have no hopes of him.

The circumstantial account of this example is of more consequence than it may at first appear. How many lessons are contained in this one! How many mortifying consequences are sure to follow this first emotion of vanity! Watch with care, young preceptor, the first emotion in your pupil; and be assured, that, if you can thus make it productive of humiliation and disgrace, you will be long before you see any appearance of a second. What preparations are here! you will say; I confess; and all to make us a compass to serve us instead of a meridian.

Having learned that a load stone acts through the substance of other bodies, we have nothing to do but to construct a machine like that we have seen. To this end, we procure a large flat basin; placing it on a table, and filling it with water; we make our duck a little neater than the former; and thus our apparatus is ready. From our constant attention to what passes in the basin, we at length remark that the body of

the duck, when at rest, preserves always nearly the same direction. We repeat the experiment, and, on examination, find this direction to be from south to north. This is sufficient; our compass is now as good as made.

The earth hath various climates, and these climates different temperatures; the seasons varying more considerably in proportion as we approach either pole. All bodies contract with cold, and dilate with heat: this effect is still more conspicuous in fluids than solids, and is commensurable by spirituous liquors; by means of which, the thermometer was constructed. The wind blows against our faces: hence we find air is a body, a palpable fluid, although we cannot by any means see it. Press a drinking glass turned upside down, into water, the fluid will not occupy the whole space within it, unless by leaning it sidewise you let the air escape: hence we find air is capable of resistance. Press the glass with a still greater force downwards, and the water will gain upon the air without ever being able entirely to fill the glass: hence we find air is capable of a certain degree of compression. A ball filled with compressed air will rebound better than another filled with any other substance: air, then, is an elastic body. Lying down at one's full in a bathing tub, if we endeavour to raise our arms in an horizontal position out of the water, we shall find them loaded with a prodigious weight: air, therefore, is evidently heavy, and may be weighed against other fluids; hence the contrivance of the barometer, the syphon, the wind-gun, and the air-pump. All the laws of statics and hydrostatics

statics discover themselves by experiments equally obvious and common. I would not, therefore, have him enter the cabinet of an experimental philosopher to learn any of these. His apparatus and pomp of machinery disgust me; their scientific air is destructive to science itself; those various engines either frightening a child, or taking up that attention to their figure, which he ought to bestow on their effects. I would have all our machines be of our own construction, and would not begin to construct the instrument before I had made the experiment; but, after having made this imperfectly, and as it were by chance, we would by degrees invent the instrument to confirm it. I had rather our machines should be less accurate and complete, and that we should have more just ideas of what they ought to be, and of their operations. For my first lesson in statics, instead of providing myself with a balance and scales, I lay a stick across the back of a chair; I measure the length of both ends when it hangs in equilibrio. I next hang different weights on each; placing them nearer or farther off the point of suspension, as occasion requires: by these means I find, that the equilibrium depends on a reciprocal proportion between the weights and the length of the levers; and thus I instruct my young mechanic to rectify a balance before he has ever seen one.

We acquire, without doubt, notions more clear and certain, of things we thus learn of ourselves, than of those we are taught by others. Another advantage also resulting from this method is, that we do not accustom ourselves to a

servile submission to the authority of others; but, by exercising our reason, grow every day more ingenious in the discovery of the relations of things, in connecting our ideas, and in the contrivance of machines; whereas, by adopting those which are put into our hands, our invention grows dull and indifferent, as the man who never dresses himself, but is served in every thing by his servants, and drawn about every where by his horses, loses by degrees the activity and use of his limbs. Boileau boasted that he had taught Racine to rhyme with much difficulty: among the many admirable methods taken to abridge the study of the sciences, we are in great want of one to make us learn them with difficulty.

The most obvious advantage of these slow and laborious researches, is to preserve, in the cultivation of speculative studies, the activity of the body; to preserve the suppleness of the limbs, and to be always busied in some manual operation, or employment, of use to mankind. The diversity of instruments, invented to direct us in our experiments, and make up for the deficiency of our organs of sense, makes us neglect the exercise of the latter. A theodolite dispenses with our estimating the extent of angles; the eye, which is capable of measuring distances with great exactness, gives up the task to the chain; the steel-yard excuses me from judging of the weight of any thing by poising it in my hand. Thus the more ingenious and accurate our instruments, the more unsusceptible and inexpert become our organs: by assembling

sembling a heap of machinery about us, we find afterwards none in ourselves.

But when we set about the construction of these machines ourselves, and employ therein that sagacity and address which are required to do without them, we lose nothing: on the contrary, we gain every thing; and, by adding the knowledge of art to nature, become more ingenious without being less dexterous. If, instead of keeping a boy poring over books, I employ him in a work-shop, his hands will be busied to the improvement of his understanding; he will become a philosopher while he thinks himself only an artisan. In short, this practice hath other uses which I shall speak of hereafter, and show in what manner these philosophical amusements lead to the exercise of the proper functions of a man.

I have already observed, that the mere speculative part of science is by no means adapted to children, even when they approach adolescence; it is proper, nevertheless, though you do not enter with them too profoundly into the depth of physical theory, to connect their experiments by some chain of deduction, that they may arrange them in some order in their minds, for the sake of remembering them: for it is very difficult to retain separate and independent facts and conclusions long in the memory, without some leading clue for occasional recollection.

In your researches into the laws of nature, begin always with the most common and obvious phenomena; accustoming your pupil to look upon them always as mere facts. I take up, for instance, a stone; and, pretending to place it

in the air, open my hand, and it immediately falls to the ground. I look upon Emilius, who stands all the while attentive to what I am doing, and ask him why the stone falls? Where is there a child who would not have an answer ready to that question? There is none, not even Emilius, if I had not taken great pains to prepare him not to know how to answer it. Every one will say, The stone falls because it is heavy. And what is heavy? The thing that falls. So the stone falls because it falls. Here my little philosopher is stopt in good earnest; and thus ends my first lecture of physical theory; whether he profits by it, also, in this science or not, it is a general lesson of good sense.

As a child advances in understanding, other important considerations oblige us to be more nice in the objects of his employment. As soon as he acquires so much knowledge of himself, as to conceive in what his happiness consists; or becomes sensible of such extensive relations, as to be able to judge what is fitting or unfitting to his state and condition; he is then in a situation to perceive the difference between labour and amusement, and to regard the latter only as a relaxation from the former. Objects of real utility may then make part of his study, and engage him to give a more constant application to it than he might do to mere amusements. The law of necessity, ever recurring to the mind, teaches us betimes to do that which is disagreeable, in order to prevent consequences still more displeasing. Such is the use of forecast; in the regulation of which consists all the wisdom, and depends all the misery, of mankind.

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Every individual would be happy: but, in order to arrive at happiness, it is first necessary to know what it is. The happiness of man, in a state of nature, is as simple as his manner of living: it consists in his being free from pain; and is constituted by health, liberty, and the necessaries of life. The happiness of man, in a state of society, is another thing; but this is at present out of the question. I cannot too often observe, that objects purely physical are those only which can interest children, particularly those whose vanity is not yet excited, and who are not already vitiated by the prejudices of opinion.

When they come to foresee their wants, their understanding is considerably advanced, and they begin to be sensible of the value of time. It is of consequence now, to use them to employ themselves on subjects of utility; this utility, however, should be applicable to their age, and adapted to their knowledge. Every thing that depends on moral institutions and the practice of society, should not be so early presented to their view; because they are not in a capacity to understand it. It is a folly to require them to apply themselves to things, merely because they are told in general terms, that such things are good for them, while they are ignorant in what that good consists: we may in vain assure them they will find their interest therein as they grow up; while they are uninterested by their present use, they are incapable of comprehending the future.

Let a child do nothing merely because he is bid; nothing is good for him which he cannot perceive to be so. In hurrying him on before
his

his knowledge, you think yourselves making use of forecast, and you only betray the want of it. In providing him with many implements he may never use, you deprive him of the most universal and useful of all others, that of good sense. You use him to permit himself to be always conducted, and to be only a machine in the hands of others. In requiring him to be docile and tractable when he is little, you prepare him to be a credulous dupe when he is grown up. You are for ever telling him, "All I desire of you, child, is for your own advantage, though you are as yet incapable of knowing it to be so. What is it to me whether you do what I require or not? It is for your own good only you should do it." With such fine speeches as these, intended to make him wise, you only pave the way for the success of those who may hereafter take him to some projector, alchymist, false prophet, or any kind of cheat, with a view to intrap him by some snare, or in order to make him adopt their own folly.

It is requisite men should be acquainted with many things, of which children cannot in the least comprehend the utility: but is it necessary, or even possible, that a child should learn every thing it is requisite a man should know? Endeavour to teach a child every thing that is useful to him at his age; and you will find him full employment. Why will you insist on his application to the studies proper for an age to which he may never arrive, in prejudice of those which are proper for him at present? But you will ask me, perhaps, whether he will have time to learn what he ought to know, when it is required

quired of him to make use of his knowledge? This I cannot tell; but I am very certain it is impossible to learn it sooner, for our real and only true instructors are experience and sentiment. Never can man be made truly sensible of what is useful to him but from the circumstances in which he is situated. A child knows he is designed to grow up to manhood; all the ideas he can form of that state will be to him so many opportunities of instruction: but, as for those which are above his capacity to comprehend, it is better he should remain in absolute ignorance of them. This whole treatise is calculated to illustrate this principle of education.

As soon as we are so far advanced as to give our pupil an idea of the word *useful*, we have attained a considerable influence over his future conduct; this term being very striking, provided the sense annexed to it be adapted to his years, and he see clearly its relation to his present welfare. Ordinary children are not affected by this term, because no care has been taken to affix to it an idea conformable to their understandings, and because others taking upon them to provide for them what is useful, they have no need to think of it themselves, and therefore remain ignorant of the meaning of utility.

What is the use of that? shall, for the future, be the determinate question between my pupil and me, on all occasions. On my part, I shall infallibly make use of it in answer to all his interrogatories; which may serve as a check to that multiplicity of silly, troublesome questions, with which children are incessantly teasing those about them, more for the sake of indulging them.

themselves in a kind of imperiouness, than out of a desire of information. The child who is taught, as the most important lesson, to know nothing but what is useful to him, will interrogate with the views of a Socrates: he will not put a question, without having an answer ready to that which he knows will be put to him before his own is resolved.

What a powerful instrument have I here put into your hands, for the conduct of your pupil! Knowing a reason for nothing, he is reduced to silence whenever you please; while, on the other hand, you can make use of every advantage your knowledge and experience give you, to demonstrate the utility of what you propose. For you must not mistake the end of this question; it is only to instruct him to question you in his turn; and you must expect, in whatever you propose to him afterwards, to have him reply by asking you, Of what use is this or that? in the terms of your proposal.

This will lay a snare, perhaps, which a governor will not easily avoid falling into. If on a child's asking this question, you only endeavour to divert the affair, by giving him an answer he cannot well comprehend, he will think that you reason on your own ideas, and not on his; and will believe what you call useful to be so to yourself only, and not to him: he will no longer place any confidence in you, and then all is over. But where is the preceptor who will stop short, and own his want of knowledge or mistakes to his pupil? It is the general way with tutors not to confess their real ignorance, whereas I make it mine to affect to be more ignorant than

than I am, when I cannot adapt the required information to his understanding. Hence, always apparently candid in my behaviour, he does not suspect my motives, and I gain more credit with him by affecting ignorance, than other preceptors would do by concealing theirs.

In the first place, you are to consider how seldom it is proper for you to propose what he is to learn; it is his place to desire to know, to seek for, to discover it: it is yours artfully to excite this desire, to place the object within his reach, and to furnish him with the means of attaining it. It follows hence, that your interrogations should be few, but select; and that, as he will have much more to do with you than you with him, you will be less exposed than he, and more often in the circumstances of saying to him, Of what use is it to you to know what you ask?

Add to this, that, as it is of little consequence whether he learns many things or not, provided he has a clear conception of what he does learn, and its use; whenever you have not a proper explanation of the thing required at hand, you may safely forbear to give him any at all. You may say to him without scruple, "I have no good reason to give you; I am somehow mistaken;" and leave it there. If your instruction was really improper, it is not amiss to give it up entirely; and, if not so, you will soon find occasion to make him sensible of its utility.

I do not at all admire explanatory discourses: young people give little attention to them, and never retain them in memory. The things themselves are the best explanations. I can never enough repeat it, that we make words of too
much

much consequence; with our prating modes of education, we make nothing but praters.

Let us suppose, that, while I am studying with my pupil the course of the sun, and the method of its returning to the east, he should stop me short, by asking me to what purpose is all this? what a florid discourse might I not make him, in answer to such a question? what a number of fine things might I not take occasion to expatiate on by the way, particularly if there were any witnesses to our conversation*? I might talk to him of the utility of travelling, the advantages of commerce, the produce peculiar to every climate; of the manners of different nations; of the use of the calendar, of the computations of the returning seasons for agriculture, of the art of navigation, and the manner of conducting a ship at sea. Politics, natural history, astronomy, and even morality itself, with the laws of nations, might all be introduced in the course of my harangue; with a view to give my pupil great ideas of the sciences, and to excite in him a desire to study them. When I had done, however, I should only have been exposing my own pedantry, without my pupil's having comprehended one single thing I had been talking about. He would have still a great mind to ask me, as before, to what end the sun returned to the east, but that he would be fearful

* I have often remarked, that the learned instructions usually given to pupils, have been calculated rather for the grown persons, in whose presence they were delivered, than for the puerile capacity of children. I am very certain, also, of the justice of this remark, as it is founded on my own repeated observation.

ful of offending. He would therefore find his account in pretending to understand what he was thus compelled to hear. This is the practice carried on in polite education. Our Emilius, however, brought up in greater rusticity, and so difficult of comprehension, will listen to nothing of all this. At the very first word he might not understand, he would turn away and play about the room, leaving me to finish my oration by myself. We must seek, therefore, some more obvious solution; this scientific method of explication being useless to him.

We were observing the position of the forest to the north of Montmorenci, when he interrupted me with this impertinent question, of "To what end is all this?" On which I answer, "You are in the right; we must think of this matter at leisure; and if we find this inquiry is useless, we will drop it, for we have no need of useless amusements." We then betake ourselves to some other employment, and talk no more of geography during the rest of the day.

I propose to him next morning a walk before breakfast: he likes nothing better; children in general are ever ready for running about, and mine is fit for exercise. We enter the forest, traverse the country, and rambling about till we are almost tired, we lose ourselves, and know not which way to return home. Our time is spent; the heat of the day increases; we begin to grow hungry, and wander about from one place to another, among copses, woods, and quarries, without meeting with any object we are acquainted with. At length, overheated, famished, and fatigued, we find ourselves only

more and more bewildered. We sit down, therefore, to rest ourselves and deliberate on what is to be done. Supposing Emilius to have been educated like another child, he does not deliberate about the matter, but sits down and begins to cry; ignorant that we are just by the gate of Montmorenci, which is concealed from us only by the trees of a narrow coppice: these trees, however, appear an impenetrable forest to him; such a little gentleman as he, lost in the bushes.

After some few minutes passed in silence, I say to him, with an air of disquietude, What shall we do, my dear Emilius, to get out of this forest?

EMILIUS, *all in a sweat, with the tears running down his cheeks.* I know not: I am so weary, so hungry, so dry, I know not what to do.

Rouffeau. Do you think that I am in a better situation than you; or that I should not cry too if I could breakfast upon tears? Our business is not to weep, but to look about us. Look at your watch; what is it o'clock?

Emil. It is noon, and I have not yet breakfasted.

Rouff. It is very true; it is noon, and I am fasting too.

Emil. You must then, surely, be very hungry?

Rouff. Yes; but the worst on it is, my dinner will not come here to find me. Let me see—it is noon; that is precisely the time at which we observed yesterday the situation of this forest from Montmorenci: if we could but observe in like manner the position of Montmorenci from this forest——

Emil.

Emil. True, but yesterday we saw the forest, and we cannot from hence see the town.

Rouff. That is our very misfortune.—If we could, by any means, but find its situation without seeing it——

Emil. O, my good friend! but how?

Rouff. Did not we observe that the forest lay——

Emil. To the north of Montmorenci.

Rouff. Montmorenci therefore should be——

Emil. To the south of the forest.

Rouff. We have a method to find out the north at noon.

Emil. We have so, by the direction of our shadow.

Rouff. But as for the south.

Emil. How shall we find that?

Rouff. The south is always opposite to the north.

Emil. That is true; we have only to take the direction contrary to our shadows: here, this must be to the south. Montmorenci must certainly lie on this side: let us go this way.

Rouff. You may possibly be in the right; here, let us take this path through the wood.

EMILIUS, *clapping his hands, and shouting for joy.*

Ah! I see Montmorenci directly before us. Come along, let us go to breakfast, to dinner, let us make haste: astronomy, I see, is good for something.

Observe, that if he does not actually make use of this latter expression, he will think so; it does not signify which, provided I do not teach it him. You may be assured, also, he never will forget this day's lesson as long as he lives; where-

as, had I only supposed this adventure in my chamber, all that I could have said on it would have been forgotten the next day. For this reason, we ought to inculcate all we possibly can by actions, and to say only what we cannot do.

The reader will not expect I can have so little opinion of his sagacity, as to give him an example in every kind of study: but which soever may occasionally relate to the point in question, I cannot too much exhort the preceptor to adapt his explication to the capacity of his pupil; for I repeat it once more, the evil lies not in what he is ignorant of, but in what he imagines he understands.

I remember, that one day endeavouring to give a child a taste for chemistry, after I had shewn him several metalline precipitations, I explained to him the method of making ink. I told him its blackness was occasioned only by the very fine particles of iron separated from the vitriol, and precipitated by an alkaline fluid. In the middle of my learned explication, the shrewd little querist stop me short with my question, which I had taught him, and which indeed not a little embarrassed me. After thinking a little, however, I took the following method to resolve it. I ordered a bottle of wine to be brought out of the cellar, and another of common ordinary wine to be fetched from the tavern. I then took a little phial full of a solution of fixed alkali; and, pouring out two glasses of wine, one out of each bottle, I thus prepared for the experiment *.

It

* A little preparation is necessary to every experiment exhibited to children, as it serves to render them attentive to what is doing.

It is customary, said I, for the venders of certain commodities to adulterate them in order to make them look better than they really are. These adulterations deceive both the eye and taste; but are in themselves hurtful, and make the adulterated commodity, notwithstanding its appearance, worse than before.

Liquors in particular, and wines more than any other, are subject to this adulteration; because the deception is not easily detected, and is very profitable to the vender. The adulteration of tart or sour wines is made with litharge, which is a preparation of lead. Lead united to an acid produces a sugar or sweet salt, which corrects the taste of sour wine, but is poisonous to those who drink it. It is requisite therefore, before we drink any wine suspected of adulteration, to know certainly whether there be litharge in it or not. Now, it is by this method of reasoning I am led to the means of discovering it.

I know that wine contains not only an inflammable spirit, as you have seen in the brandy distilled from it; but also an acid, as you may be convinced, by the tartar subsiding from it, and the vinegar into which it is converted.

The acid is attracted by metallic substances, and adheres to them in their solution, forming a compound salt; such, for example, as is the rust of iron, which is nothing more than the particles of the metal dissolved by the acid spirit contained in the air or in water: such also is verdigrease, which is only copper dissolved by vinegar.

At the same time this acid has a stronger attraction, however, to alkaline than to metalline

substances; in so much that, by the intervention of the former between the compound salts above mentioned, the acid is separated from the metal to which it was before united, and adheres to the alcali. Hence the metalline substance, detached from the acid which kept it in a state of solution, is precipitated, and makes the fluid black.

If then either of the wines before us be adulterated with litharge, its acid keeps it in a state of solution. So that if I pour this alkaline fluid into them, it will compel the acid to let go its hold of the metal, and adhere to itself; when the lead, being no longer kept floating, will again appear, trouble the wine, and at length be precipitated to the bottom of the glass.

On the contrary, if there be no lead nor mixture of other metal in the wine *, the alkali will unite itself quietly to the acid †, the whole will remain dissolved, and you will see no precipitation.

On this, I poured the alkaline solution successively into both glasses; the liquor in one of them remaining afterwards clear and transparent; that in the other became thick and troubled, and
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* The wines which are sold by retail by the wine-merchants at Paris, although they should not be purposely adulterated with litharge, are seldom without some lead in them: because their measures and other implements are usually made of lead; and the wine, in passing through them, always dissolves some part. It is strange so manifestly abusive and dangerous a practice should be suffered in a city so respectable for its police. It is true, people of fashion and substance, never drinking these retailed wines, are not so liable to be poisoned.

† The vegetable acid is very mild. If it were a mineral one, their union would not be effected without fermentation.

in less than an hour we could see clearly the lead precipitated to the bottom.

There, said I, you see one of these wines is pure and genuine, and the other adulterated and poisonous. This discovery we make by means of that kind of knowledge of which you require to know the utility. When we know how to make ink, we know how to detect adulterated wine.

I was myself very well satisfied with the explication and example I had given; I observed, however, that it did not strike the child. It required some time for me to discover it to be very idle, and that I had been all the while talking to no purpose. For, setting aside the impossibility that a boy of twelve years of age should follow the course of my argument, the utility of the experiment would never enter his head; because, tasting both wines, and finding both good, he had annexed no meaning to the term of *adulteration*, which I thought I had so clearly explained; the words *pernicious* and *poisonous* conveying no idea to his apprehension.

Those relations between cause and effect of which we cannot perceive the connection, that good and evil of which we have no idea, and the necessities we have never felt, have no influence on our understanding. We have as vague notions, at fifteen years of age, of the happiness attendant on wisdom, as, at thirty, of the celestial glories of the New Jerusalem. If we have no clear conceptions of the one or the other, we shall take but little trouble to obtain them; and, though our ideas were ever so precise on these subjects, we should take just as little,

tle, unless we felt some attachment to, or desire after them. It is easy to convince a child of the utility of whatever we have a mind to teach him; but it signifies little to convince him of this, unless you can persuade him also to pursue it. Reason in vain may induce us coldly to approve or blame; the passions only are the springs of action; and how can our passions be excited by objects or circumstances in which we do not perceive ourselves at all interested?

Never point out any thing to a child which is beyond his views. While he is a stranger to the relations and duties of humanity, as you cannot raise his comprehension to the state of manhood, you should bring down the state of manhood to a level with his capacity. In projecting what may be useful to him hereafter, speak to him directly only of what is apparently useful to him at present. Beware, also, in general, of making comparisons between your pupil and other children; let him have no rival, no competitor, not even in his corporeal exercises, as soon as he begins to reason. I had much rather he should not learn at all whatever must be taught him by means of vanity or jealousy. I would content myself, in this respect, with remarking his annual progress, and comparing his situation and exploits in the present year with those of the past. I would say to him, You are grown so much since such a time; here is the ditch you leaped, the weight you lifted, the distance you threw a stone, so far you run without fetching breath; let us see what you can do more at present. Thus would I excite him to emulation, without making him jealous

or

or envious of a rival : he would be desirous indeed to excel himself, and so he ought to be ; I see no inconvenience in this kind of emulation.

I hate books ; they only teach people to talk about what they do not understand. It is said that Hermes engraved the elements of the sciences on columns, to secure his discoveries from being lost in the time of a general deluge. Had he imprinted them on the minds of men, they had been better preserved by tradition. The organs of the memory, duly prepared, are the monuments on which human science would be most indelibly engraven.

Is there no expedient to be thought of, to collect the various instructions, scattered up and down in so many voluminous tomes ? to unite them under one general head, which may be easy to comprehend, interesting to pursue, and which may serve as a *stimulus* even to children of this age ? If one could but conceive a situation, in which all the natural wants of man would be displayed in a manner adapted to the understanding of a child, and wherein the means of satisfying those wants are gradually discovered with the same ease and simplicity, it would be in a just and lively description of such a state that we should first exercise his imagination.

I see the imagination of the philosopher already take fire. Impetuous genius ! give yourself no trouble ; such a situation is already discovered ; it is already described, and I may say, without any impeachment to your talents, much better than you could describe it yourself ; at least with more exactness and simplicity. Since we must have books, there is one already, which,

which, in my opinion, affords a complete treatise on natural education. This book shall be the first Emilius shall read. In this, indeed, will, for a long time, consist his whole library, and it will always hold a distinguished place among others. It will afford us the text, to which all our conversations on the objects of natural science will serve only as a comment. It will serve as our guide during our progress to a state of reason; and will even afterwards give us constant pleasure, unless our taste be totally vitiated. You ask impatiently, what is the title of this wonderful book? Is it Aristotle, Pliny, or Buffon? No. It is Robinson Crusoe.

Robinson Crusoe, cast ashore on a desolate island, destitute of human assistance, and of mechanical implements, providing, nevertheless, for his subsistence, for self-preservation, and even procuring for himself a kind of competency. In these circumstances, I say, there cannot be an object more interesting to persons of every age; and there are a thousand ways to render it agreeable to children. Thus, you see, I have realized that desert island, which I at first made use of only by way of comparison. Such a situation, I confess, is very different from that of man in a state of society. Very probably it will never be that of Emilius; but it is from such a state he ought to learn to estimate others. The most certain method for him to raise himself above vulgar prejudices, and to form his judgment on the actual relations of things, is to take on himself the character of such a solitary adventurer, and to judge of every thing about him, as a man in such circumstances would, by
its

its real utility. This romuace, beginning with his shipwreck on the island, and ending with the arrival of the vessel that brought him away, would, if cleared of its rubbish, afford Emilius, during the period we are now treating of, at once both instruction and amusement. I would have him indeed personate the hero of the tale, and be entirely taken up with his castle, his goats, and his plantations; he should make himself minutely acquainted, not from books, but circumstances, with every thing requisite for a man in such a situation. He should affect even his dress, wear a coat of skins, a great hat, a large hanger; in short, he should be entirely equipped in his grotesque manner, even with his umbrello, though he would have no occasion for it. I would have him, when at a loss about the measures necessary to be taken for his provision or security upon this or the other occasion, examine the conduct of his hero; he should see if he omitted nothing, or if any thing better could be substituted in the room of what was actually done; and, on the discovery of any mistake in Robinson, should amend it in a familiar case himself: for I doubt not but he will form a project of going to make a like settlement. Not unlike to this were those ancient castles in Spain, in that happy age, when the height of human felicity consisted in the enjoyment of liberty and the necessaries of life.

What opportunities of instruction would such an amusement afford an able preceptor, who should project it only with a view to that end? The pupil, eager to furnish a magazine for his island, would be more ready to learn than his
tutor

tutor to teach him. He would be solicitous to know every thing that is useful, and nothing else: you would in such a case have no more occasion to direct, but only to restrain him. Let us hasten, therefore, to establish him in this imaginary isle, since to this he confines his present happiness: for the time will now soon come, in which, if he is desirous of life, it is not to live alone; and in which even a man *Friday*, the want of whom does not now affect him, would not be long satisfactory.

The practice of simple manual arts, to the exercise of which the abilities of the individual are equal, leads to the invention of the arts of industry, the exercise of which requires the concurrence of many. The former may be practised by hermits and savages; but the latter can be exercised only in a state of society, and render that state necessary. While man is subject only to the calls of physical necessity, he is capable of satisfying them himself; but, by the introduction of superfluous wants, the joint concern and distribution of labour become indispensable: for though a man by his own labour, when alone, procures only subsistence for an individual; yet an hundred men working in concert, will easily procure, in the same time, subsistence for double the number. As soon, therefore, as one part of mankind take upon themselves to live idle, it becomes necessary that the concurrent labour of numbers should supply the place of those who live without work.

Your greatest care should be, to keep from your pupil the notions of those social relations which he is not in a capacity to comprehend;
but

but when the connection of his ideas obliges you to speak of the mutual dependence of mankind, instead of presenting him at first the moral side of the question, divert his attention as much as possible to industry and the mechanic arts, which render men useful to one another. In going about with him to the workshops of various artificers, never let him see any thing performed without lending a hand to the work, nor come out of the shop without perfectly understanding the reason of what he observes there. To this end you should work yourself, and in every thing set him an example. To make him a master, be you in every thing the apprentice; and reflect that he will learn more by one hour of manual labour, than he will retain from a whole day's verbal instructions.

The different arts are entitled to various proportions of public esteem, and that in an inverse ratio to their real use. This esteem is directly as their inutility, and so it politically ought to be. The most useful arts are those which are the worst paid for, or least rewarded; because the number of workmen is proportioned to the wants of the whole society, and the labour the poor must purchase must necessarily be at a low price. On the contrary, those important artificers, who, by way of distinction, are termed artists, and are employed only in the service of the rich and idle, set an arbitrary price on their workmanship; and as the excellence of their baubles is mere matter of opinion, their high price constitutes great part of their merit, and they are esteemed in proportion to what they cost. The value thus set upon them is not on

account of any use they are of to the rich, but because they are too costly to be purchased by the poor. *Nolo habere bona nisi quibus populus inviderit* *.

What will become of your pupils, if you permit them to adopt this ridiculous prejudice, if you encourage it yourself, or see them, for example, enter with more respect the shop of a jeweller than that of a locksmith? What a judgement will they form of the real merit of the arts, and the intrinsic value of things, when they see whim and caprice universally opposed to real utility, and find the more a thing costs, the less it is worth? If ever such ideas as these take root in their minds, you may as well give up at once the remaining part of their education; they will, in spite of all you can do, be educated like the rest of the world, and you will have taken, for fourteen years past, all your trouble for nothing.

Emilius will see things in a very different light, while he is employed in furnishing his island. Robinson Crusoe would have set a greater value on the stock in trade of a petty ironmonger, than on that of the most magnificent and best furnished toy-shop in Europe. The first had appeared to him a respectable personage, while the owner of the latter had been despised as frivolous and contemptible.

I doubt not but some sagacious member of society will make the following objection. "My son," he will say, "is formed to live in the world; not to reside among a set of philosophers, but to herd with fools; it is proper, therefore,

* Petron.

“ therefore, he should be acquainted with those
 “ follies that influence their conduct. The
 “ knowledge of things, as they are, may be
 “ useful; but that of men and opinions is much
 “ more so; for, in society, the knowledge of
 “ mankind is the best means to make the most
 “ of them, and he is the wisest man who ac-
 “ quires the most, and makes the best use of it.
 “ To what purpose, then, is it to give children
 “ the ideas of an imaginary order of things di-
 “ rectly contrary to that which custom has e-
 “ stablished, and by which they must regulate
 “ their behaviour? read them first lectures to
 “ make themselves wise, and then you may take
 “ what method you will to instruct them in
 “ what respect others are fools.”

Such are the specious maxims, on which is
 founded the false prudence of parents, who en-
 deavour to make their children slaves to those
 prejudices in which they themselves are educa-
 ted. How many things are necessary to be
 known, previous to the study of mankind! this
 is the last and most arduous task of the philoso-
 pher, and you would have it be the first of a child.
 Before you instruct him in the knowledge of
 your own sentiments, you should begin by teach-
 ing him to form some estimate of their truth and
 propriety. Our opinions are imparted to children
 as reasons; is this the way to teach them the
 folly of them? in order to attain wisdom, it is
 necessary to be able to discern what is not so.
 How shall your child know how to study man-
 kind, if he is incapable to judge of their senti-
 ments, or to detect their errors? It is a misfor-
 tune for him to know their opinions, while he

is ignorant whether they be true or false. Teach him first, therefore, what things are in themselves; and you may afterwards instruct him at leisure, what are the general sentiments of mankind. Thus will he be enabled to judge of our opinions by the criterion of truth, and soar above the mistaken notions of the vulgar. To adopt prejudices is not to know them as such, nor are the multitude governed by those who are like themselves. If you begin by making your pupil acquainted with the opinions of the world, before you have taught him how to judge of them, you may assure yourself, say what you will, they will become his, and you will never after be able to eradicate them. I conclude this subject, therefore, by laying down as a maxim, that to render a youth sensible and judicious, we ought to form his opinion of things, and not to dictate ours.

You will observe that hitherto I have said nothing to my pupil about mankind; he would have had too much good sense to understand me, if I had: his connections with, and relations to his fellow-creatures, are not as yet striking and conspicuous enough to enable him to judge of others by himself. He has no ideas of human nature but what centre in his own person, and even his self-knowledge is but very confined. If his ideas, however, are contracted, at least they are just. He knows not the relative situation of others; but he is sensible of his own, and keeps his place. Instead of restraining him by social ties, the force of which he could not comprehend, we have bound him by the obvious chains of necessity. He is as yet
little

little better than a mere physical being; let us continue to treat him as such.

He forms his judgment, and estimates the value of the works both of nature and art, by their relation to his own convenience, security, and preservation. Hence he looks upon iron as a more precious metal than gold, and glass to be more valuable than diamonds. For the same reason he hath more respect for a shoemaker, or a mason, than for all the celebrated jewellers in Europe. A pastry-cook is, in his opinion, a person of singular importance, and the whole academy of sciences of less consequence than the respectable personage of the meanest confectioner. Goldsmiths, engravers, and gilders, are, with him, idle insignificant people, who amuse themselves in employments frivolous and useless; nay, he does not hold a watchmaker in very high estimation. Happy in the enjoyment of this native liberty, he profits by time without knowing its value. That tranquillity, which, undisturbed by the violence of passion, makes its succession equal, serves him instead of a machine to measure the quantity elapsed *. In supposing his pocket to be furnished with a watch, as in supposing him to cry, I only made use on that occasion of an Emilius vulgarly educated, for the sake of illustration: for, in fact, a child so different from all others, can hardly be made use of as an example in any case.

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* We lose our constitutional measure of time, when the passions would subject its duration to their will. The philosopher's time-piece is evenness of temper and tranquillity of mind; he is always in his own time, and knows it exactly.

There is another order of distinction, not less natural, and still more judicious, according to which the arts may be ranked agreeable to their order in that necessary chain which connects them together; placing the most independent in the first class, and those which depend on the greatest number of others in the last. This method of arrangement, which may furnish important considerations to the order of society in general, is similar to the former, in that it is equally subject to be perverted by the prepossessions and caprices of mankind. Hence it is, that all manufactured substances are first laboriously operated on by workmen below consideration, and almost without pay; that the more hands they pass through, the more expensive becomes the labour, and the more creditable the profession of each successive artisan. I will not here inquire whether it be true, that industry is more exerted in the elegant arts, than in those which give the first form to the massive substance, and fit it for common uses: but I affirm, that, in all cases, those arts which are the most general and indispensable, are incontestably those which deserve to be held in the greatest esteem; and that such as require the least assistance from others, deserve still less to be degraded lowest of all, when they are at the same time the most free and independent. These rules form the true criterion whereby to judge of the merit and estimate the value of arts and industry. All other are arbitrary and capricious. The first and most respectable of all arts and professions is that of agriculture: next to the husbandman, I rank the smith; to the smith succeeds the carpenter, and

and so on. A child, who should not have acquired a misjudging partiality from vulgar prejudices, would rank them also precisely in the same order. How many important reflections on this subject may not Emilius deduce from Robinson Crusoe! What will he think in seeing the arts carried to perfection, by being divided and subdivided into such a number of branches, and by the invention of such an infinite variety of implements to work with? will he not call their ingenuity ridiculous, and think they are afraid their arms and fingers are not fit for use, that they have contrived so many expedients to work without them? To exercise one trade, they must be furnished with tools by a thousand others: the artificers of a whole town must be employed to set any one of them to work. As to my companion and myself, our ingenuity lies in our dexterity; we make use of the tools we carry about us. Let the proudest workman belonging to the nicknackitories of Paris come to our desert island, his talents useless here, he will be glad in his turn to serve an apprenticeship to us.

Confine not your observation here, reader, to the corporeal exercise and manual dexterity of my pupil; but consider the proper methods we take to gratify his childish curiosity, remark the effects of his good sense, his genius for invention, his foresight, and other intellectual abilities. In whatever he sees, or is employed in, he wants to know the reason of every thing; tracing back one instrument from another, till he arrive at the first and most simple. He takes nothing upon supposition or on trust; but refuses

ses even to learn any thing that requires a previous knowledge of which he is not possessed. If he sees, for instance, a file, or a spring, he immediately recurs to the method of working up the materials from the ore. If he sees the sides of a chest fitted together, he must know the methods of felling the timber and sawing it into planks. If he be himself at work, he never fails to reflect on every new tool he makes use of, and to consider how he might have constructed such an implement, or have made shift without it.

There is an error, however, difficult to avoid, in employing your pupil in these mechanical operations; and that is, you will always suppose him to have a taste for those you are fond of yourself: but you must beware, that while you are seeking your own amusement, you do not fatigue and disgust your pupil, who perhaps will not let you perceive it. Your little artisan should find in himself every thing needful to execute his designs, but he should find in you every thing needful to direct him in those designs. You should observe him, and watch his motions continually, without his knowing it; you should anticipate his thoughts, and prevent those which are improper; in short, you should keep him so employed, that he should not only be sensible of the use of his own talents, but that he should take delight in his employment, from a like sense of its utility.

The intercourse of the arts consists in the reciprocal exchange of industry, that of commerce in the exchange of commodities, and that of money in the exchange of bills and cash: all these

these are intimately connected with each other, and we have already acquired ideas of the principles on which they are founded, from our dispute with Robert the gardener. At present we have nothing more to do than to generalise those ideas, and to extend them to a variety of examples, in order to give to Emilius a just notion of the nature of commercial connections; which may be exemplified by the natural history of the produce peculiar to different climates, by enumerating the arts and sciences which relate to navigation, and representing the various obstacles that are surmounted in transporting commodities from one country to another. No society can exist without making use of the expedients of exchange, nor can any exchange be carried on without some common standard: this also must be formed on some principle of equality. Hence every society has, for its first law, some conventional equality, both of persons and of property.

The conventional equality between persons is very different from the natural, and therefore requires the protection of government and laws. The political knowledge of a child should be very clear and confined: he ought to have no other idea of government in general, than what relates to the notion concerning the right of property which he hath already imbibed.

The conventional equality, between articles of property, gave rise to the invention of money; which serves as the means of comparing the value of the different species of such articles; and in this sense money may be denominated the real bond of society. Every thing, however,

ver, may be converted into money. Formerly cattle were made use of as such; so at present, in some countries, are shells, teeth, &c. The money of Sparta was iron, that of Sweden has been made of leather, as ours is now of gold and silver.

Metals, as the most easily transported, are generally made choice of to form this mean term in our usual course of exchange. To facilitate this end, by sparing the trouble of recurring to weights and measures, they are converted into regular coin. For the stamp imprinted thereon is no more than an attestation, that the piece so marked is of such a certain weight; the sovereign only having a right to coin money, so long as he is possessed of a right to require his attestation to pass unquestioned through a whole people, or so long as he reserves to himself such exclusive privilege.

The use of this invention, thus explained, will be readily perceived by a child of the dullest apprehension. It is, indeed, difficult to make a direct comparison between commodities of different kinds; as for example, between cloth and grain: but when a standard common to both, such as money, is established, it is easy for the manufacturer and husbandman to apply the value of their respective articles thereto, and to judge what quantity of each is equivalent to the other. For if so many yards of broad-cloth be worth a certain sum of money, and so many bushels of wheat be worth the like sum, the draper, in taking the wheat for his cloth, makes a fair and equitable exchange. Thus it is, that, through the medium of money, the produce

produce and manufactures of different kinds and countries may be estimated and compared with each other.

Go no farther than this, nor enter into any disquisition concerning the moral effects of this institution. It is of consequence, in every case, to bring your pupil acquainted with the nature and end of every custom before you point out its abuse. If you attempt to explain to children in what manner signs are substituted for things, that money hath been productive of the numerous chimeras of prejudice and caprice, and that countries abounding in silver and gold must be proportionably destitute of real wealth; in doing this, I say, you treat them, not only as if they were professed philosophers, but also as men of experience; and attempt to give them exceptions of what even few philosophers have clearly understood.

To what a variety of interesting subjects may we not, by these means, direct the curiosity of our pupil, without ever quitting those real and sensible relations which are contained within the sphere of his knowledge, or exciting in his mind one idea beyond the reach of his capacity. A judicious preceptor will not dwell, with heavy prolixity, on frivolous subjects; but be constantly preparing his pupil for the knowledge of those important relations, which will one day be necessary for him, in order to his forming a right judgment of the good or evil customs of society. He will endeavour to adapt his conversation and amusements to the turn of mind he has given him. A question that would scarce excite the
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attention of another child, will perplex Emilius for six months together.

I take an opportunity, we will suppose, to carry him to dinner at the house of some opulent family; where when we arrive, we find great preparations making for an elegant entertainment, much company, a number of servants, a variety of dishes, and a superb side-board of plate. There is something intoxicating, to those who are unaccustomed to it, in this appearance of splendour and festivity. I foresee the effect it will have on my pupil; and therefore, in the midst of the hurry and clamour that prevail round the table, I whisper in his ear, and ask him, how many hands he thinks were employed in furnishing the entertainment before us. What a croud of ideas will those few words bring thronging into his mind! In an instant his delirium vanishes. He muses, reflects, begins to calculate, and puzzles himself with thinking. While grave philosophers, inspired by the wine, or perhaps by the charms of the ladies, degrade themselves by talking idly, and, in the gaiety of their hearts, behave like children, Emilius sits philosophising by himself at one corner of the table; he applies to me with an interrogation, which I refuse to answer, deferring it to another opportunity. At this he grows uneasy, he cannot eat a morsel, nor drink a drop more; but burns with impatience to get away from table, in order to converse with me more freely. What an object this for his curiosity to work upon! what a text, pregnant with instruction! With a sound judgment, unbiassed by prepossession and untainted with prejudice,

judice, what ideas must he form of luxury, when he comes to find that all the countries in the world have been laid under contribution, that twenty millions of hands have been for a long time employed, that thousands of men, perhaps, have lost their lives, and all this to present him, in such public pomp at noon, what he may privately disburden himself of before night?

Be very attentive to those conclusions which the heart of a child will deduce in secret from all his observations. If you have taken less pains with yours than I have prescribed, he may be tempted, in such a case as the above, to give his reflections quite a different turn, and look upon himself as a person of very great importance in the world, in seeing so much pains taken to provide for his dinner. If you foresee this sentiment, you may easily prevent it, or at least presently efface the impression it makes on him. Being as yet ignorant of the means of appropriating any thing to himself, except by actual possession and enjoyment, he cannot judge of their convenience or inconvenience to him, but by the pleasure they afford him. Now the simple comparison, between such a splendid and formal repast, and a plain and homely dinner provided by his own labour, and seasoned by appetite, liberty, and ease, is sufficient to make him sensible that all that magnificent appearance of festivity had been of no real use; and that, his hunger being as fully satisfied at the table of the peasant as at that of a lord, he enjoys nothing at the one more than at the other, which he can truly call his own.

Let us imagine what a polite governor would say to a child on such an occasion. Recollect the circumstances, he would say, of each repast, and determine within yourself which afforded you the greatest pleasure. At which have you demonstrated the greatest expressions of joy? At which have you shewn the keenest appetite, drank the most cheerfully, and laughed the most heartily? Which lasted the longest without making you weary, or kept you longest from being again hungry? Yet, see the difference: this brown bread, which you relish so well, comes from the corn, sown and reaped by the peasant; this thick wine, so refreshing and wholesome, is produced from his own vine; his table-cloth is made of his own flax, spun in the winter by his wife and children: no other hands than those of the family have been employed in providing for his table; the nearest mill and the next market-town are to him the extremities of his universe. What then have you really enjoyed of all that profusion, with which the most distant parts of the earth, and the complicated industry of man, so splendidly furnishes the table at which you lately dined? If that splendor did not add to the satisfaction of your repast, what did you gain by all that superfluity? What did you find there made for you? Had you even been the master of the house, might he add, the magnificence would be still less, with any propriety, to be called yours: for your solicitude to display the wealth and plenty you enjoyed, to others, would absolutely deprive you of such enjoyment: you only would have all the trouble, and your guests the pleasure.

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This discourse may be very fine, but it would be of no use to Emilius, being above his comprehension, and, moreover, to dictate his reflections is not our custom. Speak to him, therefore, in a more simple manner. Having made both the above experiments, say to him some fine morning, Where shall we dine to-day? round that mountain of plate which covered three fourths of the table, and the dessert of artificial flowers and looking-glasses? among those women with their great hoop-petticoats, who treated you like a puppet, and wanted to make you talk what you did not understand? or shall we rather go to the village two leagues off, where the good people received us so joyfully, and gave us such excellent cream? Emilius will not hesitate a moment to determine; for he is neither given to babbling, nor puffed up by vanity; besides this, he hates restraint, and has no relish for high-seasoned ragouts; but he is always ready to run about the fields, and loves fine fruit, fresh vegetables, good cream, and good people *. There is no doubt, but the re-

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* The taste which I suppose my pupil to have for the country, is the natural effect of his education. Having, besides, nothing of that foppish and affected air, which is so taking with the women, he is less caressed than other children, and of course is less pleased with, and less spoiled by, being in their company, the charms of which he is at present incapable to perceive. I have taken care, in particular, not to learn him to kiss the hand; to repeat their ceremonious nonsense; or shew them, in preference to the other sex, even the respect which is their due. I lay it down as an inviolable rule, to require nothing of him, of which he is not in a capacity to comprehend the reason: now, no good reason can be given, why a child should treat one sex with more respect than another.

fection you want to inculcate, will suggest itself, during your excursion; and that our pupil will observe, that the people who furnish out such grand entertainments, throw away their labour, or that they are quite ignorant of our enjoyments.

The examples which I introduce by way of illustration, though proper for one subject, may be improper for a thousand others. If the reader enters into the spirit of them, however, he will see they may be varied as occasion requires; their application depending on the genius and disposition of the pupil; a knowledge of which is acquired by the opportunities given them to display themselves. It cannot be expected, that, in the space of three or four years, we should give a child, even of the most happy turn and disposition, such an idea of the arts and sciences as is sufficient to enable him to study them without farther assistance. In thus bringing him acquainted, however, with the various objects requisite for him to know, we put him in a situation to display his genius and taste by degrees, to make the first advances to the proper objects, and to indicate the route which must be taken to second the designs of nature.

Another advantage arising from our thus giving him a just, but limited, series of ideas, is that of shewing him their proper relations and connection, of placing every thing in a due order in his estimation, and of preventing the rise of those prepossessions which most men entertain in favour of the talents they cultivate, and to the prejudice of such as they have neglected. He who perceives the order of the whole, sees the due

due place of every part ; and though a man who knows only a part, if intimately acquainted with it, may be stiled a man of knowledge, the other only is the man of judgment ; and it is to be remembered that the great object in view, in our method of education, is judgment, and not science.

However this be, my method is independent of the examples I make use of to illustrate it. It is founded on the progress of the human faculties at different periods, and on the choice of those proper objects on which such faculties should be employed. I conceive it will be very easy to find another method which will promise better ; but, if it be less adapted to our species, age, and sex, I doubt much if it will be attended with the same success.

In the commencement of this second period of childhood, we took the advantage of our abilities exceeding our wants, to extend our views beyond our own persons : we soared into the expanse of the heavens, took measure of the earth, deduced the laws of nature ; in a word, we have explored our whole island : let us now, therefore, return home to our more immediate habitation ; happy to find at our entrance, that no enemy hath taken possession, or threatens to wrest it from us by force !

What remains for us to do after observing every thing that surrounds us ? To make use of every thing we can appropriate, and to employ our curiosity to our advantage. Hitherto we have made a provision of tools and implements of every kind, without knowing to what uses we shall have occasion to put them. Perhaps, use-

less to ourselves, they might yet be of service to others; and perhaps we, in our turn, may have need of theirs: hence we should all find our account in making an exchange. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to learn our reciprocal wants; every one should know what the other possesses that might be of use to himself, and what he might be willing to accept in return. Let us suppose, for instance, ten men, each of whom stands in need of ten different things. If they go about separately to supply their wants, each must apply himself to ten different kinds of occupation; but, on account of their different turn and genius, some will succeed better at one occupation, and others at another: thus, though collectively they might succeed equally in all; yet, each attempting it separately, they are every one but ill served. Let us form a little society, therefore, of these ten individuals, and let each apply himself solely to that kind of occupation at which he is most expert; by this expedient each will profit as much by the talents of the rest as if he had possessed them all. By continued application, also, to one kind of employment, they would all acquire additional dexterity; and thus would not only be completely provided for themselves, but soon acquire a superfluity for the use of others. This is the apparent principle on which are founded our various mechanical and other institutions. It is not my business to examine here into the consequences: I have already done it in another treatise.

On this principle, a man who should be desirous to consider himself as a solitary and independent

pendent being, could not fail of being miserable. It would be even impossible for him to subsist; for, finding the earth already occupied and divided into *meum* and *tuum*, and having no implements or property, by what means would he provide himself with the necessaries of life? In departing ourselves from a state of nature, we oblige all our fellow-creatures to do the like; no one can remain therein, in spite of the rest; and it would be to act most preposterously against nature, to be obstinately tenacious of a situation in which it is impossible we should exist; for the first law of nature is that of self-preservation. Thus may we form, by degrees, in the mind of a child, ideas of social relations, even before he really becomes an active member of society. Emilius sees already, that, to acquire implements for his own use, he must possess some for the use of others, which he may exchange for those he stands in need of: thus I lead him easily to perceive the necessity of this commercial intercourse, and prepare him, when occasion offers, to turn it to his advantage.

Sir, I must live, was the saying of a wretched libeller to a minister of state who reproached him with the infamy of his profession. *I cannot see the necessity of it*, replied the minister very coldly. This reply, excellent as it was from a secretary of state, had been unjust and inhumane from any other person. Every man must live. This argument, which every one thinks more or less cogent in proportion to his humanity, appears to me unanswerable with respect to the person who urges it. Of all natural antipathies, our aversion to die is the strongest;

strongest; it follows, therefore, that necessity has no law, and that nature authorises a man who hath no other possible means of living, to take any step for his preservation. The principles on which a virtuous man acquires a contempt for life, and learns to sacrifice his existence to his duty, are very different from this primitive simplicity. Happy people, among whom goodness requires no self-denial, and men may be just without virtue! If there be so miserable a state in the world, as that wherein men cannot subsist without injustice, and whose citizens must of necessity be knaves, it is not their criminals who ought to be hanged, but those who made them such.

As soon as Emilius knows what life is, my first care shall be to teach him to preserve it. Hitherto I have made no distinction of situation, rank, or fortune, nor shall I distinguish them otherwise in the sequel; for man is the same in every rank and situation. The rich have not better appetites than the poor, nor quicker digestion: the master has not longer arms or stronger than his servant: a great man is no taller than the meanest artisan; in a word, our natural wants being the same in every situation of life, the means of providing for them ought to be in all the same. Adapt the education of a man to his personal, and not accidental abilities. Do not you see, that, by bringing him up only to fill one station in life, you make him unfit for every other? and that mere accident may render all the pains you have taken useless, or destructive to him? Is there a more ridiculous being on earth than a lord become a beggar,
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and retaining in his misery the prejudices attached to his birth? What is more vile and contemptible than a rich man become poor, sensible of the disgrace of poverty, and reduced to the lowest of the human species? The one hath no other resource than to turn common cheat, and the other servilely to put on a livery, with this fine phrase in their mouths, *We must live.*

You make a dependence on the actual order of society, without thinking that order subject to unavoidable revolutions, and that it is impossible to foresee or prevent that which may affect your children. The high may be reduced low, and the rich may become poor, and even the monarch dwindle into a subject. Are these changes of fortune so unfrequent, that you can flatter yourself that your pupil will be exempt from them? We certainly are approaching the crisis of human establishments, the age of political revolutions *. Who can assure you what will be your lot? All that men have made, they may destroy. There are no characters indelible but those imprinted by nature; and nature never made man royal, noble, or rich. What then will become of the pupil you have educated to live only with splendor, when debased into indigence and meanness? What will become of a farmer of the revenues, whose soul delights in
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* I hold it impossible, that the great monarchies of Europe can subsist much longer; they all affect magnificence and splendor. Every state that doth this, is upon its decline. I could give very particular and cogent reasons for this assertion; but it may not be proper; and indeed they are but too obvious.

nothing but wealth, when he is reduced to want and beggary? How miserable must be the situation of that pampered helpless being, who, destitute of every thing, is incapable of providing in the least for himself, and places all his satisfaction in things dependent on others? Happy is he who knows how to quit a rank that is quitting him, and to remain still a man in spite of fortune. Let others lavish what encomiums they please on the frantic behaviour of the vanquished monarch, who wanted to bury himself alive in the ruins of his throne; for my part, I hold him in contempt. It appears to me, that his existence depended on his crown; and that, had he not been a king, he would have been nothing at all. But the monarch who can throw aside the robes of royalty and be still himself, is, in my opinion, infinitely superior to a crown. From the rank of a king, which may be filled up by a coward, a knave, or a fool, he rises to that of a man, which so few are able to fill with decency and dignity. Such a man may brave the vicissitudes of fortune, and will triumph over them. He owes nothing to any one but himself; and though destitute of all adventitious substance, is not therefore annihilated; he is still something. Yes, I prefer infinitely the character of a king of Syracuse turned school-master at Cofinth, of a king of Macedon become a notary at Rome, to that of an unhappy Tarquin ignorant how to subsist without a kingdom; of an heir to a race of kings, become the sport of all who are brutal enough to exult in his misery, wandering from court to court in search of relief, and meeting on every side with
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nothing but mockery, insult, and affronts; and all for want of knowing how to exercise any employment different from that to which he has been educated, and which is no longer in his power.

Whether we consider ourselves as men or citizens, or whatever be our station in life, we can contribute nothing more than our own personal abilities to society; all our other acquisitions belong to it, in spite of ourselves: hence, when a man becomes rich, he must either not enjoy his wealth himself, or the public will enjoy it also. In the first case, he only robs others of what he also deprives himself; and even in the last he gives them nothing. Thus the debt he owes society remains undischarged so long as he pays it only with the use of his property. But, you will say, perhaps my progenitor, in amassing his wealth, was of public service. He might be so; and therefore may have discharged his own debt, but not yours. Nay, you lie under still greater obligations than if you had been born poor, as you have had greater opportunities of profiting by education. It is not equitable, that what one man hath done for the public should discharge another of what it has a right to expect from him: for every one, standing indebted, in himself, to society, cannot substitute any thing in the room of his personal service. A father cannot transmit to his son the right of being useless to his fellow-creatures; and yet, according to your notions, he actually does this, by transmitting to him his wealth, the proof and reward of his labour. The man who earns not his subsistence, but eats
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the bread of idleness, is no better than a thief; and a pensioner, who is paid by the state for doing nothing, differs little, according to my notion of things, from a robber who is supported by the plunder he makes on the highway. Man, in a state of solitude, not being indebted to the assistance or good offices of others, hath a right to live as he pleases: but in a state of society, where he must be necessarily maintained at the expence of the community, he certainly owes the state so much labour as will pay for his subsistence; and this without exception to rank or persons. To labour, then, is the indispensable duty of social or political man. Rich or poor, strong or weak, every idle citizen is a knave.

Now, of all the occupations which serve to furnish subsistence to mankind, those which approach nearest to a state of nature are the manual arts: of all conditions of life, the most independent of fortune or the caprices of mankind, is that of the artisan. The artisan depends only on his own labour; he is as free as the husbandman is a slave; for the latter depends on the produce of his fields, which lies at the discretion of others. The enemy, the sovereign, a powerful neighbour, a law-suit, may run away with the crop which he hath laboriously toiled for; he may be distressed a thousand ways by means of the local stability of his property; whereas, if an artisan be oppressed in one place, his baggage is easily packed up, he folds his arms about him, and disdainfully marches off to another. Agriculture is, nevertheless, the principal profession of mankind; it is the most honest, the most useful, and of course the most credit-
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able in the world. I have no need to bid Emilius apply himself to agriculture: it is already his study: every kind of rustic employment is familiar to him. His first application was to the labours of the husbandman, and it is in those he regularly exercises himself. I say to him, therefore, cultivate the land thou inheritest from thy fathers. But it may be said, suppose this were to be lost, or that a child had no paternal inheritance, what must he do then? Learn a trade.

My child learn a trade! make my son a mechanic! consider, Sir, what you advise.—I do, Madam, I consider this matter better than you, who would reduce your child to the necessity of being a lord, a marquis, or a prince, or perhaps one day or other to be less than nothing. I am desirous of investing him with a title that cannot be taken from him, that will in all times and places command respect; and, I can tell you, whatever you may think of it, he will have fewer equals in this rank than in that he may derive from you.

The letter destroys, and the spirit maketh alive. I would not have him learn a trade, merely for the sake of knowing how to exercise it, but that he may overcome the prejudices usually conceived against it. You will never be reduced, you say, to work for your bread. So much the worse for you; I say, so much the worse. But, no matter; if you labour not through necessity, do it for reputation. Stoop to the situation of an artisan, that you may raise yourself above your own. To make fortune subservient to your will, you must begin by rendering your-

self independent. To triumph in the opinion of the world, you must begin by despising that opinion.

Remember, I do not advise you to acquire a talent, but a trade; a mechanical art, in the exercise of which the hands are more employed than the head; an art by which you will never get a fortune, but may be enabled to live without one. I have often observed, and that in families far enough removed from all appearance of wanting bread, a provident father very anxious to furnish his children with various kinds of knowledge, that at all events they might be capacitated to earn a subsistence. In doing this, also, such parents conceived they did a great deal in the way of making provision for their offspring, in case of the worst accidents. In this, however, they did nothing; because the resources, with which they thus provided their children, depend on the same good fortune of which they wanted to render them independent. So that a man possessed of the finest talents, unless he find himself in favourable circumstances to display them, is as liable to perish for want as he that hath none.

Ever since the intrigues of party have been in fashion, it requires as much art and assiduity to live genteely by a liberal profession, as to regain the estate you may have lost. If you have cultivated those arts whose success depends on the reputation of the artist; if you have fitted yourself for such employments as are in the gift of the great; of what use to you will be all your acquirements, when, disgusted with the world, you disdain to make use of those means, with-

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out which it is impossible you should succeed? Let us suppose you may have studied politics, and made yourself perfectly acquainted with the interests of princes; all this is very well: But what will you do with your knowledge, if you know not how to get access to ministers of state, have no patroness in a woman of quality, no interest with the commissioners of the several departments of the finances; if you have not the art of making yourself agreeable to them, or the baseness to do all the dirty business in which they might find you employment? But you are an architect or painter, we will say. It is very well; they are noble arts: but you must make your abilities known to the public. Do you think to carry your point merely by exposing your designs at an exhibition? No, no, this will not do. You must be previously admitted into the academy; you must be honoured by the protection of the great: you must throw aside your pencil and rule, take coach, and drive about from house to house, to make interest for reputation in your profession; at the same time you are to observe, that the houses you are to visit, have all Swifts or other porters, who understand nothing but facts, and have the gift of hearing only in their hands. Are you desirous of teaching any of the arts and sciences you have learned; to become a teacher of geography, of the mathematics, of languages, of music, or design? To do this, you must find scholars, and of course advocates and puffers. It is of more consequence to be acquainted with the arts of quackery and imposition, than to excel in your profession; and you may depend on it, if you know nothing but

what you profess, you will ever be treated as a blockhead.

Thus you see how unserviceable will be all those fine accomplishments on which you depend, and how much you stand in need of others to profit by these. What then must become of you in this humiliating state of depression? The rebuffs you meet with will debase without instructing you; subject more than ever to the caprice of public prejudice, how will you raise yourself above it, when it is become the arbiter of your fortune? How will you be able to despise that meanness and vice which are necessary to your subsistence? You will depend on the encouragement of wealth, and would soon become dependent on the persons of the rich; you would only have added mortification to servility, and loaded yourself with misery. Thus would you behold yourself poor, without being free; the most wretched and contemptible state into which it is possible to fall.

But if, instead of returning to these sublime professions, which are rather calculated to nourish the mind than the body, you apply yourself, when occasion requires, to the use of your hands, all these difficulties will disappear; the arts of servility are needless; your resources are at hand the moment you want to profit by them: probity and honour are no obstacles to your subsistence; you have no need to fear or flatter the great, to creep or cringe to knaves, to be complaisant to the world, or to be either a borrower or a thief, which is much the same thing when a man sees no prospect of paying what he borrows. The opinion of others will not affect you;

you; you will be under no necessity of paying your court to any one; you will have no ideot to humour, or Swifs to soothe; no courtezán to bribe, nor, what is worse, to flatter. Let knaves jostle each other, and thrust themselves into preferment; it is nothing to you; this will not hinder you, in your obscure situation, from being an honest man, or gaining a livelihood. You have only to go into the first shop of the trade you have learned, and desire employment, and it will be readily given you. Before noon you will have earned your dinner; and, if you are sober and industrious, before the week is out you will have earned enough to subsist on a fortnight; thus may you live free, healthy, sincere, diligent, and honest: a man's time is not thrown away in learning to make this provision.

I am determin'd, therefore, that Emilius shall learn a trade. A creditable one to be sure! you will say. I should like to know the meaning of that word. Is not every employment creditable that is useful; I would not have him learn to be an embroiderer, a gilder, or varnisher, like the fine gentleman of Mr Locke: I would have him neither a fiddler, a player, nor a pamphleteer. Except these professions, and a few of a similar nature, he might take his choice of all others; I would confine him to nothing. I had much rather he should be a cobbler than a poet; that he should learn to pave the highway, than enamel or paint the flowers on china. But, you will say, spies, bailiffs followers, and even hangmen, are useful people in their way. That they are so, is the fault of government, which might render them useless: but to give up this point,

I was indeed mistaken; it is not enough to fix on a trade useful to society, it should be such a one as doth not require those who exercise it to be possessed of those detestable qualities of mind which are incompatible with humanity. We will recur, therefore, to the term you made use of, and chuse a creditable employment; always remembering, however, that nothing should be called creditable that is not at the same time useful.

A celebrated modern author, whose books are full of extensive projects and confined views, made the vows of chastity, like other priests of his communion, and had therefore no wife of his own. Being a little more scrupulous, also, in having to do with the wives of others than many of his profession, it is said, he chose to have pretty servant-maids, with whose assistance he endeavoured to repair, as well as possible, the wrong he had done his species by entering into such rash engagements. He looked upon it as a duty incumbent on a citizen to provide children for the state; and with the tribute he paid of this kind, he peopled the class of artificers. As soon as his children were arrived at a proper age, he put them all to some profession agreeable to their inclinations; excepting against those only which were idle, frivolous, or subject to the fashion; such, for example, as is that of a peruke-maker, which is not at all necessary, and may some time or other become useless, unless nature, indeed, should take it into her head not to furnish our heads with hair.

By these views should we be conducted in chusing a trade for Emilius; or rather, we ought to

to leave that choice entirely to him; as the maxims he hath already imbibed, giving him a natural contempt for things that are useless, he will never think of throwing away his time in an unprofitable employment; and he judges of their being profitable by their real utility: he would chuse a trade that might have been of use to Robinson Crusoe in his desert island.

By giving a child a successive view of the various productions of nature and art, by exciting his curiosity and tracing its tendency, we may be enabled to study his taste, inclinations, and propensities; to discover the first spark of his genius, if he have one of any particular turn. But it is a common error, which you ought carefully to avoid, that of attributing to the warmth of genius the mere effect of opportunity, and to construe into an inclination for a particular art, that spirit of imitation which is as common to the ape as to the human species, and leads him mechanically to do what he sees done by others, without knowing very well to what purpose. The world is full of artifans, and particularly of artists, who have no natural talents for the arts they profess, to which they have been trained from their infancy, either from motives of convenience, or from some apparent zeal which had operated as well in favour of any other art, had the same opportunities offered of seeing it exercised. One youth hears the beat of a drum, and conceives himself born to be a general; another sees the masons at work, and immediately forms the design of being an architect. Every one is tempted to make choice of
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that profession which offers itself, and appears to be held in esteem.

I knew an instance in a footboy, who, from seeing his master design and paint pictures, took it in his head to be a limner and history-painter. From the moment he formed this resolution, he took up the crayon, which he laid down only to assume the pencil, and this he will never quit while he lives. Without rules, without instructions, he set himself down to design every thing that fell in his way. Three whole years did he sit poring over his wretched daubings, getting nothing but his labour for his pains, and yet without being disgusted at the little progress his mediocrity of talents permitted him to make. I remember to have seen him, for six months together in a very hot summer, sitting, or rather nailed to his chair, in a little antichamber open to the south, before a globe, of which he was attempting to draw the figure on canvass; beginning, rubbing out, and beginning again, with the most invincible obstinacy, till at last he hit off the rotundity of the sphere to his satisfaction.

By the directions of an artist, and the patronage of his master, he at length so far succeeded as to throw off his livery, and live by the pencil. Perseverance supplied his want of talents to a certain degree; having attained this, he could never go farther. The spirit of emulation and resolution of this honest lad are commendable: he will be ever esteemed for his assiduity, fidelity, and good behaviour; but he will never rise in his profession higher than to the merit of a sign-painter. Who is there that has not been misled by his inclinations,

clinations, and mistaken them for real abilities? There is a considerable difference between being pleased with any occupation, and being capable of it. It requires much nicer observation than is generally imagined, to ascertain the taste and genius of children: their casual inclinations display themselves oftener than their innate dispositions; and we judge from the first, for want of knowing how to study the last. I wish some judicious hand would give us a treatise on the art of studying children; an art of the greatest importance to be acquainted with, though fathers and preceptors know not as yet even its simple elements.

But, perhaps, we here make the choice of our employment of too great consequence. As it relates only to some handicraft business, Emilius need not hesitate, he hath already served half his apprenticeship in the exercises to which he has been accustomed. He is ready to turn his hand to whatever you may require of him; he knows how to handle the spade and the hoe, to make use of the mallet, the plane, and the file; the tools of all kinds of workmen are familiar to him. All that he needs farther is to acquire the same dexterity and facility in the use of them, as a good artist in that peculiar branch to which he may apply. To this end, also, he hath a great advantage above most other children, in the agility of his body and the suppleness of his limbs, by means of which he can throw himself into any attitude, and continue any kind of exercise for a long time without tiring. Add to this, that his senses are acute and experienced, and all the mechanism of the
arts

arts already known to him. To turn the work out of his hands like a master, he requires nothing but practice; and practice is to be gained only by time. All that we have to do, therefore, is to determine what kind of mechanic employment we shall bestow so much time on, as to make ourselves expert in the exercise of it.

Let every man apply himself to one that is becoming his sex and age. A close and sedentary profession, which enervates the body, will neither please nor be proper for youth. No one ever yet naturally aspired to be a taylor; artificial motives are required to induce our sex, for whom such business was never designed, to embrace so effeminate an employment *. The sword and the needle are not made for the same hands. Were I a sovereign, I would permit none but women, or maimed and deformed persons, to follow any such kind of trade. On the supposition that eunuchs are necessary, I think the Turks very great fools for making them on purpose. Why do not they content themselves with such as are impotent by nature; selecting them from that herd of dispirited, cowardly mortals, whose mutilated hearts render them unfit for the more manly offices of life; society hath a use for all others. Every feeble, timid, and delicate male, is condemned by his constitution to a sedentary life; he is formed to live among the females; or at least after their manner. Let such be early initiated into the mysteries of the taylor, the mantua-maker, and other professions of the like

* There were no taylors among the ancients, the cloaths of the men being made at home by the women of the family.

like nature; and if it be absolutely necessary to have real eunuchs, let those only be made such who dishonour their sex by their voluntary application to such unbecoming employments. Their very choice sufficiently indicates the error of nature; in correcting it therefore, either one way or the other, you can do no harm.

I prohibit my pupil following any unhealthy business; but not those which are laborious, or even dangerous. The latter exercise at once both his strength and his courage; they are proper for the men only, the women making no pretensions to them: how comes it then the men are not ashamed to encroach on those properly exercised by the women?

*Luctantur pauca, comedunt colliphia pauca.
Vos lanam trahitis, calathisque peracta refertis
Vellera *.*

In Italy no women are to be seen serving in the shops, which give the streets a very dull and heavy appearance to those who have been accustomed to the gay and lively figure they make in France and England. When I see your haberdashers and man-milliners, measuring out lace, ribbons, and gauze to the ladies; I cannot help thinking such elegant commodities appear very ridiculous in those clumsy fists, which would be with greater propriety employed in blowing a smith's bellows, or at the labours of the anvil. I should think, that, in such countries, the women ought by way of reprisals to turn sword-cutlers and gunsmiths. Let each sex manufacture

* Juven. sat. 2.

ture and vend the arms peculiar to itself. To understand them well, it is requisite we should know how to employ them.

I would have a young man learn to exert a strong arm; to handle the axe and the saw; to square a piece of unhewn timber, to mount the roof of a house, to lay on the ridge, and to fit the joists and scantlings. Would it be more ridiculous in him, while thus employed, to call out to his sister to come and assist him in his labour, than for her to bid him sit down to her needlework?

I perceive I have already said too much for my polite and delicate contemporaries; but I sometimes permit myself to be hurried away by the force of my own arguments. Thus far, however, is certain, that if any man whatever be ashamed of being seen to handle a plane, or wear a leather apron in public, he is only a slave to prejudice, one that would be ashamed of the most commendable actions, if they were ridiculed as unfashionable. We may give up, nevertheless, to the prepossessions of parents, whatever be not injurious to the understanding of the child. It is not necessary to exercise indiscriminately such professions as are useful, merely to do honour to them all; it is sufficient not to hold any one in less esteem than it deserves. When we are at liberty to make our choice, and have no other motives to determine us, why may we not consult our own inclination and convenience, in chusing among professions of the same rank? The manufacture of hardware is useful, perhaps the most useful of all others; and yet, without some particular reason for it, I should not make
your

your son a brazier or a blacksmith; I should not like to see him, at the forge, resemble the figure of a Cyclops: neither would I make him a mason or bricklayer, and still much less a shoemaker. Somebody, doubtless, must be of those trades; but he who can make choice of which he pleases, ought to have some regard to cleanliness and neatness: these do not depend on caprice, but affect our senses. Add to this, I should not like any of those stupid professions, in the exercise of which the workmen need neither industry nor ingenuity; but, like mere machines, employ their hands constantly in the same manner. Such are cloath and stocking weavers, stone-sawers, and the like. To what purpose should a man of any understanding be put to such trades, wherein the workman and his engine are only one machine moving another.

All things duly considered, the trade I should like best my pupil should have a taste for, is that of a joiner. This is neat, useful, and may be carried on within doors: it is sufficiently laborious to keep the body in exercise, and requires both diligence and dexterity: at the same time, taste and elegance are not excluded from being displayed on the form and contrivance of the work.

If it should so happen, indeed, that your pupil has a natural turn for the speculative sciences, I should not blame you for teaching him a mechanic art conformable to his inclinations; let him learn, for example, to design and construct mathematical instruments, quadrants, telescopes, and the like.

When Emilius learns a trade, I also will learn

it with him; for I am convinced he will never learn, as should be, what we do not learn together. We will, therefore, both serve an apprenticeship; not affecting to be treated as gentlemen, but as real apprentices who are not trifling with a profession: nay, why should we not be so in reality? Czar Peter worked as a common ship-carpenter in the yard, and served as a drummer in his own troops: do you think that prince was not your equal, at least either in birth or merit? The reader will observe, I do not ask Emilius this question, but put it to every one, of whatever rank he may happen to be.

Unfortunately we cannot spend all our time at the work-bench; as we do not only apprentice ourselves to the profession of a joiner, but to that of man, the latter of which is by much the most tedious and difficult to learn. What then shall we do? Shall we hire a master-joiner, for an hour in a day, as we do the dancing-master? No: that would not be making ourselves his apprentices, but his scholars; and our ambition is not so much to learn the trade, as to raise ourselves to the condition of a joiner. I am therefore of opinion that we should go once or twice a-week, at least, and spend the whole day at his shop; that we should rise at his hour in the morning, that we should be at our work before him, that we should eat at his table, work according to his orders, and, after having had the honour of supping with his family, return, if we pleased, to sleep on our own hard mattresses. Thus you see how we might learn several trades at once, and exercise ourselves with

manual

manual labour, without neglecting our other accomplishments.

Be simple in well-doing. Let us not encourage vanity by the means we are taking to destroy it. To take a pride in having overcome prejudice, is to submit to it. It is said, that from an ancient custom peculiar to the Ottoman race, the Grand Signior is obliged to practise some mechanical employment, and every one knows the superior merit of such workmanship: a prince can turn nothing out of his hands but a masterpiece. These curious productions of his ingenuity he distributes about magnificently to the grandees of the court, and the work is paid for according to the quality of the workman. The real evil of this custom is not in the pretended imposition of it, against which some have so loudly exclaimed. This, on the contrary, is a benefit. For in thus obliging the bashaws and other petty tyrants of his empire to divide with him the spoils of the people, the prince is excused from doing it directly himself. This is a necessary relief to despotism, without which that horrible mode of government could not possibly subsist.

The real inconvenience of such a custom lies in the idea it gives the poor wretch of his princely merit. Like Midas, he sees every thing he touches changed into gold; but perceives not the long ears sprouting out and exposing the ass. To preserve Emilius from being exposed in the like manner, we shall not give him any such valuable talent; the price of his labour shall not depend on the workman, but on the work. We shall never suffer him to judge of

the merit of his workmanship, but by comparing it with that of the best artisans. Of any thing that is well executed, we may say to him, *This is well made*; but it will be wrong to add, *Who made it*? And if he should ever himself add, with an air of triumph and satisfaction, *It was I that made it*, it will be requisite to answer coldly, *Whether you, or any body else, it is no matter; the work is very well done*.

Let every careful and well-meaning mother guard against the impositions to which she may be liable in respect to the improvement of her child. If her son pretends to much knowledge, let her distrust every thing he affects to know: if he has the misfortune to be rich, and to be educated at Paris, he is undone. So long as he is in the midst of able artists, he will be possessed of all their talents; but, when he is at a distance from them, he will have none at all. At Paris, a man who is rich knows every thing; there is nobody ignorant there that is not poor. That capital is full of pretended connoisseurs, and superficial judges, of both sexes. I know but three honourable exceptions amongst the men, though there may be more: but I know not of one among the women, and I much doubt that there is really any. In general, a name is acquired in the arts as in the law; we may become artists, and judge of artists, as readily as to take up a degree in the civil law, and become a magistrate.

If, therefore, it should ever become fashionable to be master of some mechanic art, your children

children would soon be expert at it, without taking the trouble to learn: they would pass masters of arts, like the counsellors of Zurich. I will admit of no mere ceremonies of this kind with Emilius; he shall make no appearances, but always possess the reality. He shall not talk of what he knows, but continue to improve himself in silence. He shall be always employed about a masterpiece, without ever setting up for a master; and be known for a workman only by his labour, and not by what he professes.

If I have hitherto made myself understood, the reader will perceive, that, while I have accustomed my pupil to corporeal exercise and manual labour, I have given him insensibly a taste for reflection and meditation; in order to counterbalance that indolence which would be the natural result of his indifference for the opinions of mankind and the tranquillity of his passions. It is necessary that he work like a peasant, and think like a philosopher, lest he become as idle as a savage. The great secret of education is, to make the exercises of the body and the mind serve as a relaxation to each other.

Let us beware, however, of anticipating those instructions which require a riper judgment. Emilius will not be long a workman before he becomes sensible in himself of that inequality of conditions which he at first barely perceived. Hence, proceeding on the maxims I have laid down, he will be disposed, in turn, to examine me. In receiving every thing from me, and seeing himself so little removed from a state of

poverty, he will be curious to know wherefore I appear to be so rich. Taking me unprovided on this head, he may put some very knotty questions. *You are rich*, he might say; *you have told me so, and I see it. But a rich man owes his labours to society in his quality as man; and of what public utility are yours?* What answer a polite tutor might make to such a question, I know not. He might probably be ridiculous enough to talk to him of the nature and importance of his services in taking care of his education. As for me, the joiner's work-shop affords me an apology; I might, therefore, put off the question thus. *A very pertinent query, Emilius; and I promise to answer it, on my part, when you can make a satisfactory reply to it on your own. In the mean time, I shall take care to give my superfluity to you and the poor, and to make a table or bench every week, that I may not be quite useless to the public.*

Thus are we again returned to ourselves. Behold my pupil, just ready to throw off a state of infancy, recur again to himself, and perceive more than ever that necessity he lies under to circumstances and things. After having set out with the exercise of his body and its organs, we proceeded to that of his genius and understanding, and have at length united the use of his limbs with that of his faculties. We have succeeded in the formation of an active, thinking being; to complete the man, we have nothing more to do than to render him affectionate and susceptible; that is to say, to perfect his reason by sentiment. But before we enter upon this new disposition of things, let us
take

take a retrospect of that we are about to leave, and trace, as exactly as possible, how far we have proceeded. Our pupil had at first only sensations, at present he has ideas; he once did nothing but perceive, he can now form a judgment of things. It is from the comparison made between several successive or simultaneous sensations, and the judgment formed thereon, that a kind of complex or mixed sensation arises, which I call an idea.

The peculiar manner in which we form ideas, is that which constitutes the genius and character of the mind. To form our ideas of things on their actual relations only, betokens a solid understanding; whereas, to be contented with their apparent relations, betrays a superficial one. To conceive these relations, as they really exist, displays a right judgment; to conceive mistaken notions of them, denotes a wrong one. Those who see imaginary relations, that have neither reality nor appearance, are madmen; while those who make no comparison between them, are idiots. The less or greater aptitude to compare these ideas, and discover such relations, is what constitutes a greater or less degree of genius and understanding.

Simple ideas are only the result of comparative sensations. A judgment is to be formed from simple as well as from complex sensations; and this I call a simple idea. In judging of our sensations, the judgement is merely passive; it deduces only the perception of what is immediately perceived. But in the ideas arising from those sensations, the judgement is active; it collects, compares, and determines those relations which

which the senses could not. This is all the difference, but this is very considerable. Nature never deceives us; we are always deceived by ourselves.

A child eight years old, hath some freezing milk set before him. He puts the spoon up to his mouth, without knowing what it is; and no sooner doth the ice touch his lips, than he cries out, *he is burnt*. He feels a very acute sensation, and knowing none more sharp and painful than that of heat, he imagines that to be the cause. He is nevertheless mistaken; the sudden cold may hurt, but it does not burn him; nor are the sensations of heat and cold alike, those who are more accustomed to both never confounding them together. It is not the sensation, therefore, that deceives him, but the judgement he forms of it.

We are liable to the same kind of deception the first time we see a mirror, or make use of any optical machine; when we go into a vault in the depth of winter, or in the height of summer; when we put a very warm or cold hand into water of a middle temperature; or when we hold a round ball between the finger and the thumb of each hand held crosswise. Should we content ourselves, in any of these cases, with declaring simply what we perceive or feel, the judgment would be merely passive; but when we judge of the thing itself by its appearance, the judgment is active, it compares, and reasons on those relations which are not perceived, and thence we become liable to deception. It is from experience only we learn to prevent, or correct, such errors.

Shew your pupil in the night the clouds passing

sing over the moon, and he will at first think the moon moves the contrary way, and that the clouds stand still. He will conclude so from a precipitate induction, because he is more accustomed to see little objects move than great ones, and the clouds appear to him much bigger than the moon, of whose distance he cannot judge. When standing still in a ship in full sail, he views the shore at a small distance, he falls into a contrary error; the trees and houses on the beach appearing to move, because not perceiving his own motion, he conceives the ship and the sea as one immoveable object, of which the less objects on shore are only a part.

The first time a child sees a stick plunged half-way into the water, he sees it broken; he is not deceived by his sensation, which is a true one, and would be so were we even ignorant of the cause of this phænomenon. If you ask him, therefore, what he sees, he will tell you a broken stick; and it is very true, for it is very certain such is the object of his perception. But if, deceived by his judgment, he should go farther; and, after having affirmed that he sees a broken stick, maintain that what he sees is actually such, or that the stick so placed in the water is really broken, he would then maintain a falsehood. And why so? Because then his judgment becomes active; he judges not from immediate inspection, but rational deduction, in affirming what he does not perceive, *viz.* that the conception suggested by one sense would be confirmed by another.

All our mistakes thus arising from error in judgment, it is clear, that, if we were under

no necessity of judging, we should have no occasion to learn any thing; we should never be liable to be deceived, and should be much happier in our ignorance than we can be in our knowledge. We do not deny that the learned know a thousand things to be true, of which the ignorant will never know any thing. Are the learned, therefore, nearer the truth in general? Quite the contrary: the more they advance, the farther off they find themselves; because the vanity of judging of things making greater progress than our abilities to judge, we form an hundred erroneous conclusions for one that is just. Nothing is more evident than that the learned societies of Europe are public schools of falsehood; and it is very certain that the academy of sciences have adopted more errors than are to be found among the whole nation of Hurons.

Since our errors thus increase with our knowledge, the only method to avoid error is to remain in ignorance. So long as you suspend your judgment, you will not be deceived. This lesson is inculcated by nature, as well as authorised by reason. If we except a very few of those striking relations, which things immediately bear to ourselves, we have naturally a very great indifference for all the rest. A savage will not step a foot out of his way to view the mechanism of the finest machine, or the most astonishing phenomenon of electricity. *What is it to me?* is a phrase the most familiar with the ignorant, and the most proper for the learned.

Unhappily, however, this phrase is now useless. Every thing is something to us, since we

are

are become dependent on all things; and our curiosity necessarily extends with our desires. For this reason I attribute great curiosity to a philosopher, and none at all to a savage. The latter stands in need of nobody; and the former of every one, and particularly of numerous admirers.

Will it be said that I here deviate from nature? I deny it. Natural maxims; it is true, are founded on necessity, and not opinion; but our necessities vary with our situations. There is great deal of difference between the natural man in a state of solitude, and the natural man in a state of society. Emilius is not a savage, destined to prowl in the woods, but to inhabit towns and cities. It is requisite for him, therefore, to know how to manage his fellow-citizens, and to live among, if not like them.

Amidst the variety of connections and dependencies of such a state, he will be under a necessity of forming various judgments concerning them; let us instruct him, therefore, to judge of them aright.

The best way to effect this, is that which tends to reduce our experience to bare matters of fact, and enable us even to proceed, though wanting such experience, without falling into error. Hence it follows, that, after we have long accustomed ourselves to explain and confirm the evidence of one sense by another, we should further learn to verify the testimony of each sense by itself, without having recourse to the others; by which means every sensation will stand in the place of an idea, and that idea will be always conformable to truth. Such are the
acquire-

acquirements which I have pointed out for this third stage of human life.

This manner of proceeding, I own, requires a degree of patience and circumspection of which few tutors are capable, and without which the pupil will never learn to judge properly. If, for example, when the latter is deceived in the appearance of the broken stick, you are in haste to convince him of his error, by precipitately taking it out of the water, you may undeceive him, it is true; but what will you teach him by it? Nothing but what he would soon have as well learned of himself. This, therefore, is not the thing you are to do. The point aimed at is less to teach him what is actually and particularly true, than to teach him how to discover the truth in general, or at any other time. To instruct him properly on this occasion, therefore, you should not undeceive him so soon. Let Emilius and his tutor serve for your example.

In the first place, I suppose that a child educated in the ordinary manner, on being asked if the stick be broken, will readily answer in the affirmative. I very much doubt, however, if Emilius will be so ready to determine it. As he sees no necessity either to be or to appear knowing, he is in no haste to judge of the matter: his judgment of things is founded on evidence; and he who so well knows how liable we are to deception in the objects of sight, is very far from thinking the evidence in the present case sufficient. Add to this, that knowing from experience that the most frivolous questions I put to him have always some material object, though not immediately perceived, he is not used to reply

reply carelessly and without thinking. On the contrary, he is suspicious and attentive, examining such questions very carefully before he ventures to answer them. Hence he never makes me a reply that he is not well satisfied with himself, and it is no easy matter to satisfy him in this particular. In a word, neither he nor I pique ourselves on knowing the truth of this, but only in not falling into error. We should be much more ashamed of sitting down satisfied with an insufficient reason for a thing, than of our incapacity to find any reason for it all. *I do not know*, is an answer so satisfactory to both, and which we repeat so often, that it now costs us nothing. But, whether such an absurd affirmative should escape, or he should avoid it by our convenient negative, *I do not know*, my reply to him would still the same: our way should be to look and examine.

The stick, half immersed in water, stands, we will suppose, in a vertical position: to know whether it be really broken as it appears, we have many things to do before we take it out of the water, or even touch it with the hand.

In the first place, we should move round the stick, and in so doing we should see the apparent fracture turn with us; the eye appearing to occasion the change; but it is well known our looks cannot alter the form of the stick.

Secondly, We should look down it from end to end, in which case we should not see it broken or crooked. But can our eye have reunited or straitened it.

Thirdly, I would give the water an undulating motion, when we should see the apparent fracture

ture take different sides, the stick appearing to bend backwards and forwards with the motion of the water. Now, can we think the motion given to the water sufficient to break, soften, or bend the stick?

Fourthly, we take and pour out the water; by doing which we see the stick become gradually whole and streight in proportion as the water decreases. Can any thing farther be required to explain the nature of this fact, and lead us to the discovery of the refraction? It is not true, therefore, that the sight deceives us, since we have no need to use any other sense to rectify those errors we attribute to it.

But suppose a child so great a blockhead, as not to perceive the result of these experiments; in such a case it will be proper to call in the touch to the assistance of the sight. Instead, however, of taking the stick out of the water, let it remain some time in the same situation, and let the child carry his hand down it from the top to the bottom, by doing which he will find there is no angle, the stick is not bent or broken.

You will tell me, perhaps, this is not simply forming a judgment of things, but reasoning on them in form. It is very true; but do not you see plainly, that as soon as we arrive at ideas, to form a judgment of any thing is to reason upon it?

The consciousness of a sensation is a proposition, an opinion; and as soon as we compare one sensation with another, we reason. The arts of judging and reasoning are one and the same.

Emilius can never learn dioptrics, if I cannot teach it him by means of this stick. He shall not, to this end, dissect insects, or count the spots

spots in the sun; he shall not even know the use of microscopes and telescopes. More polite and learned pupils may possibly laugh at his ignorance; for before he knows how to make use of these things, I purpose that he shall invent them; and this you doubt if he will compass so soon.

You see here the spirit that governs my system. If a child holding a little ball between the fingers crosswise, imagines he holds two, I would not permit him to look, before he had otherwise convinced himself that he held but one.

These explanations, I imagine, will suffice to denote precisely the progress of my pupil's understanding, and the route he hath taken. But you are alarmed, perhaps, at the multitude of objects which have been presented him. You are afraid his understanding should be depressed or bewildered by such a variety of knowledge. On the contrary, however, I have taught him to be ignorant of many more things than he knows. I have opened for him a way to science, smooth and easy indeed, but long, extensive, and tedious. I have instructed him at his first setting out, that he might know the entrance; but I shall never permit him to go very far.

Obliged to learn of himself, he makes use of his own reason, and not of that of others; for to give no influence to prepossession, no weight should be given to authority: and it is certain that our errors arise less from ourselves than from others. From this continual exercise of the understanding will result a vigour of mind, like to that which is acquired by the body from constant labour and fatigue. Another advantage is, that we advance in knowledge only in proportion to

our capacity of digesting it. The mind may be overloaded as well as the body. But when the understanding makes every thing perfectly clear and familiar before it commits it to the memory, whatever it deduces thence afterwards, is properly its own: whereas in overcharging the mind with the remembrance of a heap of confused ideas, we expose ourselves to the inconvenience of never recollecting any thing that can properly be called our own.

Emilius has but little knowledge; but what he has, is truly his own; he knows nothing by halves. Among the few things he knows, and with which he is well acquainted, the most important is, that there are many things he is now ignorant of, which he may one day know; that there are many more which others know, and he will never be acquainted with; and that there is an infinity of others which neither he nor any body else will ever know. He possesses an universal capacity, not in point of actual knowledge, but in the faculties of acquiring it; an open, intelligent genius, adapted to every thing, and, as Montaigne says, if not instructed, capable of receiving instruction. It is sufficient for me that he knows how to discover the utility of his actions, and the reason for his opinions. Once again, I say, my object is not to furnish his mind with science, but to teach him the method of acquiring it when he has occasion for it; to instruct him how to hold it in estimation; and to inspire him, above all, with a love for truth. By this method, indeed, we make no great advances; but then we never take an useless step, nor are we obliged to turn back again.

Emilius

A TREATISE of EDUCATION. 389

Emilius is acquainted with no other science than that which is merely physical. He knows not even the name of history, nor what is meant by metaphysics and morality. He hath studied the essential relations between men and things; but no moral relations between man and man. He is ill qualified to generalise his ideas, or form abstract notions of things; contenting himself with observing the general qualities of certain bodies, without reasoning on those qualities themselves. He has a notion of abstract space, by the help of geometrical figures; and of abstract quantity, by means of the signs in algebra. Those figures and signs, however, are the support of those abstractions, on which he rests without seeking any further. He does not endeavour to find out the essence of things, or what they are in their own nature; but only their relations, and particularly those in which he is interested. He holds nothing external in estimation, but from its relation to himself; but then the degree of this estimation is very just and exact. The caprice of custom, or general agreement, stamp no value on any thing with him. He holds that in the highest estimation which is the most useful; and, never departing from this method of estimating the value of things, pays no regard to fancy or prepossession. Emilius is laborious, temperate, patient, resolute, and bold. His imagination never exaggerates danger; he is susceptible of few evils; and knows how to suffer with patience, because he has never learned to contend against destiny. With respect to death, he is hardly sensible what it is; but, accustomed to yield without resistance

resistance to necessity, when it is his lot to die, he will submit to his fate without murmur or complaint.

This is the utmost that our nature will permit in that dreadful moment. To live independent and unattached to life by human connections, is the best way to learn to die.

In a word, Emilius is virtuous in every thing relating to himself. To possess the social virtues also, he only requires to be made acquainted with those relations that give rise to them; he only wants that information, which his mind is already formed to receive.

At present he considers himself as entirely unconnected with others. He requires nothing of any one, and thinks no one hath a right to require any thing of him. He stands alone, and independent, in the midst of society. Indeed his pretensions to independency are better founded than those of any other; as he is in himself very thing man is capable of being, at his age. He lies under no errors but those which are inevitable: he has no vices but such as no mortal was ever free from. He hath an healthy constitution, agility of body, perspicuity of mind, and a dispassionate heart. Self-love, the first and most natural of all the passions, as yet hardly exerts itself. Without disturbing the repose of others, he has hitherto lived as content, happy, and free, as was possible for his nature. Do you think a youth thus arrived at his fifteenth year, hath misemployed the term of his infancy?

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